ARRIVING IN KOREA

I flew from the United States as a military replacement for the 8th Army, first to Tokyo International airport, then by ship, landing at Inchon, South Korea, in the aftermath of  Gen MacArthur’s historically successful Marine Corps landing there to cut off the North Korean Army from its rear. That was followed by the ‘Breakout’ of the Pusan Perimeter in the south by the 8^th Army, led by Task Force Lynch – the 3d Battalion, 7^th US Cavalry Regiment, which overran trapped North Korean units all the way to Seoul before crossing the 38^th Parallel border between North and South and continuing on the historic ‘Invasion Route’ north from Seoul.

I was luckily assigned as a replacement officer to the famed 1^st Cavalry Division, which then assigned me to the legendary 7^th Cavalry – Custer’s old outfit – and the 7^th Cav assigned me further to Company K, 3d Battalion, 7^th Cav. Which, interestingly enough was the lead company, commanded by Captain John Flynn in the breakout, with the deepest 24 hour penetration into enemy territory in American military history – 114 miles.

As it turned out I could not have been assigned to a better US Army Division, US Army Regiment, Battalion, and Rifle Company for an inexperienced 2d Lieutenant who never had the chance even to go through the Basic Infantry Officers Course – which was routine for all Infantry-Branch 2d Lieutenants prior to, and after, the Class of ’50 -  before I was plunged into combat.

I had to catch up with the Cav Division from Inchon, for the entire 8^th Army had pushed north past the 38^th parallel border very rapidly after the backbone of the North Korean Army was broken. It was at the Yalu River 200 miles north by the end of November. I had Thanksgiving dinner at a Replacement Company in Pyongyang, the Capital of North Korea which had been overrun by the 1^st Cav.

I then caught up with the 7^th Cav near Kuna-Ri just as it had stopped, encamped, and been put into 8th Army Reserve for a breather while the 8^th and 5^th Cav Regiments pushed patrols onto the actual Yalu River’s edge that marked the border between North Korea and China.

My first exposure to the actual fighting soldiers and officers of the 7^th Cav came after daylight after we offloaded from a 2 ½ ton truck in the dark and slept in a large windy tent with several other replacement officers. We would be taken to our company units the next day. It was cold, but not severely – yet. I had my issue down-filled sleeping bag which I had been warned not to get wet by the supply sergeant who handed it to me back at the Replacement company in Pyongyang, lest it would lose its ability to retain body warmth.

That was one of the most important pieces of Army equipment ever issued for the Korean War. In fact a retired Infantry Chinese Colonel who fought against our 1^st Cavalry Division, said 50 years later to me – translated by my Chinese daughter in law “You had better sleeping bags than we did.” True. For the entire American 8^th Army was about to experience one of the severest Korean Peninsula winters on record.

The Garry Owen

While waiting for the administrative staff to take us to our assigned companies that November 26^th, 1950, I was able to stand by and watch a pretty large 7^th Cav Regimental Review and Awards Ceremony, with a Color Guard out in front of the ranks of the men who were to be decorated. Col Billy Harris, the 7^th Cav Regimental Commander drove up in his jeep which had a western horse saddle across the hood. And a big metal 7^th Cav  emblem on the front bumper. Col Harris, shorter than most of the men, wore a very long insulated and lined overcoat that came all the way down to his boot tops. He wore a Pile Cap with, with his colonel’s rank eagle insignia on its front. He had a cane.

Colonel William 'Billy' Harris, Commander of the 7th Cav Regiment in Korea

Before he went out to accompany Gen Gay making the awards he held up, for a photographer, a captured Korean or Chinese horn that I learned soon enough, was blown by the enemy during attacks.

The 1^st Cav Division Commander Major General G Gay was driven up next, for he would actually pin the awards on the soldier’s uniforms.

This was a rare formal ceremony in the field in the midst of a war, with all who attended armed and in their battle dress. I learned it was the first chance commander Col Billy Harris had to address his troops since the 7^th Cav landed in Korea July 22d, four months before, before bitterly defending the Pusan Perimeter, and then attacking north the entire 400 mile length of the Korean Peninsula.

Harris made a stirring speech recounting the accomplishments of the 7^th Cav, and paid tribute to those killed in action.

And while the Adjutant read off the citations, General Gay pinned Silver Stars on the field jackets of a number of the troopers, and Bronze Stars with V/Device (for Valor) on others. Then Chaplain Griepp read the 23d Psalm, a bugler sounded Taps, and another chaplain read off the names of the dead soldiers who were receiving posthumous awards for their bravery.

The men were not turned out with polished boots or particularly clean and pressed field jackets or pants – they were combat soldiers right off the line – which they would go back to as soon as the ceremony was over. They had their Steel Helmets on, some had 1^st Cavalry patches on their jackets, some were in brown leather combat boots, others wore something strange to me, insulated ‘shoe-pac’ boots.

Watching that ceremony and listening to those citations for combat awards for what those men, living and dead were being cited for, I got an unexpected introduction into the ‘Garry Owen’ – the motto, the song, the name and  reputation – most associated with the 7^th United States Cavalry. It was not an ‘elite’ unit, and in fact was a boots on the ground, not horse, cavalry unit which it was throughout WWII. But General McArthur chose the 7th Cavalry to parade down Tokyo's main avenue after the Japanese surrender. By the Vietnam War it was 'air'cavalry. But it had pride based on its military history – which is what I knew was a valuable asset for men’s morale in war. It was exactly the kind of unit I wanted to be part of, and if I made it, to command in it at a higher level that Rifle Platoon.

Next Korea(2)

The regimental and battalion staffs were so busy that day of the Regimental Ceremony, they didn’t get around to getting we replacements to our units until after dark and we had eaten the rations they had for us.

The temporary encampment of the 7th Cav near Kuna-Ri was hardly like a stateside Army post. It was all tents from soldier pup-tents to larger ones, trucks small and large. And all three Infantry battalions, the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, and the various headquarters and supply companies were bivouacked in clusters, with a well guarded outer perimeter. About 5,000 men.

The defeated North Korean Army threat was so slight by this time, the Regiment was not even worried about long range Artillery fire hitting their camp. If NK artillery had been a credible threat, no way would the Regiment have had a massed ceremony such as it did. Too tempting a target. But getting administrative 'office work' done was not easy under such cold and remote area conditions.

I vividly remember to this day when Company K’s First Sergeant led me to a small tent in the dark, where he said were Captain Flynn, the company commander and Lt Ryan, the executive officer.  When he asked permission to enter, someone said ‘Ok, Sergeant’ and he opened the flap to let me in. I saw a low-light Coleman lantern on a table, two wooden cots, and in them two figures on their backs inside their sleeping bags zipped up to their necks. They could see me standing there in the low light with my helmet on, wearing my Field Jacket with my duffle-bag hanging down from one shoulder and my .30 Caliber Carbine handing from the other.

The First Sergeant said ‘Sir this is Lieutenant Hughes, the replacement officer Battalion said we were going to get.”

Flynn thanked him and said ‘Welcome to Company K, Hughes. So you came from West Point?” He chuckled.

I said ‘Yes sir.’

And both he and the executive officer sort of guffawed, like they were sharing an inside joke. My heart sank. These sounded like they were non graduates who had some kind of ‘attitude’ against West Pointers, especially green lieutenants.

But then Flynn said “That’s alright. We will take all we can get.  I am assigning you to the Second Platoon, which has no officer platoon leader, just Sergeant Ingram, a good man.”

And with no more said, and nothing asked of me then, he said “First Sergeant, take Lieutenant Hughes down to the 2d Platoon and turn him over to Sergeant Ingram. I’ll see you in the morning. Goodnight.”

I answered “Yes sir” Saluted in the dark, turned and left with the First Sergeant.

I was at the beginning of my learning curve. I now ‘commanded’ a 40 man platoon of American soldiers.

The 2d Platoon, K Company, 7th Cav

On the short way to where Sgt Ingram's - a Sergeant First Class - SFC - pup tent was, the First Sergeant, who seemed pretty young to me said "Captain Flynn is a great company commander. He has a sense of humor. He is also from West Point."

That gave me a start, but that was settled. Sense of humor in the middle of the war that was never supposed to happen.

SFC Ingram was pretty lanky, seemed older than the First Sergeant. He was 32 and was a career soldier, who had enlisted during WWII.

He jumped up from his tent and saluted me and immediately was concerned for my welfare - like where was I going to sleep. He called out two men from their pup tents and sleeping bags - it was at least 9PM by now. They helped get another tent up for me.

I soon was sacked out in my own pup tent, sleeping bag, my dufflebag with the only personal belongings I had with me occupying the other half of the tent. About the only time I would, as an officer, share a pup tent would be with my platoon 'radio operator.' So critical is quick communications in combat, that I would soon have my platoon radio operator shadowing me where ever I went, day or night.

I slept until the noise of men getting up woke me about 5:30 am.

Before I even had a chance to warm up the can of ‘C Rations’ beans and coffee  and a tin of  fruit salad that constituted my breakfast, I was summoned to Captain Flynn’s ‘CP’ – company command post. Just a space with a wooden table near his tent.

The other three platoon leaders had been called together also. It was the first time I had to see who they were and what they looked like. And to see Captain Flynn and Lt Ryan, the exec, out of their sleeping bags.

Flynn was taller than I expected. From West Point he would have been a cadet in one of the ‘flanker’ companies. And solidly built. He was about 30 years old, it seemed. With a smiling Irish face.  I later learned he graduated in the Class of 1944 and saw the tail end of WWII in Europe.

Captain Flynn as he looked as Company K commander during summer on the Pusan Perimeter. Only picture I have of him in Korea.

Lt Ryan’s flaming red hair and sharp tongue was what struck people about him.   Maybe in his mid 20s.

The other two Rifle Platoon Leaders were Lt Richard Shanks and Master Sergeant Abaticio. I don’t remember the Weapons Platoon leader, a warrent officer. He made no impression on me even though he was there.

Shanks

The thing that struck me about Shanks from the beginning was that he was carrying a full sized obsolete Springfield Rifle instead of the .30 Caliber smaller Carbine that officer Platoon Leaders like me were issued normally - one of which which I was carrying on my back with the sling over my right shoulder. The 1903 Springfield which he was carrying was a WWI model which was made in quantity in 1944. It was not the same  semi-automatic M-1 Garand – which his men were carrying - same model M1 rifle I paraded with at West Point, and fired on the rifle range during Camp Buckner to earn my Expert Rifleman Badge.  I wondered why he carried that obsolete, bolt-action rifle.

I learned later three things about Shanks, already a 1st Lieutenant with some prior troop experience. He had come over from being stationed in Okinawa when the 8th Army was still locked into the Pusan Perimeter and short on manpower. He was given the 1st Platoon. He carried that bolt-action rifle for its renowned accuracy and near immunity from cold. It was taken off a dead North Korean soldier. It was his personal preference for his personal weapon.

I was thus introduced for the first time, up close, to the propensity of American soldiers - officers and men - to get their hands on weapons and equipment that they were comfortable with when the time came for deadly combat action. Even if they came from dead enemy troops. They have to be sure they will fire the same ammunition that is in the supply chain, but experienced soldiers want to fight with weapons that they think will protect them best while killing or wounding armed enemy soldiers and defending themselves.

I wondered, uneasily, what did Shanks find wrong with the .30 Caliber Carbine I was carrying and which was issued to him when he got to Korea.

It was no time for me to ask such questions as we gathered around Captain Flynn

I also later learned from Sgt Ingram that Shanks had won a Silver Star for his personal actions around Osan, South Korea, in September, destroying two Russian built T-34 Tanks manned by North Koreans, with just his Rifle Platoon and the newly arrived 3.5mm Rocket Launchers. He was already a seasoned and very respected officer among his men, which is the most important thing that counts in combat.

He also had an easy smile and often whistled happily as he walked.

Abaticio

When I saw MSGT Abaticio he was wearing only his field jacket, with his bare right hand stuffed into its pocket, while others wore pile lined coats, like me, that everyone were being issued in the arriving bitter cold. His left arm carried an M1 rifle with its sling over his shoulder The M1 was what  all his soldiers were issued and fought with. He always looked that way when I saw him later, no matter how cold it got. He too had had  been in many firefights all the way from the desperate defense days at Pusan to the breakout.. He had a reputation for being a rock of a platoon leader, even though only a Sergeant. Flynn was obviously quite satisfied with him as the 3d Platoon Leader. Abatecio was always serious-faced and kept to himself. His officer platoon leader had been killed during the Pusan Perimiter actions, and was never replaced.

Then Me, Combat Platoon Leader

Then there was me, with new uniforms, a brand new light .30 caliber M-1 Carbine on my shoulder, a yellow metal 2d Lieutenant’s bar on my right collar. I still had a set of metal crossed rifles – denoting Infantry – on my left collar which I got at West Point before graduation. An obvious ‘new guy.’  As soon as I could I replaced the crossed rifles with crossed Sabers – after all we were the 7th Cavalry, right? Even if we fought as Infantry. For heraldry and military tradition of famed units are kept as much intact by the US Army between wars. Soldiers are known by the Units they have served in.

At this time in that War, officers were still wearing metal insignia on their uniforms, rank on one collar, branch of service on the other. As well as on soft caps or, as in Korea, ear-flap pile caps as protection from the cold. It would be some time before those important symbols of rank were made of cloth, and dark - easily recognizable by other soldiers and officers up close, but not an inviting target by North Korean snipers. who knew well enough if they kill the leader, the unit will be weakened.

New Mission

The purpose of Flynn's meeting was to inform the Company that the Regiment had new orders, and it was to move into a forward assembly area further north, and prepare to go on line with other units to halt the enemy advancing. For the 8th Cav Regiment had been in contact with a new enemy force as it reached Unsan, and had taken tremendous number of casualties, one battalion was virtually overrun, and many prisoners were taken by the enemy. The new enemy seemed to be Chinese. We were also to watch for lost American soldiers scattered by the Chinese assault. We were to get ready to move out in 1 hour.

That was the first time – November 27th, 1950, that I heard the term ‘Chinese’ instead of ‘Korean’ with reference to the enemy in front of us. The entire world would know it soon - that China had massively entered the Korean War, and crossed the Yalu River international border to oppose the United Nations forces, especially the American Army and Marines.

I returned to my 2d Platoon area and passed the word. Sgt Ingram translated it into specific orders to everyone in the platoon. There were no upbeat faces or comments from my soldiers when they heard the news of their new mission. For this had been their only really good break in months, MacArthur had promised all the soldiers home ‘For Christmas’ it was getting damned cold, and now the 7th Cav was going back ‘into the line’ of fire and combat action, against a new enemy.

My Platoon's History

While we were waiting, after our 30 man platoon (which was supposed to have 40 men) got packed and ready to move out on trucks, Ingram and I talked. I learned two important things.

I learned that Captain Flynn had relieved - fired - the previous 1st Lieutenant, 2d platoon leader. I was his replacement. Sgt Ingram didn't venture an opinion why he was relieved and I never found out.

Then Ingram said that the 2d Platoon was not too well regarded by the rest of the company officers and NCOs. I asked why.

Ingrams’s answer surprised me. He said that at least half of the platoon were jail birds. That when the rifle companies at Fort Benning, Georgia were ‘levied’ to provide so many soldiers with such and such MOS’s (Military Occupational Specialties), to fill up what would become a newly formed 3d Battalion, 7th Cav which would be shipped to Korea, some company commanders - whose units were staying on at Benning - were understandably reluctant to provide their best men. They attempted to palm off their worst. So they went to Judges in Columbus, Georgia who were responsible for jailing their men for minor to more serious charges, and asked if the Judges could give their men a choice – stay in Jail or go to Korea. Several judges obviously agreed to make the offer.

So the Korean War helped empty the Columbus, Georgian and Phenix City, Alabama jails. And the 3d Battalion, 7th Cav, got a bunch of soldier jail-birds.

Then, over time, within Company K there seemed to have been requested shifts in men from one platoon to another, which is not unusual when men want to be near their buddy, or to get out from under an NCO or officer that they can't get along with. So the 2d Platoon was not left with the best men. It had become the "Jailbird" platoon. 

It became clear SFC Ingram and I had our work cut out for us. I was faced with my first 'commander' challenge. I wasn’t about to follow in the footsteps of my predecessor lieutentant who was fired.

I didn’t know much about field manual Infantry combat yet, but I knew quite a bit about leadership. I had spent the last 4 years at West Point learning it.

Next Korean War (3)

The 3d Battalion ‘Edge’

This is a good a place to tell why the 3d Battalion, 7^th Cavalry Regiment, in which I was to serve the rest of my year of combat in Korea, was a little different from the ‘older’ 1^st and 2d Battalions. And from a number of standpoints had an edge on the other two battalions. 

Now Infantry Battalions, whether they were in the 1^st Cavalry Division, or the 2d, 25th, or 7^th Divisions that also served in Korea, are pretty much identical – in organization, manpower, equipment and weapons, and distribution of skills among the 1,000 officers and men Each had three 200 man Rifle Companies,  a Weapons Company, with Heavy, Watercooled 30 caliber Machine Guns, and 81mm Mortars,  and a Headquarters Company. 5 Companies. Each, when they were available, headed by a Captain.

Infantry Regiments – such as the 7^th, 5^th, and 8^th Cavs are also usually similar – with 3 Infantry Battalions, a Heavy Weapons Company with larger 4.2 inch mortars, 75mm Recoilless Rifles, and heavy, water-cooled machine-gun sections, and usually supported by an Artillery Battalion with 105mm Canon to support the units of the Regiment.

But the conditions of training, equipment and leadership, of those ‘Regular Army’ units that exist at the outset of a war can greatly influence their success or failures and reputation – at the top, and among soldiers.

Post WWII War Deterioration

When the Korean War broke out – as a huge surprise to Washington, as well as the American Public – on the 25^th of June, 1950, both the Truman Administration and the Congress had, from the end of the War with Japan, let the Army deteriorate. Equipment was not modernized, troop training – which costs money - was de-emphasized. And manpower was reduced. In the Occupation Forces in Japan by 1950, including the 1^st Cavalry Division, had their fighting strengths reduced by fully 1/3d.

Now the method the Army command used to meet the Administration reduction of strength ordered was to cut one 1,000 man Battalion out of all three 1^st Cavalry Division Regiments. That reduced them, including the 7^th Cavalry – which had the honor bestowed on it by Gen Douglas McCarthur – of leading the 1^st parade in Tokyo after the surrender of the Japanese – to a two battalion 7^th Cav Regiment. The 1st and 2d Battalions.

Now that is more than just a matter of 1,000 men less Regimental over all strength. Its screws up the ‘triangular’ tactical organization the Army was based on and had succeeded brilliantly through WWII. In turn that is based upon the judgment that, while two squads per platoon, two platoon per company, two companies per battalion, two battalions per regiment, and two Regiments  per Division fight up front, one third should be held in reserve until the critical action demands its intervention – such as the last push to victory over a more linear enemy. And a way to give soldiers in 1/3d of the command a break from heavy combat. 

The 3d Battalion to the Rescue

So for manpower savings, the 7^th Cav had only two Infantry Battalions in each Regiment when the war broke out. As it was ordered to get ready to intervene in South Korea where the North Korean Army had already overrun the South Korean Army and mauled the first US Units of the 24^th Division that were thrown in, a Third Battalion was needed. To bring the 7^th Cav up to full designed strength.

The Army ordered Fort Benning, Georgia,  to organize a 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry in manpower, equipment, leadership and prepare it for shipping. Because the pool of officers at Fort Benning was large, the Chief of Staff of the Army was able to handpick the Battalion Commander – Lt Colonel Jim Lynch, West Point Class of 1938, who had commanded a battalion in WWII. He was a proven leader.

Lynch in turn selected his staff officers and four company commanders, Captain Flynn, Class of 1944 among them – for Company K - who had been teaching Infantry operations to officers at Fort Benning, and was well ‘up’ on tactics and operations.

That 'new' Battalion got in a little  badly needed unit training under experienced officers before it left for Korea.

So by July 23, 1950 the 3d Battalion arrived at Fort Stoneman, California, embarked with all its equipment, and sailed for Korea, arriving as a unit in Taegue, South Korea by the 26^th of August to join the 7^th Cavalry as an integral and badly needed, but untested, ‘3d’ Infantry battalion.

It even trained - took classes - on the troop ship that brought that Battalion to Taegue, South Korea. It never landed in Japan

The Problems for the 1^st and 2d Battalions

While the 1^st and 2d Battalions, having been occupation troops in Japan, had a large number of their WWII experienced NCOs stripped from them to reinforce the battered 24^th Division already in Korea. So their commanders and staff were just from those remaining in Japan. Their units had not been able to do any serious Infantry across-ground training in Japan for two reasons – they were not permitted to cross rice paddies badly needed to be planted for an national economy in shambles. And a severe set of storms had drowned much arable land. They were just 'occupation troops'  forced into combat service in the southern portion of South Korea before they were really combat ready.

It was that combination of circumstances that led to the breakdown of control in the face of the swiftly advancing enemy, the retreating refugee civilians, mixed in with clandestine North Korean agents green US troops, all of which led to the Nationally publicized Incident at No Gun Ri, that 50 years later was branded a ‘massacre’ by the second-guessing US Press,  which had most of its facts wrong, even though its reporter got a Pulitzer Prize, who was aided by a fraudulent, lying US Soldier whom the press - including NBC's Tom Brokaw - relied on, and who eventually went to jail for defrauding the US Government. It was the 2d Battalion, 7th Cav which became the fall guy. I never forgave Brokaw for never, on air, apologizing to the officers and men of the defamed 2d Battalion.

Suffice it to say that the newly formed 3d Battalion of the 7^th Cav  retained an edge in operational success from the day it landed, until the entire 7^th Cavalry was as part of the 1^st Cavalry Division were pulled out of  Korea in December, 1951 once the Truce Talks stopped major military operations by either the US-UN or the Chinese.

But all three battalions and the Regimental Headquarters, got their baptism of fire, and plenty of combat experience during the touch-and-go defense of the Pusan Perimiter from August to October.

So I was privileged to be part of the best Battalion of the 7th Cavalry during its most trying times to come - against the very large and not defeated - Chinese Army.

Next Korean War (4)

The 7^th Cav moved out from its Army Reserve position, near Kunu-ri the end of November toward and into the new ‘assembly area’ to the North behind the 8^th and 5^th Cavalry Regiments who were still‘on the line.’ With truck shuttles it took all day and into the night to reach the ‘assembly’ area it was ordered to occupy. 

Information and Rumors began to fly. While on the move K Company – including me – could not hope to keep up with the ‘news’ or what the current situation was around us. The ‘Fog of War.”

There was no question now that the Chinese Army was massively on the move. China was in the War in a big way, replacing the defeated and dispersed North Korean Army. And it was coming due south to and through the 1^st Cavalry Division and the adjacent – to the east - 7^th Infantry Division. And it was attacking the  Marine Expeditionary Force that was north east of the 8^th Army, driving it toward the sea. In between had been the II ROK (Republic of Korea) Corps that the Chinese hit in large force shattering it.

The threat was obvious – split the UN army, drive south and trap the 8^th Army major forces, including the 1^st Cavalry Division.

Rumors abounded about the 8^th Cavalry having had an entire Battalion overrun. In fact the 1st Bn lost 15 officers and 250 men, the 3d Bn ceased to exist, and in all the Regiment lost over 800 men the first week of November killed, wounded, or captured. In fact Cav units following up behind them found many soldiers trying to escape to the south toward our 7^th Cav after their units were overrun or bypassed. Three soldiers were found dead in the main road north, executed with their hands tied behind their backs. An indication of how the Chinese were likely to fight.

My first mission, while our 7th Cav was on the line, was to take out a patrol and see if we could rescue any American soldiers who had escaped from the 8th Cav bloodletting. We found none.

While it was years before I learned all the facts, two of my West Point classmates, one of whom I knew later - Mike Dowe - was captured when a battalion of the 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Division was overrun, and Mike was a POW for 3 years. In all, 40 of my Class of '50 Classmates were killed in action during the Korean War. The highest number of any class which served in that war - or any other war.

It was also at that time that a Catholic Chaplain, Fr Kapauan who was in the 8th Cav, refused to escape to the south when the units he served were being overrun. He chose to stay behind, tend the wounded, give last rites - and be captured himself. And he died as a Chinese prisoner of war, never giving up his faith. His bravery and devotion were so great, that, urged by fellow POWs after they were released in 1953, Chaplain Fr Kapauan was, in 2014 awarded posthumously, the Medal of Honor, by the President himself. He remains the only Military Chaplain who was awarded the Medal of Honor in all American Military History. Mike Dowe, (my classmate) in the Prison Camp, observed Fr Kapauan's strenuous efforts to help his fellow soldiers to survive - in body and soul. And he aided in the recommendation for award.

Thus by December 1950  the  7^th Cav went, now formed as a Regimental Combat Team, with its own Armor and Artillery, started into what can only be described as a ‘Blocking Position’ astride the invasion route at Kujong-ni. But that was soon changed to protect the east flank of the 8^th Army at Pukchang-ni since the ROK units were collapsing to the east, and the Chinese could come around behind or flank US Units.

I only had fragmentary information that painted the alarming situation. And no maps. Originally the only maps of such areas were Japanese maps. It took a long time before the Army Map service was capable of getting 1:50,000 scale maps with readable information to the units. We were flying partially blind, so to speak.

                                  Dante’s Inferno

Company K and the 3d Battalion  moved into position behind the 1^st and 2d Battalions to act as a counterattack reserve force. It was dark. I looked to the north where there were mountains between us and the Yalu River, just over those mountatins.

Every mountain within sight had a Ring of Fire around it! About a quarter to a half way up. That was a stunning sight – and memorable. It was Dante’s Inferno all over again in this godforsaken place called North Korea! And I was in Hell.

The Chinese had set those fires to burn out the South Korean units defending those hills.

Whether it worked or not, I never knew. But I was struck with the extent the Chinese were willing to go to win – decisively, once its mass military power was unleashed.

Then I set to the task of insuring my soldiers were digging in to await the inevitable attacks against us.

Refugees as Cover

Another problem emerged that made movement along the roads very difficult as the Chinese Armies advanced. CIVILIAN Refugees. Thousands upon thousands of refugees fleeing. Even though they were North Koreans, they feared the Chinese. So fled south.

Controlling them was nearly impossible. Closing Check Points to stop them clogging the roads so American units or trucks had to pass didn't work. They just streamed by by moving away out into the fields and flowed around the checkpoints like water.

Worse, both Chinese and North Korean agents took advantage of that flow, and concealed themselves as Refugees to sneak through while carrying under their clothes weapons and ammunition and weapon parts. All of them could not be searched - too many. Those few discovered with such, were detained as prisoners on the spot.

Few Americans understand that such a tactic - as infiltrating agents and armed soldiers dressed as civilians has been a cardinal strategy by Communist and then later Islamic insurgents forever. Americans would 'never do that.' For several reasons - we bend over backwards to not risk or impersonate innocent civilians. We don't hesitate to use CIA agents and their contract locals to 'infiltrate' into foreign countries or areas controlled by them. But we do that strictly in accordance with US laws that limit what such government agents can, and can't do - such as carry weapons or explosives to kill, not only enemy government persons and equipment, but also innocent civilians - the latter for the purpose of intentionally either causing an propaganda 'incident' or to terrorize the populace. (That's called "Terrorism" if you missed the point.)  

That tactic had been used earlier - in July, when the 2d Battalion of the 7th Cav was just moving inland from its landing craft from Japan, the North Korean Army was still attacking and moving south through South Korea. The North Korean agents not only 'infiltrated' into the rear areas, they sometimes fired on green 2d Battalion soldiers from the roadway, and prodded soldiers to fire back, hitting many innocent civilians and creating the No Gun Ri INCIDENT, that the clueless press loved to report on.

It was just that scenario that triggered a reporter 60 years later to interview some old South Korean civilians, many communist who lived in the area, who claimed, in 2006,  there had been a civilian 'massacre' by US soldiers at No Gun Ri, South Korea, in July 1950!

One savage incident happened to the 7th Cav during our December retreat from far North Korea. As refugees piled up at a Check Point the 29th of November, a Lieutenant Sheehan, Company E Commander of the 2d Battalion tried to go forward of his check point in a jeep into the crowd with an interpreter and a bull horn. He got up on the hood of his jeep with the interpreter, a South Korean soldier who spoke some English and started to reason with the crowd. Either a Chinese or North Korean 'agent' from close inside the crowd tossed a grenade onto the jeep. It went off, killing Sheehan, the interpreter, two other US soldiers at the jeep and several civilian refugees close by.

The Chinese didn't give a damn what civilians they killed also. They used such opportunities as an excuse for a propaganda incident, to try and paint American soldiers as civilian killers. 

The profound difference between Chinese soldiers and their Communist leaders, and Americans and theirs, are the differences as to who goes out of their way to avoid harming innocent civilians. And make restitution if they do. American's follow the internationally agreed to - as in the Geneva Convention - Rules of War. The North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet governments do not follow such rules. 

So throughout the Korean War, that difference was apparent to me in my first war.

The Frozen Retreat

Then came a grueling 200 mile frozen foot marching Retreat for the 7th Cavalry. It had been ordered to continue to be the covering force in the western side of North Korea, as the entire 8th Army started a planned 'Retrograde' movement all the way back to Seoul.

First of all there were not enough trucks to carry all units, including the 7th, simultaneously.  So men had to march, continuously day and night over the deteriorating frozen roadway and shoulders. And then periodically we had to set up  blocking positions, with rifle companies trudging up to a mile left and right to extend the line so the Chinese could not easily flank even the blocking units. Then when the order was given, to trudge back down and continue the endless march southward. Sometime Army 2 1/2 ton trucks shuttled units part of the total 200 mile way south.

That was exhausting. While the temperature dipped to 30 degrees below at times. Especially in the late night hours while we had to march, and not stay in our down sleeping bags.

And Company K still did not have cold weather gear for every man.

Those damned Shoe-Pacs were issued for Rifle Company men. They were designed to keep the feet warm of men who stood around a lot - like artillerymen - cooks, or in headquarters or drove trucks and jeeps. Not for hard marching Infantry soldiers. Their felt padding got wet inside, and the frozen rubberized boots came apart at the seams from being creased constantly as men marched. They fell off the feet of some men. At least half of my platoon, already reduced to less than 30 by sickness and frostbite, had those things. And I would see some men holding their Shoe-Pacs on their feet by twine and rope.

Some Army Quartermaster genius back in the US who never saw a Rifle Squad in the field designed them and contracted with US companies to manufacture them. I am sure he got a boost in his pay for that 'invention' to solve the problem of the unanticipated Korean winter cold.

I refused to wear them. I stuck with my standard GI leather boot, as did Sgt Ingram and most other of my men, even though we were risking frostbite. I had to work hard to keep my worn socks dry when we had breaks. Even so, my feet became raw.

I appreciated what Napoleon's soldiers went through in their thousand mile retreat from Moscow. The majority of them never made it back alive. We lost some men, but US Army medics and the medical support structure of the Army really earned their pay.

I never saw a television episode of MASH 50 years later that portrayed Doctors in the Korean War which covered the frostbite problems of the 8th Army during its long retreat in the winter of 1950. Not romantic enough.

Those forced marches were brutal on all of us. And we were conscious we might be fired on from out in the dark at any time, by Chinese soldiers trying to race us south, so they could set up road blocks to cut us off. - even by 'guerilla' units formed in our rear, among South Korean civilians, who looked forward to a North Korean - i.e. Communist - victory in that war.

Even when the Japanese occupied the Korea's, there were plenty of underground communist movements throughout the country. They looked forward to defeat of the South Korean government.

The Attack on L Company Near our K Company

During one 8 hour period, Company K was ordered to set  up blocking positions on the slopes of a sloping hill mass to our east, while L Company was astride the road, and  M company was stretched out on the other side of the road. L Company's Command Post was right on the road, and they had been able to erect a stand up tent, lights inside it. 3d Battalion Headquarters was further behind L company, also on the road itself, where its few 3/4 ton trucks and command jeeps - 1/4 ton - were able to park next to it.

My platoon was strung out, with two man positions, up the sloping ground where the forest was fairly thick to the north of us. We started digging into the frozen ground The exhausted Commo Platoon carried wire on carrying spools with crank field telephone to my position, and the other two platoon positions and then back to Company Hq, where Captain Flynn, his radio operator and a few others where huddled. Our already flakey 'walkie talky' hand held SCR536 radios had long since lost their battery charge. So wire was the only way to communicate, other than by runner.

I thought to myself, if the Chinese come through those trees, this would be it - my first  combat engagement.  While I was shivering I was calm. It was about December 10th. I wondered what my mother and sisters were reading about this war, and the defeat of the 8th Army, that was retreating.

Later I realized they learned little about the 8th Army retreat. What they did read about was the Marine force retreating in another sector under our same conditions. Reporters flocked to cover them. But then the Marines always have had a big publicity machine. They get the press. So the public always publicly pitied the poor, cold, Marines. While much larger force, the 8th Army, was not even mentioned in the reports.

I started to call it a 'Second Page War.'

About 10PM, firing started down on the road, about 200 feet down below us to the left. Tracers split the air, machine guns and rifle fire suddenly opened up without warning. I never heard mortar rounds landing at first. It was a surprise attack An enemy force was ramming its way at, and through the L Company guarding the road. I could look down and see the firefight. It raged for at least 20 minutes and then the Chinese pulled back to lick their wounds and drag off some of their dead. 

The Chinese had overrun a platoon of L Company, and got into the tent behind it. Several L Company men in the tent were killed, others wounded.  They had not broken through the last line of defense at Battalion Headquarters with a platoon guarding it. I wondered if I should be doing anything with my soldiers, such as fire down on the road with my Platoon machine gun to a point on the road beyond where I last saw in fading light where L Company was dug in.

But I had no orders from Flynn to do that, and it just might expose my platoon to those coming through the trees. I was trying to think tactically. I did nothing, while some Americans died 200 yards to the side of me.

The Chinese never came through the trees. Quite a few rounds went over our heads, with the characteristic 'crack-thump' sound, except the firing was so close that the thump merged with the crack. 

I learned a lot from that brief engagement I could hear and largely see  when flashes of gunfire illuminated for a second the scene, to the side of me. The different sound of the different rifles, machine guns. And 60 mm mortar fire outgoing to where the Chinese came from along the road. I never noticed the cold. I guess my blood was churning, producing heat.

That fire fight started my realizing how much my hearing, in the dark, was so important for me to understand what was happening. And the Chinese Army almost always attacked at night, to minimize the effect of superior American firepower during the day.

I was begining to accumulate combat experience.

I don't know whether it was right then that night in my first Infantry combat experience, but I soon realized I was getting eligible for the prized - by soldiers - the blue 'Combat Infantry Badge.' For that badge can only be earned and worn by Infantry officers, full colonel or below in rank, and enlisted men, whose official MOS was Infantry (not artillery, or signal or anything else), and who were subjected to 'small arms' (i.e. rifle) fire by an armed enemy of the United States. 

At the time I thought one had to be in such combat for 30 days or more, but unbeknown to me was that Captain Flynn, already had put me in for the CIB, which all his officers and men were eligible for from the first time they were fired on.

The blue field Combat Infantry Badge - CIB - with its wreathed musket - of the type used by the first Americans during our 1776 Revolution - is the most coveted Infantry badge - which implies no 'bravery' per se  - but exposure by Infantrymen and Infantry Officers to direct deadly enemy rifle fire.

      Our Own Dante's Inferno

The Battalion Commander had decided to pull back along the road to set up another blocking position. The failure of the Chinese to break through and cause much more mayhem seemed to give them pause, before they would attempt again. The Regimental Commander would have had to approved. He obviously did, for the Battalion Commander put out a novel plan quickly.

The order was to use some deception. We were, now that the firefight was over, to start bonfires - out in front of us far enough that 60mm mortar fire would not hit us.  Americans are famous for starting warming fires at the drop of a hat..

We were to start bonfires AS IF they were warming fires. And to move around as if we meant to stay.

THEN, at exactly 1 AM and as quietly as possible slip back and away, down to the road behind where L Company still was, blocking the road. And the entire Battalion would then march hastily south, toward the next blocking position.

I remember taking one last look at the 10 or so 'warming fires' still crackling - with nobody around them. Our own Dante's Inferno.

IT worked. we were miles further south before the Chinese, planning their next attack, woke up to the fact there was nobody there to attack.

Two can play with fire, not just one.

We continued on our retreat.

Next Korean War (5)

Our retreat - which was destined to continue through December all the 200 miles back to Seoul, South Korea, with our Company K soldiers road marching at least 100 of those miles in the dead of winter - was a real test of our Army, and my 'platoon level' leadership.

The pattern kept being repeated - 15-20 miles marching while carrying full packs, with rifles - M1's, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR) and one squad carrying a machine gun and its ammunition passing through a blocking unit, then being trucked for perhaps 20 more miles, dropped off, where we set up a temporary encampment out in the open, soldiers eating their C-Rations and resting all night. Some times being a being a blocking force  while other companies passed through us. Then repeating the cycle. It took over 20 days to arrive north of Seoul, and the Han River  south of the 38th Parallel border, while staying ahead of the Chinese Army, whose infantry soldiers were suffering as much as we were. And they did not have down sleeping bags.

But there was a repeated nightly gathering that became my REAL Infantry School - the one I and all my West Point Classmates from '50 didn't get before being thrown into the Korean War.  That took place at an early or later time to eat, after the Company was looked after by we leaders - sometimes making our men take off their boots and socks so we could check the condition of their feet and order remedies from our Medics for men whose feet really looked bad.

Captain Flynn would have all we platoon leaders together, sometimes with good heat, sometimes not, but always with Coleman Lantern Light and we inside a blacked out abandoned Korean Hutch abandoned by its owners. We would heat up and eat our C-Rations (and sometimes when rations were short and all the men could not be given a canned C-Ration, I ate local rice stirred up as Korean dish named 'Go Hung'. which gave me intestinal worms for years afterwards)

There was no mail from home reaching us during the retreat. When any did arrive, it came in bunches.

I had no letters from home yet. Though I sent probably 4 or 5, including to my sisters as well as my mother. I knew they would be intensly interested in, and fearful of what I was going through.

But the memorable 'fireside' chats (sometimes with no real fire to watch) were led by Flynn who talked to each of us in turn learning what went on of importance that day in our platoons, and listening to recommendations from each of us. Then Flynn would explain another valuable 'tactical' lesson, usually pertaining as to how to fight the Chinese units - the craft and art of Infantry war. He would add some general comments on the general war and our situation, with what he learned from the Battalion briefings he attended also.

I soaked it all up. One very striking recommendation - to use 'marching fire' in the assault more than 'aimed' fire - stuck with me. I had never thought of it, nor really knew what  substituting volume for accuracy of fire could accomplish.

I did remember back at West Point in one Military History course reading S.L.A. Marshal's "Men Against Fire" researched in WWII. In which he pointed out that, for a variety of reasons only a FEW men actually fire their rifles in combat. That was a surprise to me when I read it. But Marshal had interviewed many men, NCOs, and officers in many Rifle Companies in Europe.

The reasons were many. Some men didn't want to 'give away their position' by firing. Some couldn't settle down and aim at a man-target, because enemy men would be ducking and bobbing around, as well as shooting back. Some were just so rattled and frightened by the battle they literally forgot what they were there for. And a few, very few,couldn't bring themselves to shoot to kill another man, even an enemy.

Flynn pointed out that the American Army had for too long stressed making men go to a rifle range, and shoot at stationary targets all day long. Pursuing only 'accuracy.' But combat is not a series of stand up and wait targets, but fleeting figures shooting back, who can be intimidated by the deady crack of incoming fire.

What was the antidote? Flynn said 'use marching fire' - get everyone to fire at the outset of an assault at the area where enemy soldiers are likely to be, even if hidden, and keep it up while the attack lasts. He pointed out that the US Army can afford the expenditure of ammuniton (while many other nation's Armies cannot). That massed fire is a US Army strength. Accurate fire is not. That is a job for Snipers and those few soldiers who - usually from their early years on farms,  ranches, or hunting - learned to fire very accurately.

THAT lesson not only stuck with me but became my salvation months later in a very harrowing operation. Its application was so significant in the success of one of our missions against superior Chinese force holding a dominant hill, that that I wrote it up after I left Korea while teaching at the Infantry School in Fort Benning. It was published and featured in the Army Combat Journal as "Surprise and Marching Fire" 

I was beginning to find my writing tongue in the first two months of my being immersed in the hard combat actions of the Korean War. For I had something of importance to say. About life and death, tactical military matters and human drama, and even about the philosophy of war, and of the obligations of leadership.

My Bahavagad Gita

Now I can't remember where or when I got my copy, or why I carried it with me in my back pack.  But I started, almost every night when we had light and fire, to read versus from the Bahavagad Gita. The sacred 700-verse ancient Hindu epic. 

To this day I am not sure why I started reading it. Being in the Orient? Looking for some solace from something else that Army Field Manuals? Or because it was, I knew from my general West Point education, was one of the great philosophical and literary works of the world. In a very small book, easy to carry in my backpack.

I did not carry a Bible. Or any other reading material. 

And I wondered, if I were killed in action, what the report back would say, or what my family would think when my 'personal effects' came back to them, and the Gita was there.

But I read it and part of my mind dealt with the greater philosophical issues of the war we were in.

I was beginning, in my mind, to compose ideas that I wanted to write down. All I had was a pencil and a little paper. And was about to start scribbling when, if ever, this retreat would end.

What If We, Like Custer, Are Surrounded?

Then in one of these nightly meeting, Captain Flynn told us two things.

What we should do if he were killed, wounded and evacuated, or captured what should be the the chain of command when he is gone. Who does he want to be first in command, second, third, and fourth, after he?

Both his answers stunned me.

First, if we are surrounded, cut off, and he is out of action, for us to head NORTH, not south in the direction the Chinese were moving. Reach and cross the Yalu River, get across Russia - Siberia - and come out in Europe. Try for occupied Germany!!!

Secondly, after him, if he is gone Flynn wanted Lt Shanks to command the company, then Lt HUGHES to command, then Sgt Abaticio.

Even though 1st Lt Ryan was the Executive officer and higher in date of rank (which decides who ouranks whom when both officers are the same rank) than all the others except Captain Flynn,  he was back at the Battalion Trains area, where company mess - cooks and stoves, supply, including weapons, and administration where the Morning Reports had to be filled out and sent on. If things got that bad in combat up front, it would not be clear he would even be able to get to the fighting elements of the company to take over. Someone on the ground had to take command until the immediate combat actions were over, and the normal 'chains of command' based on seniority, starting with the Battalion Commander could decide who should command K Company from that point forward.

So I was 2d in line, in case of loss of Captain Flynn.

The full weight of the possible burden of 'command' in a war we were losing, by retreating, became apparent to me at that instant.  I was really surprised Flynn had that much confidence in me after only one month in combat, during which I was in several minor actions, but also what a responsibility that would be -Commanding 200 men, the ENTIRE K Company command  - the rifle platoons, the weapons platoon, the headquarters, the other more junior officers - everything - having not recieved even the Infantry Officers Basic course at Fort Benning before being thrust into combat.  

Young, inexperienced men die in war. or fold, while some grow. In the eyes of my Company Commander John Flynn I obviously was maturing as a combat leader.

Next Korea (6)

In an effort to slow down the massive Chinese Army advance, its vulnerability in its supply chain was attacked. Several things were obvious. The Chinese supply lines were very long and getting longer - at least 250 miles from the Chinese border on the Yalu River to their target of Seoul.

The US Army Air Corps had gotten planes and pilots to Japan and they were already flying lots of air-to-ground Interdiction missions along those exposed routes south.  US Air was unchallenged when it made strikes against truck convoys over the open, nearly treeless plains. Only when high performance airplanes, such as the F-80 jets tried to rocket and bomb bridges over the Yalu were they challenged by Russian-built - and as often as not piloted by Russians - MIG's. But further south the Chinese had very little anti-air resources.

The other way to hit their supply, was to deny, as much as possible their getting food from the countryside as they came south. 8th Army tried a kind of 'Scorched Earth' campaign. Regular Army combat divisions were ordered to try and destroy crops, livestock, grain stockpiles during their retreat south.

I am not at all sure that was very effective, but I was ordered to go to a village and farm populated area near the likely route of Chinese advance and scorch the earth. A weird mission.

A Moonlight Operation

My 2d Platoon moved out at dark to our assigned area, about 5 miles away from our company headquarters to destroy anything that could be used by the Chinese Army passing through. Especially foodstuffs.

We had to be very watchful for enemy action - even incidental collision between a Chinese Army patrol and our platoon. Fortunately throughout the night no such contact was made. But it was still a risky patrol, so I had the platoon arrayed to be able to react to anything threatening.

There was a full moon and no clouds, so visibility was good - as far as moonlight goes.

With one point man - a PFC name Stefanik - well out in front, with a second man between my and the point. Then with two men each about 25 yards off on the flanks we reached an area where several farms were, with Korean buildings, wells, and some livestock roaming freely.

How do you destroy stored grain and animal forage?

How do you get rid of livestock - from cows and pigs, to chickens and fowl? Other than shoot them?

What do you do about the farmers and their families close by?

As it turned out the buildings were deserted, either because the farmers knew we were coming, or because they were already south-moving refugees.

The whole scene - which was quiet in one 'courtyard' was eerie. Like a deserted moonscape. No sign of any humans about.

I decided to make the place useless, by leading the one cow we could catch, and several pigs (how to catch farm animals in the moonlight?) and bring them to the well out front of  the farmhouse. Then shoot them one at a time and heave them down the well.

The cow required three shots. And then it was all that three soldiers could do to drag the dead animal over the low wall around the well head, and dump it down.

That animal was followed by the pigs, and several chickens the men could catch. Finally the small amount of grain we found was poured down on top of everything else.

Then we had to be especially alert to what the gunfire might attract. But nothing happened.

By the time we got that done, we were radioed to come back to our base camp. We got back by perhaps 1AM without incident.

Destroying that farmer's means of livelihood was a disgusting task for me, remembering our family ranch back in Colorado. The whole operation was surreal. 

The 'scorched earth' efforts by combat soldier's efforts died a quiet death of its own soon after.

Somehow we got Christmas Dinner on the 25th of December, 1950, wherever our 7th Cav Companies was that day. I don't remember.

The Chinese Army cooperated by not launching attacks on that Day. But I think they did that because they were at the end of their tether - their supply lines. Which our Army Air Corps hammered relentlessly as they advanced. They needed a short break too. But then they will come at us again. In overwhelming numbers. Their supply line was 200 miles long. Ours was 2,000 miles.

Our Cav Cooks and Mess Sergeants and Truck Drivers worked their butts off cooking up all that was delivered, got them into 'insulated' containers, and delivered them together with the standard aluminum mess kits to every place where our men were posted. With the temperature still below zero, the turkey and gravies were not very hot, of course, but the chow tasted good. And a welcome break from the old C-Rations and its canned beans. And somehow some men and officers produced partial bottles of booze to go with the meal. 

Somehow also mail, much of it pent up and undeliverable during the retreating weeks before, was delivered, along with the chow.

I got my first letters.

Then the holiday was over and the 8th Army had its plans in hand to make the final retreat south across the Han River and dig in for a major defensive stay.

The Arrival of the Greek Battalion

While often forgotten, the 8th Army, while all the American Army units were under command of American officers, all the way up to General MacArthur, the entire effort to rescue South Korea from both the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments, was a United Nations operation. It was a UN 'Command' that MacArthur commanded under the United Nations Security Council Direction and Policies.

The Soviets, who held one seat on the Security Council with Veto power over anything it ordered, stupidly stormed out of a Security Council meeting when the majority of the other members wanted to vote to oppose the North Korean Invasion with UN Forces in June, 1950. With the Soviets absent, the vote carried, and thus the operation from that day on was a UN, as well as US war. (The Soviets didn't make that mistake again)

There were many other country contributions of forces, from Brigade  sized units like the British. The Australians, and Canadians provided, to Battalion sized units, like the Turks, French, Ethopians fielded And then came the Greeks, fresh out of their latest civil war. 

It took some months before the contribution of the 13 other countries arrived, were trained, and were equipped - sometimes with US Army equipment - well enough, to enter the fray.

On December 19th, the Greek Expeditionary Force (GEF) - one Infantry Battalion full of combat veterans from the Civil Wars in Greece, and commanded by Lt Col Arbouzis - who had 13 years combat experience - joined the 7th Cavalry as it '4th (GEF) Battalion' ready to fight. It was indeed welcome. And over the next 12 months Company K had repeated contact with them, and engaged in cooperative combat operations with them, right down to the Company level.

I will tell about a later operation where that contact with the Greeks was important.

Across the Frozen Han

The 1st Cav Division had been pulled back into an Army Reserve position behind the 2d and 24th US Divisions which were defending along the 38th Parallel - roughly the original North/South Korean border. The Cav was still north of the Han River. 

The Chinese launched their expected 2d Offensive right at the end of December, launching mass suicidal attacks especially against Republic of Korea - ROK - units, and the 24th and the 2d Divisions. They all started taking a mauling - and penetrating enough that the 1st Cavalry Division ordered the 7th Cavalry to cross some units south of the wide, frozen, Han River to go into blocking position to cover for those two Divisions if they had to retreat across the river through Seoul.

We had another hard, cold, march to reach the north side of the river. We saw some men from other units stopped by the wayside to rest before trying to catch up with their units. In other words there were stragglers from many units on the long, long, and bitterly cold, retreat.

My platoon came to the Han river - very wide and very frozen - almost at 4AM. There was a one-vehicle wide Army Engineer laid bridge, laying flat on the ice with pontoons just in case, for use by vehicles which had to cross and couldn't risk driving on the ice. They drove very slowly, while we crossed on the ice itself, listening to the cracking ice under our feet and under the bridge every time a spaced out truck drove over.  I and my men were utterly exhaused. The river was at least a half mile wide there. The Han River dumped into the Tidal waters around the port city of Inchon, through which I had arrived in Korea in November.

When we got to the other side we went down a roadway about half a mile, past where all the other platoons of K Company had gotton to before us - a linear assembly area. Men sat down, and most fell asleep immediately.  In the chit chat between our men and the other platoon's men as we walked past, one question was asked. "Anybody seen Lt Shanks?" No, we didn't. He may have stayed behind on his platoon's path to the river with a few men to be a rear-guard if the Chinese were following up closely. Or he could have been killed or wounded - or captured.

I felt depressed as well as very cold. This was one of the worst nights in my time so far in Korea.

The Bugle Call

Within about 20 minutes, everyone in K Company seeming to have gotten across the Han and into the stretched out assembly area, it was time to saddle up, and start marching the last 5 miles to our ultimate assembly area. It was beginning to get light. About 5:00AM. Getting all the men up and on the road again would be a chore for the NCOs, and if anyone had rested too far from the roadway to be seen and roused, he might, with hyperthermia just sleep forever.

So Captain Flynn, who told the little Company Bugler, who had the Company Bugle in his backpack, to blow standard "Assembly!'

Now at that time Rifle Companies had issued bugles, and one man was a trained bugler. There were almost no times or places in Korea where a bugle call, for unit purposes was used. As portable radios began to get down to the platoon, then patrol level, bugles, except for taps or reveille or in military bands, was going the way of the Horses in the 7th Cavalry. But Flynn had already used that bugle to offset the psychological use by the Chinese who blew their horns and bugles and whistles in the Assault - to intimidate Americans. I heard them being blown when Company L was attacked on the road a week or two earlier. Two can play that mind game.

So the Bugle called 'Assembly' and it worked! Men got up and on the road. When everyone who had crossed the river was accounted for we began to start our last 5 mile march in retreat.

Suddenly we heard a huge explosion back at the Han river. Were the Chinese attacking? Flynn got on the radio to battalion, and soon learned that the senior commander of the Army Engineer unit which laid the bridge across the Han, when he heard the Bugle, even though it was to the south aways, and it was a recognizable US Army bugle call, panicked, thinking it was the Chinese coming across the Han River. So he BLEW UP the bridge - setting off the pre-positioned demolitions that he had put there to destroy it if the Chinese tried to use it, even while a number of straggling 7th Cav men were still on it! They were killed.

Chinese troops did not reach the river for two more days.

The Engineer Lt Col who ordered the explosion, lost his job, for exercising poor judgment in the Fog of War.

   The Shanks Part of the Korean War Story

The events of the last 30 days, the hard marches, the bitter cold, all seemed to have gotten to me.  It was January 1st, 1951

But something happened that night also, that touched me. As soon as we got into our assembly area, another unit was in front of us, I got warm enough to think, and write, I wrote out something in pencil, along with a short letter to my mother saying everything was ok, so far. And I mailed both in the same envelope, handing it to the company clerk. So long the platoons were within short walking distance of the K Company Headquarters with its two jeeps, a 3/4 ton, and portable desks the clerk could put all the mail in a mail bag and get it to Battalion. As I dimly recall, by this time, six months into the war, we could send first class mail without stamps - just use the APO number on it.   

At Korean War (8) I include that story, and the illustration with it, when it was over a year later published. I called it 'Shanks Bootees"

Next Korean War (8) "Shanks Bootees"

The Original Text

Shanks Bootees

    It  was during the dark days of the December retreat when I first saw them. They were hanging from the cold muzzle of an old Springfield rifle - a pair of tiny blue baby bootees. Their pale silk ribbons ended in a neat bow behind the front sight. Each little boot hung down separately,one slightly above the other, swinging silently in the wind.

       They reminded  me of tiny bells, and even though one had a smudge of dirt on its soft surface, and part of the ribbon that touched the barrel had lost color from scorching heat, they seemed to me to be the freshest, cleanest objects in all of drab Korea.

      At first the bootees had fixed my attention, but after the surprise of seeing these symbols of home in such a place had worn off, I let my eyes drift, unobserved, to their owner. He was a lieutenant, young I could see, and tired; not so much from the exertion of the trudging march, but with the wear of long days and nights in combat. He was talking to men from his platoon, all of them together watching the core of a little blaze at their center, and I could tell that he was answering some of their disturbing questions about the war. There was a tone of hopelessness in the men's voices, but the lieutenant sounded cheerful; there was a glint in his eye, and a squint that melted into an easy smile when he spoke.

         As my platoon moved on, I glanced back briefly to the blue bootees still fresh, still swinging. Often in the next few weeks I saw the lieutenant and his bootees while we moved southward before the Chinese armies. Around the ever-present warming fires I heard the simple story of the officer and his boots.

        The lieutenant was named Shank, and he, twenty-two years old, led a rifle platoon. He had come over from Okinawa while the Army was clamped in the vise of the Pusan perimeter, short on manpower. Shank had his baptism of fire on the hills outside Taegu. His youth and fire helped keep his decimated platoon intact, while the North Koreans frantically tried to crack the American lines. Then came the breakthrough, and Shank's company,rode on the record-breaking tank and truck dash northward. He picked up the Springfield rifle then, and kept it because of its renowned accuracy and apparent immunity to the cold weather. A violent day south of Pyongyang won Shank a Silver Star for gallantry, as he led his flesh-and-blood infantrymen against T-34 tanks and destroyed three of them. The Chinese intervention and beginning of the American retreat brought him up to where I met him, south of Kunari at the Yalu River.

       The bootees? That was simple. He was an expectant father, and the little boots sent by his young wife in the States reflected his whole optimistic attitude while the battle was the darkest. I also learned that when the baby came it would be announced by a new piece of ribbon on the boots - blue for a boy, pink for a girl.

       Then I forgot about him as we prepared to defend Seoul from above the frozen Han River. We were hit hard by the Chinese. They streamed down from the hills and charged the barbed wire. They charged again and again,piling up before our smoking guns. The days were but frantic preparation for the nights. Companies dwindled, and my platoon was halved as cold,sickness, and the enemy took their toll. I neared the end of my mental reserves. Names of casualties were rumored, and I heard Shank's among them. I wondered where Shank's bootees were now.

         The endless night of the retreat from Seoul came. When we got the word my few men were too dulled to show any emotion at the announcement. Most were too miserable to want to retreat again for twenty-five miles,Chinese or no. But we did, and the temperature dropped to 30 degrees below zero as our silent column stumbled along the hard ground. It was the most depressing night I had ever endured - pushed by the uncompromising cold,the pursuing enemy and the chaotic memory of the bloody nights before. I, as a leader, was close to that mental chasm. Only the numbness prevented thinking myself into mute depression.

         We plodded across the cracking ice of the Han River at four-thirty in the morning, and marched on south at an ever-slowing pace. Finally the last five mile stretch was ahead. We rested briefly. As the men dropped to the roadside they fell asleep immediately. I wondered if I could get them going again. Worse yet, I didn't think I could go myself - so tired, numb,and raw was my body.

        Then in the black despair of uselessness in a second-page war I looked up as a passing figure brushed against my inert shoe-pacs.

    There walked young Lieutenant Shank up the Korean road, whistling softly, while every waking eye followed him to see the muzzle of his battered Springfield rifle. Swinging gaily in the first rays of the morning sun were Shank's bootees, and fluttering below them was the brightest, bluest, piece of ribbon I have ever seen.

Lt David Hughes
Near Seoul, Korea, Dec, 1950

--------------------

Next Korean War (9)

With that story, I had found my writer's pen in the darkness of the Korean War.I had something of importance to say.

I scribbled out that story that night in Korea for myself. It came from my pent up desire to express what I was feeling and observing. My literary head co-existed with my military mind in my sore body - all at the same time.

I composed it the only way I could, in pencil on paper. Straight through from beginning to end. No drafts, or rewrites. And without thought of what my mother might do with it other than keep it among her son's letters. I sent it as much to lift her spirits - against the increasingly grim possibility of my death or injury  -- the way the war was going.

It was months later I learned that my dear mother had typed it out after reading and rereading its message of hope where there was seemingly no hope. Then she approached a woman who lived in the same Shirley Savoy Hotel in Denver - Mary Chase, who had written the popular national play about a 6 foot rabbit called 'Harvey.'

Mary Chase, according to my mother, was struck by the story's beauty, right while Americans were only reading dark news about defeat and death, not life, in the ugly War. She told my mother that she had contacts at the editorial level of the Ladies Home Journal - as much a literary journal then as a ladies magazine. Could she send it onto them? Mother of course said yes and gave her the typed version.

In due course, unbeknownst to me - who was still fighting a war that would  preoccupy me for at least another year - the editors liked it so much, coming right during that grim winter of war they wrote my mother that they wanted to print it, unchanged. And pay me $500 for its 1,000 words. And also to get from her,  background about who I was and where i had come from. They wanted to print that also, with the story.

That all would take some time for a monthly magazine to carry off, but it was done. So 'Shanks Bootees' was published with that large illustration (making Shanks look younger than he was). It was nationally published in June 1952 just after I had returned from Korea, while the war was still going on, though truce talks had started.  Below is that sidebar, and the photograph she sent them, that the Army Press service had taken the morning after a particularly tough battle on Hill 339 I won with my company. The Army in Korea tried to send good photos and some stories of soldiers to local newspapers where their next of kin lived. In that photo I am carrying a Thompson Sub machine gun, not an issue Carbine that I had taken off a dead Chinese soldier I had killed. It became my preferred weapon. And I had a captured Chinese whistle around my neck.

In this case the publication went national - to 6 million subscribers

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sidebar to the Shanks Bootees story, printed on the same page as the story.

From the Ladies Home Journal June 1952

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Since Shank's Bootees came to us through the author's mother, we asked for more information about her son. Her brief factual reply tells, by understatement, a story so typical of the courage expected and accepted from our young men - and their mothers - that we asked permission to share it with our readers. LHJ Ed)

Denver, Colorado

Lt. David R Hughes, age 23, was born and raised in Colorado. His father died when he was six years old.

He received an appointment to the United States Military Academy in 1946.

He graduated from the Academy with the class of June, 1950. In October he was ordered to Korea with the 7th Cavalry Regiment, First Cavalry Division. After two months in battle he was promoted to First Lieutenant. Later he was made commander of his company.

For his actions in Korea David has been awarded two Silver Stars, one Bronze Star. the Greek Cross of War, comparable to our Silver Star and the Distinguished Service Cross. He has also been awarded two Purple Hearts.

Sincerely

HELEN HUGHES"

---------------------------

Needless to say, that story got quite a bit of attention, even in writer's articles about it as a story "from the front lines" of Korea. After I got back to the US, as did Lt Shank, his family got a lot of attention too, for his last name was unusual. The couple even visited me, with the baby, in 1952 as they passed through Fort Benning, Georgia.

As recently as 2009, an adult professional daughter of that baby, now a 50 year old father (Shank was her grandfather) contacted me about more copies of that story. Shank suvived the War, as did that baby who grew up with a family of his own, and a third generation, whose last name is still Shank, contacted me.

I have heard and read of others who have sent out that story as a Christmas Card in years following.

Many ripples came from that small literary snowball I had tossed onto the ice of the frozen  Han River, Christmas, 1950. A trade magazine "Writers Digest", claimed I was a new literary find. I could have turned to that future - but I had committed to a full military career fighting wars, while just writing about them incidentally.

I only got bits and pieces of what was happening to it while I was in Korea. I was busy.

But I had found my literary voice in War, after I was matured by combat and had something of significance to say - while yet I was leading men I had spent 4 years at West Point preparing to do. My thoughts about my men and war, my responsibility of leadership, became significant subjects I wrote and philosophized about later.    

After I wrote Shanks Bootees in that bleak winter of 1950. I lost my sense of depression from the grim things around me and the uncertainty of the future. Writing was my outlet. And would be my legacy if I were killed. Life had deeper levels of meaning. And I had purpose which I could articulate. And so far I seemed to be leading my men tolerably well.

                 The Presidential Speech

Then, in early July, 2013 came another, bigger fallout.

As the 60th Anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Truce, on July 27th, 2014 approached, President Obama's Speech writer was searching for some upbeat material about the ugly war and he encountered my 'Shank's Bootees' piece on the Korean War Project Web Site where I had posted it as a kind of Christmas tale in 2000. He seemed to be greatly touched by it. He tracked me down, asked permission to work it into the President's remarks  - which I granted - and then set about trying to find Richard Shank, who would be about 85 as I was. With some tips from me on how to find Shank's grand-daughter (the daughter of the baby boy who was born in 1951) who, in 2005 contacted me about the story, the White House found Shank in Gainsville Florida.

So the President, besides telling about my writing the story, told about Richard Shank now, at 85.

That speech was internationally broadcast over television. And Richard Shank whom I had never seen or heard about for 62 years contacted me.

Those short excerpts from the President's speech are HERE.

Next Korean War (10)

Barbed Wire and a Counter Offensive

The Chinese Army ran out of steam with their Winter Campaign before completely overruning Seoul, again. It was still very cold. The first casualty in the war for the Greek Battalion was a communcations man who froze to death.

Supplying our units was hard work - 7th Cav  ammunition resupply was 70 miles south. It took 6 hours for Division trucks to drive one way to or from Supply. But, as UN forces built up, it was time to get ready for a UN Counteroffensive. And an Offense-minded  new boss was in town.

While the Great Retreat lowered the morale of the American soldiers of the 8th Army, the top leadership ,- Army, Corps, and Division Commanders were no longer inspiring or motivating the troops. At that very time, the 8th Army commander, General Walton Walker, was killed in a wintertime jeep accident. A new commander was called in from the Army staff in Washingon- Lt General Matthew Ridgeway.

Now getting a  new commander is not unusual. And one so far away in rank and position - 7 levels up - usually doesn't get the attention of the soldiers or junior officers - like me.

But in this case, the new 8th Army Commander made an immediate impression. General 'Matt' Ridgway had been a very successful combat commander in Europe in WWII. When he attached two fragmentation grenades to his shoulder harness that everyone would see in any close up photograph of him, he visually signaled that he was in Korea to fight. Soldiers, seeing the pictures of him with his grenades, like Patton's Pistols, in their inimitable fashion, called him 'Iron Tits' Ridgeway. He was clearly a warrior.

When he wrote his first command letter - which had to be read aloud to every officer down to platoon leaders (like me) in the 8th Army, - that got our attention. Including mine. I still remember standing in our 3d Battalion Headquarters with other company officers, while that letter was read aloud to us. Because its authoritative tone was of an unmistakable leader, it directly said what we were going to do offensively, and communicated the clear expectation that each of us officers would motivate our men to fight, it was nearly inspirational. It made a big impression on me.

We now have a commander who means to whip the Chinese. They are not 10 feet tall. Now I knew what I could tell my soldiers, whose general motivation for this war was low.

But what also - for me -  was noteworthy was that the medium for his motivational speech was in the form of a distributed paper that others would read, or read aloud to others. He did that because there was no way he could address all the officers of the 8th Army deployed across the entire front and rear area by an oral speech, as kings and battlefield commanders, and George Patton time immemorial have done. And it was effective.

 Matthew Ridgeway, West Point Class of 1917, learned as a cadet, not only how to motivate as a leader face to face, but how to write an effective motivational speech! The power of the written word, which I liked. Somebody for me to emulate.

He also fired several Divisional and Corps Commanders whom he thought were burned out - had been in command in Korea too long.

Ridgeway also insisted the 8th Army Infantry units get off the roads and walk and fight along the high ridge lines like the Chinese did.

He quickly turned around the spirit and will to fight by the entire 8th Army. He shifted its emphasis on defense, to offense. He got it ready to take the fight to the enemy, and not wait for them. He did that through the month of January and February 1951.

Even though, when Truman later fired MacArthur, and Ridgeway was moved up from 8th Army, to the Far East Command, he will always be credited in turning around the 8th Army from a defeated command in retreat, to an aggressive Army which would give the Chinese all they could handle.

More Barbed Wired than Anyone Else

And he did something else, either directly or indirectly. We soon got a new commander, replacing colorful Billy Harris, for the 7th Cavalry. Controversial (over time) Colonel Dan Gilmer, West Point Class of 1932.

Gilmer had been Ridgeway's Chief of Staff in Europe - not a commander. I'll bet he asked Ridgeway, who had been his boss in WWII, for a Regimental Command once he learned Ridgeway was going to command the Army in Korea. He got it. But Gilmer got that level of command, even over a foreign battalion - Greek - fighting troops, even though he had never himself commanded a Battalion, in peace or war.

That lack of WWII combat command experience came back to bite him.

I can't complain though. He thought West Point graduates walked on water - or he fired them. Very early in my career in my first experience at war he pushed very tough responsibilities on me at the Company Command level. He was not a 'motivational' leader. He was a tough 'relieve em' taskmaster. Even John Flynn, my old Company Commander, now a Major and Regimental Operations officer suffered under him until he was wounded by mortar fire and was evacuated.

That 'taskmaster' trait in Gilmer was exhibited as the Army dug in on what I remember was called the 'Wyoming Line'. It was a heavy defensive line against what was anticipated - a Big Chinese Offensive to retake Seoul. Part of digging in was laying barbed wire. LOTS of barbed wire. All across the front. Which takes a great deal of heavy truck transportation of the wire spools, and a huge amount of work by infantry - not engineer - soldiers on the ground to carry it - two men to carry an awkward and heavy spool (especially without work-type gloves) pound in the long stakes for it, and lay it. Hard, hard, work when rifle platoon and company soldiers have to do that, as well as dig their own foxholes and build bunkers for their automatic weapons.

My 35 soldiers hated it. But it was orders. And Col Dan Gilmer made his first impression on all the soldiers of the 7th Cavalry by trying to outdo all the other Regiments in the total amount of Barbed Wire laid. He suceeded.

To supervise its construction he first was driven around in his command jeep 1/4 ton, but with an elevated 'ring mount' he had ocer the passenger's side of the front seat. (He switched to jeeps with ring mounts already installed, so a machine gun could be mounted on it during 'moving' patrols). So he could stand up on the seat and surveisy his domain. He was very tall, at least 6 foot 6 inches, though not heavy.

Ring Mount Dan the Barbed Wire Man

Between Colonel Gilmer's barbed wire reputation and riding around the Regimental positions standing up inside the ring mount on his command jeep, he started being called "Ring Mount Dan, the Barbed Wire Man"

Then he went further.

He got a hold of and kept under his control an H-13 one-passenger 'bubble' helicopter - the type, new to Korea used primarily to carry wounded back to MASH level medical services - which he would fly around in to, and over, his Regiment's positions and soldiers.   

It got ridiculous - and ineffective - when, for a time, Gilmer even had a pair of sound speakers attached to the skids on the helicopter. He would sometimes fly over a unit's position, then hover over it quite low, and bark at the soldiers or officers standing on the ground looking up at him through his microphone and those speakers. Soldiers hoped he would be shot down if he strayed over the front lines.

The sound of the helicopter - engine and blades - were so loud his voice rarely could be understood on the ground. So he finally stopped that.

Col Gilmer, for all he did for, and to me, was less a leader, than often a martinet.

After several combat engagements I went through, including as the K Company Commander in the fall of 1951, Gilmer obviously had been monitoring me. In one letter - the formal endorsement of the Efficiency Report on me, he wrote  "Lt Hughes is the most outstanding officer in my Regiment"

That is saying something about  a 1st Lieutenant below 5 Lt Colonels, 10 Majors, 30 Captains, and perhaps 140 other Lieutenants in the 7th Cav Regiment in time of war.

I still have that letter.

He didn't 'protect' me in any way. Instead he insured I was twice given the toughest combat missions the Regiment faced in the fall of 1951.

I had measured up - so far.

Before attacks were launched against the Chinese Army in the western half of Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division sent out a whole series of Patrols over quite a span of time, into April. The Chinese had pulled well back and the 8th Army Intelligence wasn't sure where they were, just what they were up to, or what kind of units were there.

So I was picked to do a long patrol where others had failed to find the enemy.

After it was over I sat down and wrote an account of it to my mother. She passed it on to the Denver newspapers, and they printed large gobs of it.

Here it is, verbatim. I wrote it on April 1st, April Fools Day.

April 1, 1951, Chunchon, Korea.

Dear Mom:

Again from a mountain peak, this time the highest ever, Hill 899, a mountain almost 3,000 feet from valley to peak.

The Marines are to the right of us, and the Chinese are in front of us.

I have a rather interesting story to tell about our last, and
most successful patrol -- a patrol deep into enemy territory.

We had been sitting on a 650 meter peak overlooking Chunchon and the Song-Gang River for several days, while patrols attempted to cross the river to find the exact enemy positions.

But all of the patrols had returned, saying that the river, a swift channel 200 feet across, was unfordable. And that the Chinese had it covered with machine guns.

But the information was vital and so they sent us, Company K, saying, "You will cross the river." An order.

We set out, my 50 men and I, with a mortar, a 57 MM recoilless rifle a map and a mission. We started at six o'clock in the morning with the mountain fog so thick that one could not see the length of a squad. Our final objective was a mountain peak six miles away, over four intervening mountains) a gauntlet of enemy top ridge machine guns, a deep valley with a 200-foot river without boats or bridges -- and a record of five other patrol failures to reach that objective.

By ten o'clock our radio reception was too weak to keep us in touch with our friendly lines.

We plugged along through the fog, over ridge after ridge, after ridge, hoping our compass wasn't being affected by the ore in the mountains.

Finally I looked at my map and decided we were on the right peak, and so we began the long descent down a deep slope through jungle- like undergrowth.

But when we reached the bottom and cleared the fog, I realized that the valley went in the wrong direction. Suddenly a South Korean appeared out of nowhere and began jabbering wildly. After listening for a little while to a mixture of Korean and Japanese lingo, we realized he was try­ing his best to tell us we were very close to two machine guns of the Chinese, and that they had ambushed a previous patrol just two days ago. I saw then that we were one valley short of our route, so -- with a long look at the tiring men behind me, I started up the long, long trail.

By noon the fog had lifted and we were back on the right ridge, ready to drop down again, 1,500 feet to the river below, I ordered a short break, we gulped a C-Ration, and in fifteen minutes were on our way.

We had brief contact with an artillery liaison plane who carefully looked us over be­ore we convinced him that we were G.l.'s deep in enemy territory.

On the way down the mountainside one man dropped his helmet, and it rolled 1,200 feet before stopping at the river's edge. Well announced to the enemy by the rolling helmet, we reached the water's edge by one o'clock, and after a short search of the area we set up a mortar, cannon and machine gun to cover our crossing, lest some well-placed sniper pick us off in the water, and, with a prickly sensation at the back of my neck, I started wading across the river. The cold water went up, and up, and up. Soon it was up to my chest, and I was unable to move for the current. We just couldn't do it here, so I ordered the platoon back to the shore.' But luckily for us, an old Korean came wobbling down from his wretched house, and without a word, beckoned me to follow him down stream.

He went about 100 yards and then pointed to a lone tree on the other side.  I understood; it was an old Korean route across on a hidden sandbar.

We started out again, and this time just as the water reached my neck, I felt the slope go up and I was soon on the other side. The platoon followed, but it was apparent the short men could not make it. So, leaving ten men on the south bank to secure the crossing, we headed north again, dripping wet, and shivering in the bitter wind.

However, one forgets physical discomfort soon when operating in enemy territory, and the late afternoon sun began to quell our trembling after a while.

We had been going for eight hours steady now, and some of the older men, and the "unhardened" replacements were almost exhausted. I urged them on till we turned up the last long valley to our objective. That could really be a trap, so I dropped the tired men here to secure the mouth of the valley, and hurried up the final mountain with the last two squads.

I was reasonably sure there were no Chinese on that particular peak, and after seeing how late it was, I drove up the mountain without caution as the men straggled out behind.

It was then and there I thanked my Colorado mountain Up-bringing and West Point physical training that had prepared me for such a life .
 

Five of us gained the top by three PM and no enemy was present. There was another peak towering above us, however, that was suspected to be occupied by the enemy, and if our mission were to be entirely successful, we should be able to tell Headquarters if the enemy were there or not.

There was one risky way to find out, so I gathered all of the squads together on the very top of the peak, in an exposed position, and began milling around, preparing a good target.

Sure enough, in a minute we heard a Brr Brr Pop Pop and bullets started whizzing by. We jumped for cover, fired back, and I started to radio back to the company.'
 

Then we discovered that the radio had shorted out completely in the water and was useless.

I marked the enemy positions on the map, lest I become a casualty, and ordered the withdrawal. It was then I noticed that we were only a few thousand yards from the 38th Parallel.

I then I announced it to the men, one of them fired a round from his rifle in the general direction of the boundary line, and muttered something about l'll get something across that Parallel, anyway!"

We clambered down that mountain as fast as we could, for our mission was not to fight 'em, but to find 'em.

All the way down the mile long valley the Chinese sniped at us but we suffered no casualties and soon got to the river, picking up our outposts as we went.

The return across the river was sure to be more difficult because we had to push upstream against the current.

So three of us, armed with poles, set out dragging a long piece of Chinese communication wire behind us in order to make a sort of guy-line till the last man, Pfc. Gingles, from Abilene, Kansas, lost his footing and started to drag the two of us down stream. He finally got loose from the wire, but weighed down with an 18-pound automatic rifle, and a 15-pound ammunition belt, he began to tumble end over end down-stream.

Then the drag on the line became too much for Pic. Lewis and me and we began to get pulled off the sandbar.

Gingles got free from his equipment and tried to make for the shore, but when he saw Pfc. Lewis slip under the water, he yelled. "Lewis can't swim". and turned boldly back into the stream. I was all fouled up in the wire. and between my steel helmet my heavy boots and clothes. I quickly went under.

In a minute we would be swept into the narrow rocky curve below and into an area where the Chinese had their guns over the river.

Somehow I got loose from the wire and shed my helmet. and after endless swimming and banging along under-the water I reached a shallows, where I stood up to look for Lewis , He had gone under several times and was gasping and gagging, but Gingles had managed to pull him toward the shore, and by this time the men that we had left on the south bank had made a chain out into the water and dragged both of the men to safety.

The three of us lay for a while, utterly exhausted -- Lewis was  unconscious the patrol was split -- and we were still five miles from our lines, with the enemy knowing of our presence.

To add to the bad situation, our only map had floated away downstream. It was then four-thirty in the afternoon, and night would soon be upon us. There had to be another decision, and quickly.

I shouted across to my platoon sergeant, Master Sergeant Carl Irvine, of St. Joseph, Missouri, to take his part of the patrol down the north shore about three miles to where another Battalion had made a crossing several days before.

My half of the patrol carried Lewis to a covered draw and we
built a roaring fire, which helped to revive him, and also to take the cramps out of our aching limbs.

As soon as possible we set out for our lines, and I tried hard to remember what the map looked like in this sector.

Just before darkness closed in we reached the top of a commanding ridge, and I glimpsed a familiar looking peak in the distance.

We set out in earnest, tired to the very core, but knowing that our safety lay only in movement.

The other half of the platoon had set out immediately and by dark had surprised an enemy patrol, dispersing them; had contacted a friendly patrol, radioed our predicament back to our lines, and re-crossed the river on an underwater bridge to safety.

We were in trouble though. We slowed to a crawl in pitch darkness as we tried to make our way along the high cliffs and ridges. But about eight o'clock the U. S. Army began to operate to help us on our way back. Knowing it was useless to send out patrols over the vast expanse of mountains, they relied on artillery and searchlights to help.

The first thing we saw was a powerful, wide searchlight beam shoot into the sky over us and light up the whole area, with the glow reflected back to us from the cloud base. Then another beam shot up.

We were able to move faster. Then we heard the ominous whine of an artillery shell speeding toward us.

We jumped for cover, thinking we had been spotted by the Chinese or mistaken to be Chinese by our own units.

But as we waited for the deafening explosion, there was a welcome "POP, and the bright glow of an artillery parachute flare lit up our path. Then we knew we were O. K. -- and with the help of searchlights and flares, crossed the welcome challenge of our company outpost at eleven-thirty P.M., after seven teen and one-half hours of gruel­ing combat patrolling.

I phoned in a complete report to Headquarters, and was told
that we had done an excellent job of getting all the information needed on which to plan future operations.

That was my reward.

The reward for my men came a few minutes later when it was announced that hot coffee and cinnamon rolls had arrived from away back at our field kitchen, where a cook had been "sweating out" our return.

The lusty shouts that went up heralding our return must have
disturbed even the impassive Chinese leering at us from the far off hills to the north.

Love,
Dave

Gen Ridgway started his offensive efforts by a series of limited objective probes of the Chinese defenses North of the Han.

Company K, as part of the 3d Battalion  was given the mission on the 10th of February to climb to a series of ridges ''in their zone' and press on toward the Chinese lines to determine their strength and defenses. The 1st Platoon led all the way to the closest small summit without being fired on or gaining any other contact, Captain Flynn ordered me to pass through the 1st Platoon's position, and continue advancing along the knife-like ridge which appeared to be punctuated by a series of small peaks, the next one being a little higher than the one he was on. 

Flynn. with his radio operator, and two forward observers, one for Company K's  60mm mortar section, and the other for Company M’s 81mm mortars further back at Battalion stayed on the small summit and could watch my platoon’s progress. He told me they could not see any enemy positions or movement, even with binoculars. I was to move along the ridge and report back if I spotted any enemy positions.  That if I went 1000 yards with  no contact,  the 3d Platoon would pass through me. With a typical Flynn Irish grin he wished me good luck.

Well I was immediately faced with the classic Korean ‘narrow ridge line’ conundrum. If I had my platoon go single file along the ridge, which was no more than one-man wide, and we were fired on, my point men would take the brunt of the punishment before I could get following units into position to fire back. If I tried to move too far down off the ridge their travelling would be very difficult and slow.

So I punted. I told the 1st squad and 2d Squad behind them to continue  to move up the ridge line toward the next low peak about 150 yards ahead. I  told the third squad, with the weapons squad behind them, to walk parallel to  and abreast of the 1st squad but down on the side hill only about 5 yards. That I would be behind the 2d squad to coordinate the four squads and report back to Flynn.

We got about 100 yards when all hell broke loose with at least one automatic weapon from the very top of that first peak. At least two Chinese were there, hidden with branches and twigs making them look like part of the hill, firing right down the ridge. Everybody dived for cover, and several returned fire. Within 10 seconds, I could see one of the Chinese soldiers jump up with the light machine gun and fall  back down over the peak and go out of sight. The other one didn’t move that I could see. Firing stopped from the enemy. Nobody was hit in my platoon.

There was certainly ‘contact’ – the ridge had enemy on it, but where? I went forward to our point man who was flat against the earth, his weapon pointed at the peak. Nobody shot at me while I moved forward in a crouch I was pretty sure both Chinese had bugged out. I got two men and we carefully approached the peak. Both Chinese soldiers, who had been there, had indeed fallen back along the ridge.

Right then a burst of machine gun fired ripped past me, somewhat exposed. It came from the next peak, high point. I called out to the third squad to go around those firing and lay down a base of fire while the 1^st squad rushes the peak where the firing was coming from. I then called Flynn and told him the situation but that unless we drove the Chinese off that second peak that they could fire down on our men trying to withdraw. He agreed.

So I motioned, yelled an ordered the 1^st squad to assault the top of the hill when they hear the firing from the other side of the hill.

Neither squad seemed eager to move. I got down to the right where the 2d squad was and told them to open up on the peak. Only two or three men started firing.’

I should have moved to the left down to the 1^st Squad and went with them to the top. But I didn’t. And they weren’t moving, just staying under cover.

I was frustrated. I didn’t know how to get the Jail Bird platoon to move. I felt like I was pushing wet spaghetti. And any minute the Chinese could get aggressive and rain fire down on both sides.

I stood up, told the 3d squad to cover me, and I charged up to the top of the peak, alone, firing at it with my carbine as I went. Suddenly I was on top of their parapet and I fired down at all three there before they had time to swing their machine gun around towards me. They were still aimed down at the 1^st Squad’s location. I either killed or badly wounded all three for they just lay there. And I started firing at several others now running away toward the next ridge a long way away.  

Sgt Ingram who had my radio came along the ridge forward and yelled that Capt Flynn wanted me to pull my platoon back, that the mission was accomplished.

I yelled down to both the 1^st and 3d squads and told them to get back to the Company OP, that I would cover them.

The Chinese did not follow up, they just fell back toward their further units, nor did they open up on me.

When I got back to Flynn's position, he noted I had a gouge out of my helmet where a round struck it, probably from that first machine gun burst.

Both he and his First Sergent seemed changed in their attitude toward me. I was still hot with my inability to get my Jail House Platoon to attack. I had a lot to learn. I was the last man back off that hill.

I soon found out what had changed. Battle hardened Capt Flynn put me in for a Silver Star for my solo charge. occupation of the machine gun nest, and killing everyone there - which he watched through his binoculars.

I for one had mixed motives. While it was encouraging that I was recognized for getting the job done, I was angry that I couldn't get my platoon to do it. I had to do it myself. 

My platoon seemed to take me more seriously after that February incident.

I had passed the test as to whether I was willing and able to do anything I ordered my soldiers to do, while under fire.

(See First Silver Star under this link'

http://www.davehugheslegacy.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225:medals-and-citations-2-dscass&catid=100&Itemid=204

Having determined where the bulk of the Chinese Army units were from a series of 'Reconnaissance in Force' patrols Gen Ridgway determined that Hill 578 was important to be in 8th Army hands before any moves past it deeper into Chinese controlled areas could be risked.

The fight for Hill 578 became the first battle against a well dug in enemy on a large mountain that I got involved in. 

It took all four battalions of the 7th Cavalry to acccomplish that mission - which included the Greek Battalion that had won its spurs in late January on a series of smaller hills which were fiercely contested. 

The Chinese were on the top of 578 in force. They had had time to fortify the top of the mountain.

The operation was to be proceeded by heavy bombardment by artillery, heavy mortars, and several air strikes with 1,000lb bombs.

Then the first attempted assault on the top of the ridge by the 3d Battalion was to go up a quite steep approach route on the west side of the mountain.

Short Round

Such a battle was bound to produce errors in indirect fire. I came very close to losing my life when I found myself and my platoon pinned down from fire from atop the west side slopes of 578.

I was lying on the ground my face almost pushed into the dirt to get lower than the direct fire coming from the top, when I got word that several barrages of large 4.2 mortars would be incoming to try and supress the fire from on top.

We were told to stand by and wait until after the barrage was over, perhaps 24 rounds.

The Sound of Incoming

Now by this time in this war I was getting used to telling what caliber mortar rounds 60mm company fire, 81mm battalion fire, or heavy 4.2inch rounds were incoming by the sound they made coming down.

A 60mm mortar shell comes down whiz-bang. Unless you are within 10 yards of that your chances are good of not getting hit. But you also can't beat it to the ground when you first hear it whizzing down.

A big 4.2 inch mortar round - or the Chinese equivalent 120mm, comes down with a whisper-whisper sound that starts so high up, if you hear that and flatten yourself, the chances are you won't be hit unless it is close.

But the 81mm (82mm Chinese) is the real man's weapon. It whistle bangs fast enough that only if your ears are cocked to listen for it - perhaps because you hear the chug-chug of the mortars coming out of the enemy tube about 10 seconds before it starts down, and you hit the deck fast, you might evade being hit. 

I got very good at telling what was going on, especially at night, by the sounds the various rounds made. I also developed a bad habit, when I heard incoming mortar fire, of yanking my helmet off so my hearing was more acute.

Bad Round

So when I and my platoon were flattened out on the slopes of Hill 578, waiting for the 4.2 mortar salvos, ONE round was a dreaded SHORT round. It whispered its way down and hit less than 3 feet from me! But it was a dud, a bad round that was also short of its intended target. It dug a hole but the tail fin broke off and tumbled hitting my left arm, leaving a scratch on my arm and a sore bruise. No other injury. BUT had that 'short round' been good ammunition, I wouldn't be here.

Continued  Assault

After the salvos were over, we continued up the hill firing while being fired at. The prepatory fires had done their work. So many Chinese soldiers were killed in their foxholes that we seemed to outnumber them as we neared the top. And they could still throw grenades. 

Fortunately their grenades are crude, compared with the 'fragmentation' US Army grenades. Sometimes they just break into two or three, rather than 10 or 20 and you won't get hit unless you are in the path of those two.

I got my first Purple Heart when one of their 'potato-masher' grenades landed next to my leg, went off, but the iron end went away from me, while the wooden handle slammed my leg, giving me a painful bruise, with some blood that had to be staunched and cleaned by a medic when I limped past the aid station coming down a hill.

Then came one of the defining moments in my life on Hill 578.

My Obsolete Thompson Sub-Machine

My platoon guys were spread out crossing a series of foxholes with dead Chinese in them and firing on further hiting those who popped up. i.e. we were making progress working through a wide maze of defensive works.

I was behind the line of them, holding my radio in one hand and my carbine in the other when I heard a sound behind me, I turned to see a bloody Chinese soldier rise up and start to aim at me. He fired and missed. I fired and missed. But my carbine then jammed as its automatic light action couldn't seat the next .30 caliber shell! I had to yank it back and jam it forward again while he took a bead on me, again. My second shot killed him.

But at that instant I lost all confidence in that light officer's carbine. It can't handle the blown dust and grit on the typical Korean hill top that has been pulverized by prepatory fires.

I walked over to the foxhole where that Chinese soldier, and a second dead one was in the bottom of the hole were. I saw a Thompson .45 caliber submachine gun on top of him. I reached down and got it. It still had a magazine about half full in it.

From that moment on I carried that submachine gun with me and got rid of that carbine. It was obsolete according to the US Army. They issued something called the 'Grease Gun' to  replace it. I hated that one.

Ironically the Thompson, our WWII Army issue sub machine gun, was given to the Chinese Nationalists after the world war. After Mao defeated them those weapons were carried into Korea by his communist Army. We were fighting against our own American weapons!

But the heavy bolt action on the Thompson would crunch through grit and always seat the round. So after the fight on Hill 578, I put a sling on it, over my shoulder so it would hang, its muzzle aimed at the belly button of the man in front of me. And I kept the verticle rather the round drum magazine below to balance it. I hung it on my side, so could fire it left handed. (Only problem was that a Thompson is made for right handed shooters. So the slide with a projection for your hand to push it back comes back on the right side. When I fired it from my left side that damned handle would repeatedly gouge my hip bone. I had a sore hip for a long time after I was out of Korea)

Finally, the strike of that heavy .45 caliber slug made such a dirt puff on the kind of hills we kept climbing and assaulting, that I did better by firing single shot and 'walk'  the rounds to my target from my hip, rather than put it on full automatic and let the burst go - who knew where.

That Thompson Sub Machine gun, the famous 'Chicago Typwriter' of the Capone gang, saved my life once more in my time in Korea. On Hill 339. Both my leader's hands could still be free holding a radio and map while I moved with my assaulting platoon in attacks. Yet I could reach down and fire instantly from my hip when I needed to.

I thought back to Lt Shanks and his non-standard Springfield rifle.

I simply continued the US Army tradition of soldiers adapting to their tools of their trade in war when the differences between killing or being killed were often when an adaptation worked or not.

 Corporal Stephanak the Runner

One other thing happened I sadly remember on Hill 578. 

I had gotten pretty well known by my Jail Bird Platoon members by  Hill 578. After my taking the top of the machine gun nest by myself their respect for me went up. We joshed and joked at times. I was still an 'officer' and not their buddy. We talked about physical conditioning and I remarked I was a pretty good 440 runner when at West Point. Stephanak challenged me to a race.

About 6 of us guys raced, about 100 yards. The only soldier who could beat me was Stephanak.

Corporal Stephanak was killed in action that Feb 14th, 1951

After Hill 578 we had a break long enough for us to recover, replace broken or lost equipment, and take stock of where we are, individually.

I wrote a long letter, as much to myself as to my Mother. Here is that April letter.

Lt. David R. Hughes
Mrs. Helen Hughes
Shirley-Savoy Hotel
Denver, Colorado

Korea

Dear Mom:

I was cold, wet, miserable, tired, hungry and discouraged
a few minutes ago, when I saw some sturdy soul come trudging up the
mountainside with mail, Now, I am only cold, wet, tired and hungry.
Your letter gave me a great lift in the midst of all this chaos
and confusion.

I am now well down in a foxhole on the top of the highest - I
swear - mountain in all Korea, except, of course, for the one we were
over yesterday, and the day before, and, the day before that. We
gallant cavaliers of the First Cavalry are trying to break the backs
of the Chinese right now, and upon the reflection of the last week. I
do not see how the bodies and minds of men keep going so long without losing their elements of control and composure.

I do not kick too much for myself, for all I must carry is weapon,
ammunition and rations - but these men of my platoon. who must stagger up the slopes with 40 pounds of machine-gun ammunition - and the machine guns - and the rockets only to be shouted at, shot at, and cajoled into running the last fifty yards through machine-gun bullets, grenades, mortar fire - are men of the highest discipline. And discipline for what?

To be carried off the hill by four other men, and suffer smashed heads
and broken bodies, thinking they are the unluckiest men in all the
world until they see the dribble of others into the Aid Station with
their heads smashed in a little deeper, and their bodies broken a little
more? I don't know. It's hard to see the forest for the trees here.
And it is a question greater than all questions, when I look over
that hill and watch the placid face of the Chinaman, with the flap-eared cap on his head and the quilted coat, and wonder what he is thinking, and - what is more important •• why he is thinking it.

In an hour or so I will be there where he is, and he will be dead,
with a hole in his head much larger than you would expect from my little .30 caliber rifle. That he will be dead, I am very sure, because I have confidence in my men and in myself.

As I have been writing here, six men (two from my own platoon) have
passed my foxhole, hit by a mortar shrapnel. They are on their way
down to the Aid Station ... and rest - some for weeks, and some for months.

I wonder sometimes how much luck there is to the game, Or is it
luck? And is it a game? Back on Big Hill 578 we got pinned down close to a strong position, and they grenaded us. I was lying in the open when they yelled 'Grenade so I rolled over and felt something against my leg - looked down just in time to, see the handle of a potato masher grenade against me. Blam! The handle of the thing gave me a real Charlie Horse and a bum eye for awhile. But not a puncture in me any-where The man next to me was killed by it.

What is the answer? Luck? Prayer? I won't even hazard a guess.
SOMETHING is making it possible to live. And yet I would rather be here than anywhere in Korea now. It is life in its rawest form. It reduces sham to NOTHINGNESS, and here men are themselves. Here the values of life are returned to us; the simple act of making a cup of coffee is a worthwhile accomplishment. As a leader of 40 men I have the good feeling of responsibility, and aside from the close-in fighting, it is for me to provide many of their needs; minister to their hopes and fears; raise their morale; deal with their misbehavior; listen to their feelings as they express them; and try to direct their lives so that they will function with a will and a purpose.

There is no democracy on a hilltop; but as a platoon leader, there
is no troop leading quite as intimate or as thorough; and it is a
responsibility. There is no officer below to pass the buck to. What more could one ask in the way of service to those of lesser rank? The only guide I must religiously keep, is the principle of humility; decide with confidence; lead without fear; listen with compassion; and remain humble.
 

It is a far greater, more rewarding life on this hill, Mom, than all
the successes of what we call 'Civilization'. Mahatama Ghandi said once, about this business of leading, and very accurately. "There go my people - I must hurry and catch them, for I am their leader."

Korea is tough, but what worthwhile reward is gained without some price? Perhaps now you can see why I chose West Point. If not, someday I will explain. Since I have discovered an important truth, I suffer much less. That is, that fear is only the emotion of ignorance. If I keep informed, fill the gaps of knowledge with educated guesses, fear disappears - andI can do my job as coolly as tho I were in Denver.
 
And that's all from Korea today.

Love,

Dave

She gave it to the Denver Post, which reproduced it, full text.

It got picked up many places. The Rocky Mountain News - competitor to the Denver Post, picked it up also and printed it full text.

The Chicago 'Rush Limbaugh of its Day' Alex Drier read it aloud over his nationally syndicated talk show.

Acme Steel News - a national Steel Industry Newsletter reprinted it in its slick publication.

The Valley Forge Foundation,  gave me an award for it and cited it for its 'contributing a better understanding of the "American Way of Life"

Finally, on August 9th, Senator Eugene Millikin of Colorado, who had appointed me to West Point, read it aloud on the floor of the Senate - in, according to the Rocky Mountain News - a 'voice choked with emotion'.

It was then entered into the Congressional Record.

It was a short patrol - as Patrols Go. Less than a day, but calculated to pin down just where the Chinese were on those hill masses north of Hill 578, which we would have to tackle sooner or later.

I was given a section of 2 M4 Sherman Tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion to accompany me, to help develop where the enemy was. One thing I could use them for, was to supress long range machine gun fire from the higher hills. I was getting accustomed to being shot at from a distance in ways we could not effectively counter - unless we directly attacked their positions. Using the 76mm Tank Cannon might do the trick.

So we clanked along on the lower ground past the main hill mass until we turned the corner and started moving east toward an extension of the hills to the north.

Suddenly we started getting machine gun fire from the low ridge in front of us. I could tell from the crack-thump sounds the machine gun was pretty far away - perhaps 500 yards. I could not see their position! We were exposed, pretty much in the open. We had to silence that thing before we got casualties!

And just then the lead tank pulled up a few yards, its front toward the same hill that the fire was coming from, but it closed all its hatches! I couldn't talk to it on my radio because the Tankers were on different - from our Infantry - frequencies!

So I ran around the back of the tank where the external phone was supposed to be. It was gone! The only thing in the telephone box were two wires that had been attached to a phone. I'll bet - and I saw this before - some Infantry Grunt had run up to the back of the tank when its motor was running, tried to talk to the men inside just as they decided to move! And that caused the phone to be yanked loose as the grunt was probably turned away from the roaring sound of the engines, never saw the movement of the tank - and the phone was yanked out. Damn..

Tankers are in Tanks so they are not exposed to small arms fire. But it doesn't help when they can't see or hear where the enemy shooting at them are, so they can shoot back!

I could hear the machine gun bullets plink off the tank hull during every other burst of fire. Another reason the tankers wouId not open the hatch! I stood where I could brace my binoculars and looked to where the fire was coming from. I saw some smoke after a burst - so I had the  machine gun's location pinpointed. Sooner or later I would get a man wounded even though all of them were flat on the ground and in depressions in the ground.

We had to kill that weapon!

So I ran around in front of the tank where the driver and gunner could see me through their periscopes, my back to the machine gun and pointed at the area where the machine gun was located. The gunner rotated his canon in that general direction, but not, as I estimate where it was pointed, not close enough. So then I used hand signals, winding my arms to get him to wind the canon. Finally it was as close as I could tell, and then pointed at his periscope and banged my fists, which meant 'fire.'

The damned gunner and driver NODDED their periscopes with a 'Yes' motion. Before I could get away from the side of the canon, they fired..

The flash deflector sent the shock waves sideways right onto my right ear. It blew out my ear drum, and I have been deaf in that ear ever since!

I've never forgiven tankers for 'nodding' their periscopes instead of cracking open theur hatches. And cursed tank designers for not installing external telephones that can't be yanked out of the tank frame. And I cursed the Army for not getting tankers and the Infantry overlapping radio frequencies!

The one round that was fired seemed to silence, or scare the Chinese machine gun crew. So we patrolled on and returned to report what we had seen. My head ringing for days.

Footnote: I did not seek, nor get, a 3d Purple Heart for my damaged hearing, even though it was caused by 'friendly fire' - which qualified for one for it occured during combat operations. But decades later my family, noting my declining hearing abilities insisted that I apply, under Veteran's Administration rules for a 'Disability' benefit. Before the bureaucracy, and tests, were done, I was ruled that I had 70% hearing loss. So in 2015 I began to be paid $3,253 a month for my Veterans Disability, and was provided a modern-technology hearing aid.  

April 8th, I suppose, I could mark as my coming of Professional Age.

For on that date I led my 30 man platoon on a very complex and very dangerous mission around to the rear of a Chinese Battalion holding a dominant mountain peak blocking the advance of the 7th Cavalry. I attacked them successfully, inflicting great casualties, precipitating their later night retreat, and withdrew after suffering only one trooper killed and one wounded.

It was as close as I ever came in two wars to have carried off a perfect military combat operation. I was later asked to write up that operation for the Combat Forces Journal - then the primary professional Army Journal. It was published September, 1952.

By April 8th, having gone through the great 200 mile winter retreat, I then led my platoon in several early offensive operations, I did my junior officer combat apprenticeship under Captain Flynn. He was gone by now, promoted to Major and had become another Battalion's Operations - the 2d Bn of the 7th Cavalry. Lieutenant Ryan, previously the Executive Officer of Company K was the company commander during this Hill 878 operation.

I have attached this 4 page Journal article as a lengthy, illustrated  PDF file of that original article. It speaks for itself.

Click Here for the Long Article PDF It is an Adobe Acrobat file. You need that software to read it.

Read the pdf and you will get an insight into the tactical and leadership detail that goes into a successful operation against a numerically superior foe. And it perfectly demonstrated the lesson I learned from Captain Flynn duing the Great Retreat - how and when to use "Marching Fire" instead of carefully and slowly Aimed Fire. 

The Soldiers in my platoon trusted me by now- vitally important in hill combat where my decisions affected their very lives. And I knew about them individually enough to get the most out of them. They were no longer the Jail Birds platoon. They were as good as any other Rifle Platoon in the 7th Cavalry or 3d Battlion. 

Photo of only man killed on the Hill 878 operation - Hershal Davis, BAR man

Uncertain Trumpet, Captain Lewis, and Company K

By mid 1951 the Korean War was stretching the manpower resources of the US Army. Especially in the junior officer ranks.  Because of that, and the intensity of the war,  for the first 18 months, the Army adopted a new way to lessen the strain on soldiers and officers. It had never been used before at the level it was adopted for those serving in Korea.

It was called 'Rotation.' After so many months - averaging 13 at the beginning, that men had served in Korea, men were shipped home, and guaranteed they would not be sent back to Korea for a number of years. Men were awarded 'points' which added up to the equivalency of 'months' depending on their jobs. Men in combat units got more 'points' than men in rear areas, such as in supply and transportation.

But that policy cut into the experience level of units - especially the fighting Divisions and their combat support units. By taking out all the officers who served on the Pusan Perimeter, then the breakout to the Yalu River, then the winter retreat, and rotate them out in June of 1951, the combat effectiveness of their units could drop greatly.

One way the Army could  beef up the Company Grade officer pool - 1st lieutenants, Captains, and Majors - was to tap the Reserves who were released at the end of WWII, but required to remain in a 'Reserve Status' for a number of years, for which they could draw 'training pay' and other benefits. And there were a large number of 'Gangplank Promotions' of men who were Lieutenants in Infantry, Artillery, Armor units in the last months of WWII, and, for their 'reserve benefits' but were promoted to Captains at the very end.

Such was a Captain Lewis, who had served as a Platoon leader in WWII, never had commanded a company, had no combat experience but who, when called up for Korea, was shipped there, and was given 'command' of  a rifle company in the 1st Cavalry Division. Thus, he was assigned to the 7th Cav, with its three battalions and 9 Rifle Companies - the heart of experienced combat power of the 'Garry Owen.'

I was experienced enough to command K Company, and had all the credentials for battlefield promotion, but I could not be promoted to Captain, for with all the 'recalled' Captains from WWII there were too many Infantry Captains in the Army. Promotions stopped. (Classmates who had reached and fought in Korea from August 1950 on, were often promoted to Captain before their year was up. No such luck for me, having arrived in Korea in November, 1950. I remained a 1st Lieutenant through the my year of war.)

That is how and why Captain Lewis, in his 30s. with a great handlebar mustache, become Company K Commander, after both Lt Ryan, the Executive Officer, and Lieutenant Shank 'rotated' out of the company. And long after Captain Flynn had been promoted and moved to a higher headquarters. That left only me and numerous NCO's with less than 1 year in Korea in Company K, but with a lot of combat experience to serve under Captain Lewis, who had none. The war was still going on, and major operations would still be undertaken.

It was unfair to him to be thrust into such a position, but that's the way it was.

It took  only the first combat patrol operation to reveal his lack of tactical savvy, especially in that war against a very different enemy than he had been prepared for in Europe.

In May, 1951 I was ordered to patrol to find the enemy out to 10 miles in our Cav sector. We made the patrol out to the point we drew fire from the enemy - pretty long range rifle and machine gun fire which was ineffective. And we reported the new location where we contacted the enemy.

But it took a long time, far too long a time, for Lewis to radio me to tell me what he wanted us to do now - return or continue patrolling. So I had to remain in my position, the enemy, knew where we were, and they acted on that information, while we remained in the open, under their view. I asked whether Lewis wanted us to start digging in. I got no answer.

As I feared, the Chinese cranked up a fire mission, and then quickly zeroed in on my platoon's position, spread across three wet rice paddies. The first enemy salvo was off line, but the second landed right in the middle of my Platoon one of whose members was a highly combat experienced member of WWII's famed Asian 'Merrill's Marauders.' He was the closest we could get to a highly knowledgeable fighter against Asian soldiers.

One 82 mm mortar landed right in the middle of my 1st Squad, above ground they couldn't dig in killing him and two other men instantly.

On my own I ordered the Platoon to get moving toward the enemy to get out from under their steady surveillance and fire.

The last I saw of our Merrill's Marauder, who had been sitting up against the rice paddy berm when the mortar hit, and it laced his body and obliterated his face, killing him instantly. He didn't even fall over when the mortar round hit and perforated his body. He died motionless. I saw the proud patch on his left shoulder, a man who had fought the Japanese for years, staying alive in the unforgiving Burmese jungle, until he was the victim of an inexperienced Company Commander's lack of orders in Korea. And I blamed my self for not just telling Captain Lewis what I was GOING to do next, and start out to continue the patrol deeper into enemy territory  and let him change my orders if he needed to later.

We completed the patrol and retured to base, but I was bitter  about what happened and why.

About this time of turbulent transition in the 8th Army units top to bottom were undergoing change. United Nations forces, including the dominant US Army forces in Korea, arrayed across the the peninsula, generally south of the 38th Parallel had shown they were capable of slowing the massed Chinese Communist Armies from pushing much further south. 

One Year Rotation back to the US Mainland for the vast majority of US Soldiers caused a loss of the most combat experienced officers and men. And in many cases, like that of Captain Flynn's, experienced officers were promoted to higher headquarters, and lost to the companies or battalions they had been in.

Then one day I was tapped to become the Aide-de-camp for General Brigadier Elwyn Post,  the 1st Cavalry Assistant Division Commander.

This was a big surprise for me, with still less than one year's commissioned service. But apparently, he looked around the Division for a young officer who was promising, but with combat experience, for he, Post, only reached Korea and his assignment in 1951 - he was not there in the actions during 1950. He had graduated from West Point in 1923, and was promoted to general in WWII.

I really hated to be pulled out of my Company K where I might be in line to command it during all the losses of Captains and turmoil.

Well, I tried it, and rode around with the General in his Jeep as he familiarized himself with the Division. Assist Commanders are usually there to get experience at that level as a new General, but also to be instantly available if the Major General commanding gets wounded or killed.

Being in the Division Command Headquarters, I was able to use a typewriter for some of my longer letters home.

And I tried, for the first time ever, to send at least 15 rolls of film I had taken enroute to and in Korea. I had been able from time to time to take pictures, even including combat-aftermath photoes, some with dead enemy soldiers in them.

Now I am not sure, but either there was a blanket censorship at 8th Army, or they simply got lost in the flood of mail to and from Korea. But none of the rolls of film ever showed up at my mothers Hotel in Denver.

As a 1st Lieutenant Aide now, wearing a Cavalry Yellow scarf and the Collar Insignia to match

I had little fear of driving close to units in contact, and twice led the general too close for HIS comfort. He sensed I really wanted to go back to my unit, and continue to fight the war. So reluctantly after a month of being an aide, he let me go. 

But after visiting me back in my unit and on a hill, the General ordered that I go on R&R even before I would normally go, in another month or so. He even invited me to visit his wife's home in Yokohama on my 5 days 'R&R' (rest and recuperation) leave. I think he also wanted me to meet his 12 year old son there. For later I found out his son also went to West Point and did very well as an officer.

I instead went to Tokyo, had a ball, some of the time with Classmate Frank Duggins who knew how to party and find the girls. And I even bought a Japanese Nikon Camera - again, like I bought a Rolliflex camera in Germany after the war. Both defeated countries started  producing excellent, and still cheap 35mm color cameras.

But one thing was evident. I could not take pictures while commanding my platoon.

So after R&R I returned to Company K, 7th Cav, put my new camera in my personal footlocker stored at the Company Supply level and was notified I was being made the Company K, Commander - following Flynn, Ryan, and Lewis. Capt Lewis was moved into a Staff Officer's - rather than another command - slot. 

A very, very great leap of faith by my commanders, and I think by Colonel Gilmer, the Regimental Commander. 

Now, with the fillers that had come into the theater, I now commanded up to 200 men, in their 3 rifle companies, one weapons company, and the headquarters company. It was not until another month that I also got six officers. One of whom was a Classmate of mine, Lieutenant John Ross. He became a Rifle Platoon Leader.

We started getting ready for more combat - as the goal of the 8th Army remained to at least push the Chinese and resurgent North Korean Army back across the 38th Parallel, restoring the original national boundary -while the Chinese Government remained bent on driving south far enough to occupy Seoul again and overturn the government of South Korea, if not occupy all the peninsula. 

I was ready for war again, even if the American public was not. They were getting frustrated at the inconclusiveness of this war.

My mother was typical. She even wrote a letter to Presidential Candidate Dwight Eisenhower urging him do something, for she saw that I was always fighting over the same hills. 

I did not know that until I was back in the US for many months. And even then it was not until I went through her papers after she died in 1968, that I saw how busy she was.

The Months of May and June were spent getting the new replacement soldiers relatively trained. And patrols, many with Tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion accompanying, were sent out west and north west of Uijongbu, to keep in contact with the enemy units, which increasingly seemed to be digging in and fortifying their defenses more than we had seen before.

In turn, the 7th Cav, starting out  with the 4th GEF (Greek) Battalion setting up an advanced Patrol Base almost half way between US and Chinese Army lines. Then patrols were sent out in a 9,000 meter arc to keep contact with the enemy.

One of my platoon patrols surrounded 15 enemy troops in a house. We killed 6 enemy soldiers and took 3 prisoners.

But some other patrols lead to humorous results.Another platoon captured 10 pack horses. Brought them back, we found pack saddles, and commenced using them to transport heavy supplies to our outlying troops. After all we WERE the 7th Cavalry. Right?

All I had to do was put a yellow ribbon in that Cav Animal's forelock, a 1st Cavalry Division Crest on the horseblanket, and we were in the Garry Owen business! Thats me in the "saddle".

                                         The USO PAYS US A VISIT                            

Then, since we were pretty much out of range of Chinese Artillery, our Company was chosen to host a bevy of 4 USO lady entertainers for lunch!!

That causes us a scramble, because our Rifle Company was not used to serving plate lunches! And we sure didn't have any beer, wine much less bourbon, So we decided to really let the ladies get the idea what a 'front line unit' really was like and what it celebrated.

One idea was to take a half empty whisky bottle that someone had kept, carefully use a pen to mark on the lable a series of marks denoting 'when' we last celebrated a big event in Company K's combat history. i.e, one line on the label for when we drank to the 'Breakout of the Pusan Perimeter', 'Thanksgiving in Pyonyang,' 'Shanks Boots'- with a mark showing just where we all took one sip of whiskey and not let the bottle run dry.

So we gravely put a mark and wrote "USO Visit by the Ladies" Then each lady just took a sip. And we told them, if they hear a loud clanging bell, to get in one of the foxholes - for that meant incoming artillery.They really thought we were the warriors. And had stories to tell back home how they visited a real front line outfit - Company K, 7th Cav, Custer's outfit.

(Note that Lieutenant 'Bon Vivant' Radcliff  who came from Canada, and joined the US Army was at the head of the table as I took the picture.And also note in the marginal note, he was Killed in Action 4 months later on Hill 339.)

The 7th Cav Spirit

Milton Caniff did this Cartoon in 1959. But look closely, because he sure put 'K' on the crossed Sabers. K Company, 7th Cav. MY COMPANY! HE had the Garry Owen Spirit! We enjoyed waving our Garry Owen 7th Cav banner wherever we went. Soldiers from other, dull, units got jealous. Custer? We called the Korean War, Custer's Revenge!

The Skull Flap

Not all the incidents were laughable. At least I was not laughing when the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Haldane confronted me in July one day.

I had to spend most of my time on the defensive or offense mountain ridges with my fighting platoons. I rarely rode in my jeep "K-1." My First Sergeant or Executive officer would routinely be driven by my driver to and from Headquarters or supply, or the mail drop at Regiment. I was in that jeep only when I was called to the Hdq and it was too far to walk to and back

But my jeep had, as all of the ones across 8th Army, a verticle 'wire cutter.' An angle iron welded to the front bumper, and standing up at least 7 feet high. That was to defeat the enemy patrols which would stretch a 'decapitation' wire across well travelled routes where jeeps with personnel in the front seat were expected. At night, if the wire cutter was not there, one or both men in the front seat, especially if the windshield were down, or the man stood up to peer far ahead, could have their heads chopped off.

That wire cutter iron was routine on all jeeps and my jeep was no exception. But one day as I was hiking down to the road where my jeep would pick me up, I looked down and saw a skeleton, with a North Korean enemy uniform still attached to it from some long past battle that went through the area.  I picked up a human skull from the enemy soldier who had fallen there, and first put it atop the wire cutting angle iron. Then in my company headquarters I took a piece of yellow cavalry ribbon and put it around the skull's neck and told my driver to leave it there.

Over the next week or so, every time my driver had to visit battalion headquarters, that skull was there. The word got around. Until Col Haldane heard about it, and the next time my K-1 jeep came around, he ordered the driver to take it down. And told me he wanted to see me.

So I got an ass chewing for my bit of gallows humor.

As both the Chinese and American forces west of Uijongbo and east of the Imjin River glowered at each other from June through August of 1951 both sides kept sending out patrols to keep track of what either was doing. There were inevitable clashes between patrols.

I didn't like having to dispatch patrols repeatedly toward areas I knew would be defended well and where ambushes would be set up just to kill or capture American soldiers for which this inconclusive war had gone on too long.

I was getting new soldiers and several new officers into my Company K, 7th Cavalry. I wanted them to get used to each other before sending them out into sure trouble.

So, even though I was company commander, I decided to send out the next platoon sized patrol myself with two combat savy NCOs, to see if, with our greater experience I could avoid trouble - and casualties - while getting the intelligence Battalion demanded.

As it turned out, we encountered trouble, and only avoided more because by then I knew how to calculate time-of-flight of our artillery shells by sound alone - which I have written about before - I came to rely on my ears more than my eyes to track a battle.

We moved out on a rainy morning, first about 1,000 yards west, then started south along transverse ridge lines where the enemy could establish observation posts to look more closely at our 7th Cav lines and forces,

We were moving, as usual, in single file, and quietly, on that narrow ridge, about 30 yards between our 'point man' - the most detested position, for its the first soldier shot at, and his squad leader. I was behind the squad leader. 

There was burst of fire from what I knew were Chinese weapons, and rounds popped over our heads. We fired back, but the enemy was down in foxholes. Could have been ten or more Chinese in those holes, judging from the amount of fire aimed in our direction. We were below a rise in the ridgeline so we were not line of sight to the enemy. But everybody hit the deck. I crawled up to where the squad leader was. He didn't need prompting from me. He said "Cornell is dead." They have foxholes on both sides of the ridge. They are still in em"

I crawled past him, stuck my head up to see the soles of  Private Cornell's boots as he lay on the ground, not moving. I saw enough blood on the back of his fatigue shirt to know he had been riddled with bullets. I could also see just the tops of several Chinese heads in the foxholes just beyond him maybe 10 yards. They let him get that close before opening up.

Where Experience Counts

I knew he was either dead or so close to it, getting him back was a near impossibility. I would have to assault and overrun all those herringboned  foxholes that were on the high ground, and take more casualites over 1,000 yards to the closest friendly lines. And we had found what we were sent for - intelligence on the nearest Chinese positions.

But I also really wanted to get his body back. I didn't want the Chinese stripping his boots and clothes off, getting his rifle and ammunition, and leaving him to rot on the mountain. I couldn't remember when we ever failed to get our dead back, even if it was days after the battle. But I also did not want to get even more men hit trying to get him.

So I decided to try something only my long experience hearing shells pass overhead and explode could tell me. I already had noted mentally as we set out on patrol, the firing over our heads by the support battery of the 77th Field Artillery 105mm shells that were 'interdicting' long range, the Chinese lines in their rear. Miles and miles away. Now, having turned south we were 90 degrees to the gun target line.

I gave some quick orders to my following men to arrange themselves to be sure we didn't get flanked. Then I called in my intelligence report. I added that I was going to try and get Cornell's body back. It might take some time. That I wanted the 77th Field Artillery Forward Observer on the radio.

I told that FO that I wanted to have him order, very, very carefully, a series of fire missions short of the enemy on the ridge in front of me,  then just over them by 200 yards, so we could try and reach and pull back our dead soldier while the Chinese were ducking, not knowing where the impact would be.

He got the idea, and started the fire mission with the map coordinates I gave him, while I got two men ready to try and reach Cornell and pull him back. I urged the Forward Observer - who would be flying blind this time, just relaying what I told him - to be especially careful because were were less than 100 yards to the right of the gun-target line. He understood, and told the battery to double check.

I listened to the first rounds come screaming in to the left front of us, as I watched the Chinese foxholes, and counted the time from when we heard the guns until the splash of the rounds. As I thought the Chinese in the foxholes ducked down when they heard the rounds were incoming and they knew they were aimed at them. I told the FO to adjust a little further closer to the Chinese. At least one of the 6 rounds actually hit on the top of the ridge. Good. Really puckered them up.

I wanted the two men to scambled forward on hand and knees while the rounds were in the air and the Chinese were down deep in their foxholes not knowing whether the rounds would explode right where they were.. Then wait until the next salvo was fired. and while it was coming down off to the right front of them, pull the body back.

I could see the Chinese soldiers duck down when the first two salvos landed a good four seconds after the sound of the guns first reached them and us.

So I told the FO to fire that again, and then add 200, and fire only on my command.

The guns sounded, and the two men scrambled forward in the mud in that four seconds and lay right at Cornell's boots when the rounds splashed to the right front of them but well down the steep slope, while the Chinese stayed well out of sight, expecting to be hit.

Then I gave the command to fire, the FO relayed it, and we heard the sound, and the two men dragged Private Paul Cornell back to where we were just as the rounds went off again to our right front.

Then I told the FO it worked, but now drop 150, and fire lots for effect.

As soon as the gun sounds reached us for that salvo, we started fast back down the muddy trail with four men carrying our dead man. Meanwhile the 77th Field's 105s rounds crashed down right on or near those foxholes with maybe 10 Chinese soldiers were, once our man was safely back. No way to tell whether they hit any of the holes. The odds were good, for the 77th Field Artillery dumped at least 6 salvos on that ridge where they were, as we got back into our own lines.

As we came back, I said to myself - I suppose one could call that at the Infantry School 'Fire and Maneuver' - though no field manual ever would recommend that maneuver we just pulled off.

Hillside Prayers and the Deadly Marks

This photo is very old - it is of me holding a hillside prayer service for the platoon that soldier Cornell was in in the summer of 1951. No Chaplain was around when I wanted to do it.

But the more significant part of that photo is that I later drew lines (upper red lines) marking every man that was there that day, who was Killed in Action (KIA) afterward. And the faint lines below are of every man who was Wounded in Action (WIA) later. I studied that old photo near the end of my tour in Korea after Hills 339 and 347, when I still remembered faces. It is a photo in bad shape, but with a powerful message about the Price of War.   

A sober reminder.

Emotional Aftermath

The emotional impact of losing another of my soldiers - for they all seem to be mine now that I am their company commander - got to me as I started writing my letter to Cornell's parents. I stared out at the fog and rain for a long time.

But the only way to unburden myself was to write about the incident itself and how important it was to all of us to bring back our fallen soldier. And I held that prayer service  pictured above.

I did write about that mission and mailed it home to my mother. It is in the next item.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My mother showed that letter above to the Rocky Mountain News, which printed almost all of it.

My mother got several handwritten letters about that letter and what it told them about that endless war.

Up until August almost all the Plans and Operations of the 7th Cavalry were done with excellent results, including low number of casualties.

For a time, the 3d Battalion occupied Line Wyoming, strengthing it in the event of a general Communist Offensive. At the same time, the fledgling 'Truce Talks' at Panjumon started, and then faltered. In fact the new 8th Army commander, General Van Fleet was sure it was going to take a punishing push against the current Chinese lines east of the Imjim River to get the North Korean's back to the negotiating table.

So he planned a push to a new line Jamestown, northwest of Yonchon, that would be across, but still close to, the original 38th Parallel.  That push seemed to be started against a Hill 487. The 2d Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was the first unit to be given the mission.

That hill was not only very steep, but the closer one looked at the top, it became a hand over hand climbing problem. There were large rocks and boulders on top that gave the defenders protection from small arms fire.

Whether it was bad planning, or simply a much harder defense, together with less combat experienced - after the wave of summer rotation - soldiers and officers, they were repulsed. Several times.

Then it became the 3d Battalions time, and my Company K had to commit two platoons. It looked hopeless from the beginning to me. Hill 487 was absolutely dominant, and even plunging machine gun fire down from the top was deadly for the men trying to climb the mountain from the east side.

The worst happened. Not only were we repulsed but Lt Ross, the new platoon leader in my Company K, my West Point classmate, was shot up in his right arm so bad he had to be evacuated.

The Battalion called off the assault, and we were returned to the Wyoming line for the entire operation to be reorganized.

It took another Division almost another month before 487was taken. and only after other supporting, Chinese occupied hills fell.

Meanwhile the 7th Cav was having its own problems, in which I seem to have figured prominently, to bring off success. They were called Hills 339, and 347. 

Hill 339 became the biggest test for me, and my Company K, 7th Cavalry.

First of all that isolated round top hill, far out in front of the 3d Battalion lines, and very close to the Chinese forces east of the Imjim River in their main defensive line was like a thumb in the Chinese eye. They did not want it occupied by US Forces. I later saw why.

First of all, G Company from the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry was first unit ordered up there to establish a company sized Patrol base in order to send patrols deeper into enemy territory and at the same time keep the patrols within range of supporting weapons. 

From the first day it was clear the Chinese didn't want that thumb so deep in their eye. They started firing on it with their indirect weapons that they had, at last, been able to bring down the peninsula from China, dig in, and employ.

Company C, from the 1st Battalion relieved Company G on the 5th of September on Hill 339.

At 2200 the night of the 6th, Company C was attacked by a superior sized force. Company C was overrun, suffered heavy losses in both men and equipment. The company completely disintegrated. A heavily reinforced company from the 2d Battalion jumped off from Hills 321 and 343 to recapture Hill 339. Which it managed to do again  on the 7th.

They had to carry down the many US soldier's dead bodies from the area aroun the peak of the hill.

It was becoming clear that the Chinese were not going to let the Americans close to their lines without a fight.  And that 339 was a bloody piece of real estate.

Why Me?

Col Gilmer, the 7th Cavalry commander got into the act. First he ordered the 3d Battalion to prepare plans for a battalion sized patrol base well out in front of Wyoming, in which one company would occupy and defend Hill 339.

And he directly ordered Lt Col Haldane, 3d Battalion Commander, to put Company K and its Dave Hughes Commander on, and defend, Hill 339. So Col Gilmer apparently thought I was one subordinate commander he could rely on to win important battles.

In an 8 page letter I wrote to my old Company Commander, John Flynn, after he got back to the US, and as I was on the way home in February, 1952 after having been Gilmer's Operations Officer, but was wounded by a mortar attack, I spelled out that battle of 339, and the worst battle to seize Hill 347. You can read that letter. I won't repeat it all here, just the high points.

When I went up Hill 339 - it was uncontested that day, September 21st. The Chinese chose to stay off that magnet for US heavy artillery and mortar fire, and attack at night, as they did Company C, destroying it. 

I went up there with my present Company K strength of 6 other officers, 5 on the hill, and 169 enlisted men, and a squad of 10 South Korean Soldiers, called Katusas - from the shattered remains of the Korean Army from the earlier battles. They were to augment US combat units.

The hill was very steep all around. Here is a glimpse of one view.

The other two Rifle Companies I and L completed the perimiter of the Battalion Fire Base. 339 remained, however, the key. Who held that hill dominated all the rest.  You can see the entire layout here. "MLR" shows the trace of the Chinese Front Line. 

I quickly saw why the Chinese were so determined to get us and keep us off that hill. For not only was it close to their main line defenses, we could see down into the rear of their support areas - and direct artillery, heavy mortar, and air strikes on them. 

Immediately we started getting what we would be subjected to for the next 7 days and nights - incessant 81 and 120mm mortar fire aimed right at the peak. We began to take casualties right away. 

By 2200 hours that first night we had the first assaults from both the left flank, the right flank of the L-shaped mountain with apex at the peak, and down the north slopes to the road on which we had a 70th Armor M4 Tank and a few men around it, that broke up their first attack there.

Starting the next morning I had ordered more barbed wire, napalm for our two flame throwers, three more heavy machine guns brought up. And lots of ammunition. The Koreans were very helpful at that, since they are used to carrying huge loads. (But I kept them away, at night, from our front line - I did NOT want any of them walking around our foxholes at night - with almost no command of English, with oriental faces, and off color uniforms. 

I placed one of the water cooled .30 caliber machine guns right on top of my command bunker, just down off the highest peak. If that had to be used it would be my last line of defense. 

I was ordered then to send out a patrol on the 23d to determine just where the closest enemy lines were. I did not like it, for I could see where those lines were, and a patrol, with little maneuver room, was bound to be the focus of lots of fire from dug in Chinese soldiers.

But orders were orders. And I sent the most experienced officer I had, Lt Radcliffe to lead his platoon on that patrol. 

He only got a few hundred yards when automatic fire rained down on his platoon. Radcliff was killed immediately, .....

A Sergeant who was in the rear of the platoon, took this picture of PFC Bernal just minutes before he to was killed on that patrol.

This cat and mouse game went on for 5 more days and nights. The night of the 27/28 was the climatic battle I had prepared my men and unit for. We had already suffered 39 killed or wounded from the bombardment alone over the seven days and nights leading up to their great push.

The Chinese attacked my reduced strength (less than 125 men on the hill itself) company to seize Hill 339, with a 600 man, 5 rifle company, Battalion coming at us after a huge mortar preparation at midnight. primarily over what the diagram shows as the Left Entry Ridge, and the Right Entry Ridge. 

The next pages will show how the attack developed all night long.

When I came off Hill 347 with 192 Chinese Prisoners of War the evening of October 7th,  I knew that my Company Command Tour would be over soon. Because of the losses from casualties the last 15 days - all my officers dead or wounded, and 169 enlisted men dead or wounded - leaving Company K with only 15 effective men left, I knew that my beloved soldier unit of Company K was no more. It would have to be filled up with replacements. They had been asked to do the impossible - defeat two full strength Chinese Army Battalions, one in defense of Hill 339, and one in taking Hill 347 - and they did.

Custer would have been proud. I call the battle for Hill 347, Custer's Revenge. I know Col Gilmer was - I lived up to his very high expectations of me as a West Point graduate. 

My only regret was that he chose, instead of submitting Company K for an Presidential UNIT Citation, he recommended that I, personally, receive a Silver Star for Hill 339, and a Distinguished Service Cross for Hill 347. I would have traded both for recognition for my Cav Troopers by a Presidential Unit Citation rather than individual awards to me, on their behalf. They, not I alone, did the job.

So my dream when I chose straight Infantry coming out of West Point, a year and a half earlier, was fulfilled. Those American soldiers, over half being drafted, not volunteers, and none being elite Rangers or Airborne qualified performed exactly the way I thought they could right out of Middle America - with the right kind of leadership, organization, weaponry, and training - even if much of that took place during combat itself.

My learning curve was quite steep in the absence of formal Infantry Officer training which was supposed to happen to all my classmates before the war started, but because of the North Korean aggressive invasion, that didn’t happen. And 40 of my CLassmates were killed in the Korean War. So my learning curve had to be greatly accelerated by Captain Flynn, the other 1st Lieutenant officers of Company K and NCO's starting with steady Msgts Ingram, and Abaticio. And of course I would not have had the clarity of purpose, determination, superior physical fitness, and sustained mission focus, without my four apprentice years at West Point, regardless of my academic class standing, and spotty disciplinary record.

Staff Appointment

So it was no surprise to be ordered by Colonel Gilmer to be appointed the Assistant S-3 - operations officer - at the 7th Cavalry Regimental Headquarters. Two levels above my Company position, even though I was still just a first lieutenant. I guess you have to grow into the jobs you are handed by the Army.

There was good reason for that secondary staff  position to be filled. For the entire 1st Cavalry Division - all three of its Regiments - 5th, 7th, and 8th - were to depart Korea by the end of December after the fighting died down once 8th Army had shoved the Chinese Armies back over the 38th Parallel and inflicted a large number of casualties on them. It was then time to go back to Japan, back into the same locations in Japan they left from a year earlier. They were to be replaced pn the front in Korea by Regiments of the 45th Division - Oklahoma National Guardsmen who had been called to active duty when the war started, and who had occupied and trained - in the posts that the 7th Cav had previously occupied. (It was a Sergeant in the 45th Division which replaced the 7th Cav on Hill 347 who took the two pictures of the Hill and Trenches in April 1952)

I was to be on the 'Advance Party' of the 7th Cav, and travel to Japan, to make the changeover run smoothly. So I only spent two weeks at the 7th Cav headquarters in Korea near Uijongbu, before heading for Camp Crawford, Japan.

That duty was much less pressure-filled than I had as a Company Commander during those extreme combat operations. I could decompress. I would also have some time to do two things - first to compose and deliver recommendations and sworn statements in support of a large number - over 20 – of my personal recommendations for Combat Awards - from Bronze Stars with V/Device, and Silver Stars, to Distinguished Service Crosses - both for the living and dead Company K troopers who fought with me, and I witnessed, their extremely brave acts during those last 15 days. Secondly, with access to the Regimental operational records, I could learn just how Company K's operations fit into the bigger Regimental scheme during the same time. 

I had an intimate knowledge of what went on in my Company K, but I only had a general idea of how the rest of the 3d Battalion, the other three Battalions including the Greeks, and the Regiment and Division as a whole fared during those intense combat periods.

What I learned from that study of records during December and January at Camp Crawford, permitted me to write the 8 page report while I was on the boat coming back to the to the United States in my normal 'rotation' tour. I would send it to Major Flynn then recovering from his wounds at Fort Benning, Georgia. He had written twice to ask me what happed to 'his' Company and Regiment after he was gone. I had no chance to answer him during operations. 

My ability to write clearly appears not to have diminished during my year in Korea. While I wrote that letter to Major Flynn, just for his use, mailing it from the port of Seattle on the 3d of March, 1952, he returned the original to me decades later, but also had taken the liberty of circulating it in the 1960s and 70s to people he thought could better understand what American soldiers went though in that 'Forgotten War." 

To my complete surprise, that letter was included in 2002 in the book "The 50 Greatest Letters from America's Wars" by David Lowenherz. It shared impressive neighbors - letters from Abraham Lincoln, Gen George Washington, John Kennedy, and General Dwight Eisenhower.

That letter is included here after these first 27 chapters in this biography of the Korean War. It is in 'Korean War (28)'

'Korean War (27)' the next item after this one is called 'The Fickle Gods of War' about all the recommendations I made that were destroyed in a fire after I left Japan.

Christmas on Hokkaido

The three months I spent at Camp Crawford on Hokkaido was a welcome respite from the stressful year from landing at Inchon through the fights on Hills 339 and 347.

Besides the staff job of helping make the incoming Cav, and outgoing Guard process - which took over a month - go smoothly, and my writing down recommendations for awards, I was given one other important mission to carry out before I departed for the states.

Hokkaido is the most northern Japanese Island. And it is very close to Soviet Territory including Sakhalin Island. With the Korean War going on, with Soviet support for the North Koreans, there was US Government nervousness about any activities that the Soviets might undertake, from illicit entry into Hokkaido from the very furthest and isolated tip of the island to intelligence gathering about US units. It would be the responsibility of the 1st Cavalry Division, as an occupying authority on Hokkaido to make contingency plans for any eventuality.

What was needed was a physical reconnaissance of the north western shoreline to the tip of Hokkaido opposite Sakhalin. Also to provide an opportunity, with armed protection for US Army intelligence personnel from the CID to visit the small fishing village at that extreme tip. If anybody knew what the Russians were up to, Japanese villagers and local officials would.

The practical problem was that there is no simple road to drive to that location, no airstrip, and only the sea - in the snowy dead of winter.

I was tabbed to make that reconnaissance in the  December winter, using 7 full tracked, three person Army M29 Weasels which could navigate over the snow. They were developed by the Army for operations in Alaska in WWII.

It was also desirable that the 160 mile trek from Sapporo to the village of Wakkanai be taken right along the seacoast to be able to spot anything unusual. There was a reputed  horse or animal cart trail that followed the contours of the coast, not at shore level - for there was no shoreline, but up from 25 to 100 feet above the water line,

Of course that trail would be under several feet of snow. It would be quite a navigational challenge. But then if I had handled North Korea roads in the winter, somebody was sure I could deal with snowy coastal Japan.

So we did. 21 Persons, 18 were Army soldiers -  drivers, mechanics, radio men, and 3 NCOs with me as the only officer. And 3 civilian American CID men who knew the language. All in 7 Weasels.

Everything went ok the morning we left until one Weasel broke through the snow crust around a turn at least 30 miles deep into the trip and along the coastline with its deep ravines. The driver cut a corner too sharply where the roadway was invisible under the snow. The Weasel fell through and then bounced nose down at least 75 feet in a gully. Simple matter of manhandling it around, pointed uphill, and let it crawl its way back to the trail. Right? Wrong. The engine would not start being flooded with oil.

So it was time for me to use my ingenuity. After several suggestions were made to me, I came up with a solution that would place one Weasel on the trail but where it could crawl down one gully, while it pulled on the dead weight of the other weasel by cable up to the roadway. Then turn around the weasel now at the bottom whose engine could run, and let it climb up using its winch as an assist.

That worked. Within 45 minutes the mechanic got the dead weasel running again.

Geisha and Teriyaki

We got to the village of Wakkanai late in the afternoon. They knew we were coming. And so besides having rooms to sleep in, they got a modest feast up, with a dish I had never tasted before - Teriyaki! And oh yeah. Fish. After all this was an isolated fishing village which probably was as little affected by the war with America as any remote spot in Japan.

And they had their own version of three Geisha girls to entertain us while we ate and drank a rice wine.

We turned in, tired from the day's exertions. If the Geisha girls offered themselves to any of my men, I was not aware of it.

The CID men gathered the information they were seeking, and we set off the next day about noon for the uneventful trip back to Camp Crawford. Mission accomplished. Lesson learned? Teriyaki tastes good. And the Russians had not landed.

Homeward Bound

After lots of Christmas Holiday cheer, with plenty of pretty Japanese ladies around, a well-stocked Commissary to browse for the cash flush war-weary returnees, many of whom were due to rotate, while those who only got to Korea in the last 6 months would stay in Japan with the Cav until their normal – longer than a year – rotation.

News About the West Point I Left Behind

I packed to go home, just as I learned, for the first time, about the first ever major cheating scandal within the Army football team at West Point that had taken place the year - 1951 - after I graduated and was in combat.

Years later in the 1990s - Bill McWilliams, Class of '55 researched, wrote and published a book "Return to Glory" about the Cheating Scandal and how West Point and the Corps of Cadets recovered from its stain. As he researched it he wanted to juxtapose the scandal with exactly what West Point was for - honorably leading Americans in war. So he researched prior West Point Classes, including our Class of 1950 which was immediately plunged into the Korean War - suffering more killed in action than any Class serving in that war. He ran across something I wrote and was published, and the fact that I was the most highly combat decorated member of the legendary Class of '50. I had been doing what West Point was created for.

So he made me the 'poster boy' for his book. Interviewing me extensively, reading what I had written in 1950 and 1951, including my 8 page description of the battles for Hills 339 and 347, and reading the sworn statements my soldiers made that supported awards made to me for my actions in Korea. 

When published in 2000, and serialized in the West Point graduate magazine, that, more than anything I can think of, led to my being nominated in 2001 and then in 2004 selected and honored as a 'Distinguished West Point Graduate' - only the 9th Colonel ever to receive that honor which generally was given to retired very senior West Point graduates as general officers. Ironic. As of 2014 I am still the only living West Point Graduate who has received that high honor out of the more than 1,000 retired graduates who live in Colorado.

I had come a long way from being confined to my room in 1950 for cadet violation of rules, and graduating without academic distinction, to become highly decorated and successful in combat in an American war, to being honored for my entire life of service.

But whatever I am credited for in my military service, it is West Point that gets the credit for not only educating and inspiring me to do my sworn 'Duty, Honor, Country'  but to take a chance on me at Graduation. 

On February 7th, 1952 we sailed on the Oturu Maru for Seattle. The boat was full of Korean War returnees who had been in one regiment or another of the 1st Cavalry Division - the 7th, 5th , or 8th.

While we all swapped war stories the first days and nights out, I went looking for, and found one of the few upright Typewriters on board. So I spent time slowly thinking about and then typing out the 8 page letter to John Flynn about what had happened to 'his company K' after he left, wounded.  And I wrote some other letters to distant members of my family. They were all relieved I survived that bloody war in which 34,000 Americans were killed and 8,000 are still missing in action. And that my West Point class suffered 40 killed in action.

It took us, as I recall, a whole 15 days on that boat to reach Seattle, where we were in-processed at Fort Lewis. My orders were to report to Fort Benning, Georgia

Then I was on my way home to Denver for a month and then Fort Benning.

With that, my experience in the Korean War was over.

The Full Text of the Letter I wrote, and mailed, to Flynn is at  Korean War (28), two items after this one. The next item - Korean War (27) is about the 'Fickle Gods of War' where 22 of my soldiers were denied recognition because of that accidental fire in Japan. Incidentally, I learned, over a year later, that when the 7th Cav Headquarters burned down the only thing saved were the US and 7th Cav Colors, when the Sergeant Major rushed into the burning building to save them. The honorable tradition of Army selfless service continues on, regardless of rank or position or wars. 

POSTSCRIPT -The portion describing our defense of Hill 339 has been reproduced and included in the 2002 Book by David Lowenherz, "The 50 Greatest Letters From America's Wars." Crown Publishers

To get an idea what we were up against in the Yonchon Sector from August to November 1951, this map shows that the Chinese had two ARMIES  (xxxx), the 63d and 65^th opposite the 1^st Cavalry Division (xx) and the British 29th Brigade (xx) and the ROK 1st Division (xx)

Below are verbatim extracts of a long 8 page Letter about my Battle for Hill 339 the 21^st to 28^th September 1951. I hunt and pecked out a letter on the only typewriter on board the Oturu Maro troop ship enroute to Seattle from Japan in February 1952. It was addressed to Capt John Flynn.  Flynn had been my first K Company commander in Korea in 1950. He was promoted to Major and was the Operations Officer for the 7^th Cavalry Regiment under Col Gilmer when he was wounded by mortar fire while standing next to Gilmer, and then was stationed at Fort Benning as he recovered from his wounds. I had succeeded him as K Company Commander in August of 51.

Since I was sent  later on the advanced party to Japan with the S-3 Headquarters of the 7^th Cav in December and January 1952 while it was being exchanged with a regiment from the Oklahoma National Guard 45^th Division,  I had both the time and opportunity to study the classified and unclassified written Cav reports on the operations of the whole 7^th Cav, and my 3d Battalion from September through November in the Yonchon sector. Including the battles for Hills 487, 339, and 347, and put them together with my very fresh memory of all three battles. So my extracts below are an accurate description of those operations and their outcomes. Later while at Fort Benning, I prepared an article about the Battle for Hill 339, and the three illustrations below are from that article. They give a visual picture of the text from the letter about the unfolding battle the night of 27-28 September

Before going up on Hill 339 I had learned that Col Gilmer, 7^th Cav Regimental Commander had directly ordered Lt Col Haldane the 3d Battalion Commander to put "Lt Dave Hughes and his Company K" on Hill 339 to defend it. Gilmer expected me, a fellow West Pointer who had gotten a reputation for fighting effectively in combat actions over the past several months, to walk on water. This turned out to be one of the toughest combat missions I ever was given.

Start of verbatim extracts from letter to Flynn about Hill 339.

“ Company K got the delightful mission of holding 339, and 1,000 more yards of perimeter.

We moved out and after plastering the hill from an OP [observation post] on 321, 1,500 yards away, we went up, but the Chinese set off a red flare and pulled off. I topped the peak and about five minutes afterward learned what the score was going to be for the next two weeks. They suddenly began shelling us and mortaring until I thought the roof was going to come off the hill.

They kept working the front slope over with a battery of 75mms and self-propelled artillery and they shook us to pieces with more 120mm mortars than I thought we had in 4.2-inch. The rain of 82mm and 60mm was just incidental. The fewest incoming rounds we ever reported for 24 hours was 350, and we estimated 1,200 on the second day.

It took me until the second day to see why they had targeted us while hardly touching the rest of the perimeter. Once on the peak OP, I could see more of their positions and gun positions and access routes than they could afford to have me see, or order my Artillery and Mortar Field Observers to command long range fire to come down on them.

So it went. We dug in amidst dead enemy troops from earlier battles and tried to organize the hill. They watched us like hawks, though, and could see our rear slope from the flanks. We could not top the ridge or put a single man in position on the forward slope during daylight; they would just open up with the SP [self-propelled] guns and dig him right out of the hole. From bombardment alone, with very little movement on the hill, we took 33 casualties in a week from direct hits on holes with mortars and the midnight dose of 120's.

The first night, we had a scrap. They came across a little saddle from which they had hit Company C, and they came down the road on the extreme right flank. On the road they ran into a tank, and it scattered them while the mortar fire kept them dispersed. But on the peak they plastered us with everything they could, and came in right under their own mortar fire to hit the right shoulder of the hill and smack into Sergeant Malloy's machine gun. He waited until they were ten yards away and then cut loose. They did not definitely locate him in the confusion and noise, and he stopped them cold. They crawled around and poured machinegun fire on us for a few more hours and then pulled off their dead and withdrew. In the morning there were five dead enemy within those ten yards of Malloy, and one had his hand draped over the parapet. We took no casualties from the small arms.

This cat and mouse game went on for seven days while we took the brunt of all the fire in the battalion.

I made out a little card on the company positions and numbered the draws and worked the 60mm gun crews until they could get a round off on any concentration in 30 seconds. We were all up on the peak. It was only about 1,000 yards across the high ground, and nobody was more than ten yards from the crest, including the mortars. That paid off later too. Black Lieutenant Walker commanded the Weapons Platoon.

We sent out daily patrols that only got 600 yards before getting hit. On the 25th, I had to send out a platoon toward positions I knew were there. I didn't like it at all because the enemy had been get cagier and cagier and had been holding their fire. But out went Lt. Radcliffe and his 1st Platoon. The Chinese let them get 200 yards from the peak before opening up with cross-firing weapons. Radcliffe was killed instantly. The platoon sergeant, a corporal, didn't hesitate. He ordered marching fire , and the platoon took half the peak so the rest could get out. There were three dead. Sergeant Brown was cut down by a grenade near Radcliffe. He rolled over and took Radcliffe's .45 pistol and the maps and took them all back as he himself was carried out. A machine gunner who could not find a vantage point to set up his machinegun went up with it cradled in his arm with one belt of ammunition. He had to be evacuated for the burns on his arm. “

“Every night, enemy patrols would crawl up and feel us out. They plotted our weapons and counted our men. Every night I would have to get up and calm down a squad that thought the whole Chinese Army was out there. But this had one good effect. The men dug in tight. They kept their weapons spotless. They slept in the daytime and watched at night. The 60mm mortar crew got faster and faster under black platoon leader Lieutenant Walker, who had been school-trained in weapons control.  I collected heavy machineguns and on the 28th had five heavies and seven lights across the front. But because of the fire and dwindling number of men, we had been able to put out only a few rolls of concertina wire on the two easy approaches. The engineers all but refused to work laying mines in front of us.

The night of the 28th came. The day had been quiet and it seemed as good a time as any for the big show. “

At 2330 a bombardment came in. It was deadly accurate and concentrated on the positions controlling the two approaches. It continued until 2400 and then, for a few minutes, stepped up to a frenzied firing of all kinds of shells.

Then I heard the rip of a burp gun on the left. At the same time, just as I popped out of my bunker, a purple flare went off on both flanks of the peak. I yelled off a series of concentrations to the FO's (forward observers), and the first sergeant roused the 60's on the phone. But before I had even given a command to the 60's, two plop plops came out, and in a second a flare was burning over each flank. They had fired in about 20 seconds from the enemy flares.

“By this time, all the defensive fires were going full blast, but I was waiting for the Sunday punch. It came in about 20 minutes later at 0110. The Chinese only had a strip of our territory about 150 yards long on the right and 200 yards on the left, but they sure filled it up. They moved a mortar onto the ridge of each flank and began peppering the CP (my command post). They got a couple of machineguns up there and fired overhead for their next attack. And they never stopped pounding the top of the hill with those 120s. Then they jumped off again. The Chinese companies that had penetrated sent people around behind us,, and they raked the back slope with small arms and cut off our communciations with battalion.”

I did not know this at the time, but two things had happened. One was that they had attacked neatly, the first time, just to the left of the two machineguns on the right flank and thus never touched any part of the 3d Platoon. Only two rifle platoons, with perhaps 60 men, were involved all night long! The second thing was that at the beginning of the attack, the battalion S-2 (intelligence) section had been monitoring the SCR 300 (captured US radio) stations, and their Chinese interpreter picked up the command channel of the battalion that was attacking my company. So all night long battalion headquarters had a running account of the battle and knew how we stood, from the talk on the company radios the Chinese used and their command radio. But, we on 339 did not know that, for we could barely communicate to battalion heaquarters.

When the big attack came at 0110, the two companies on the ridgeline on both flanks started the attack toward the peak. Just when they were exterting maximum pressue on the heavy machineguns at the shoulder of the peak on each flank, two more companies came at us on those two saddle approaches we had wired in. I was waiting for that, and on the left, as they started across the wire, we opened up with the 57mm (recoiless rifle) at 20 yards on the wire, and I called in the 155s at a range of 150 yards from us and the two fires caught the company on the move. “

On the right they attacked across that little saddle, and we were waiting there too. At the first sign of the attack I called in the 4.2 mortar fire to 125 yards, and it played havoc with the supporting troops. I started the 60mm mortars firing at top speed (by this time we were getting artillery flares) and then, as the first grenade throwing wave hit our positions, we turned on our two flame throwers. The first wave just expired [fried] where it was. In a short time we were out of flame thrower juice, but it had scared them and the next waves walked across instead of running. I kept dropping the 60mm fire closer and closer until we went to 83 degrees - firing nearly vertically - when firing on a gun to target range of 65 yards and we were dropping shells only 15 yards in front of the machinegunner. PFC Mostad went back and forth between the ridge and the guns and actually gave the firing commands directly down to the 60mm mortar gunners by voice. Things were VERY dicey. It finally broke them, but only after they had got the 2d Platoon CP and had the platoon backed up to our mortar position.

On the left they got much closer. They killed the crew of one of our heavy machinegun sections, broke through the refused flank, and came steaming up the hill at our CP about 35 yards up. I had every man I could spare on the perimeter, including the 5th Platoon (South Koreans) which did good work that night, so I asked my personal radio operator, PFC Citino - who had never fired a Heavy Machine gun " to commit my last reserve. That consisted of one heavy machinegun that was sitting on top of my CP bunker. He set it up and stopped the attack 15 yards from the CP, which was full of wounded. Then I sent my first sergeant to the 57mm recoiless rifle section, which was now in an untenable position. As the section soldiers came up the hill a Chinese soldier came up with them, and after a tussle was killed in the CP. [I shot him with my Thompson submachine gun after he jumped into my foxhole hole with me]. “

“That was the high point of the attack. They had captured three of our men on the left. One of them they took off the hill immediately; the second and third were pushed up in front of them toward us during the attack, but one - seeing that heavy machinegun kill all of their mortar crew and cut down on the attack wave - kicked his captor in the balls, jumped over the side of the steep ridge, and escaped. The third GI went on up and was killed by our fire. “

“At about 0330 the artillery was out of flares, we were low on ammunition, even with our stockpile, when a flare ship arrived and helped us see to counterattack the high points of the attack.

The reserve heavy machine gun had done its work, but its water cans were full of holes. Our urine had run out, but a can of cold coffee lasted the rest of the night.

The enemy radios had reported that three of their company commanders had been killed and they could not get the GIs off the hill. They asked permission to withdraw but were told they had to have the hill "tonight." Then the reserve company, the fifth one, claimed they had so many wounded from the artillery that they could not carry them back and therefore could not attack. Of course we didn't know any of this.

Then our Regimental Commander hailed a flight of B-26s, and under flare light and by radar they dive bombed the ridge 600 yards in front of us.

We drew up in a tight perimeter at 0430 and waited out the day. In the morning we cleared the  flanks and bombarded many enemy trying to flee over the hills and down the slopes with their wounded and dead.

We still could not move around very well, because the enemy fire was still coming in, but by 0800 we counted 77 Chinese dead within our positions. Regiment reported that the Chinese suffered hundreds more killed and wounded. We had suffered 10 killed, 15 wounded, and 1 captured.

We were pretty beat up by this time, having taken - with attachments - 54 casualties in the seven days on Hill 339. On the 29th, we were rotated around the battalion perimeter and Company I took over Hill 339.”

------------------ end of verbatim extracts of the letter to Capt Flynn ---

Our Company K had just defeated a 600 man, 5 rifle Company, Chinese Infantry Battalion, after a week of intense bombardment,  nightly intelligence probing attacks, and the urging of their higher commanders.

Colonel Gilmer got me a 2d Silver Star (1^st Oak Leaf Cluster) for this battle and my personal actions. I am not sure why. It was my company that defeated that enemy battalion, not just me. Maybe he learned about my having to personnaly kill the Chinese who reached me.

See '2d Silver Star' at http://www.davehugheslegacy.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225:medals-and-citations-2-dscass&catid=100&Itemid=204 

The Pacific Stars and Stripes had a big article on this battle, and reports on it appeared in numerous newspapers across the US.

I was pretty shaky for a couple days after that very tough week. Once Company K was off the 339 peak, Gilmer said he wanted to see me. I went back to his HQ. He congratulated me, but then ordered me to sleep in his trailer overnight. He seemed to sense my shakiness and bone tiredness. And I was emotional about the death and capture of my guys. The one man captured was the only Company K soldier made a prisoner during the whole Korean War.   

A year later after I got back to the US, I wrote another story to get this battle out of my system. It was true but not with his real name. "The Death of a Soldier" Again, like Shanks Bootees, it was published nationally. This time in the April, 1953 issue of the Ladies Home Journal. Below as a PDF file you can read it. Click on

Death of a Soldier

Perhaps writing was my therapy for what today would be called PTSD.

But I still had one more huge battle to face.

The Battle for Hill 347 - Bloody Baldy

As if the Defense of Hill 339 were not enough for Company K which ended September 29^th,  and cost us 54 casualties including one officer KIA, four days and NO replacements later, we were ordered to jump off in an attack toward a final objective - Hill 347, through objective Rye. This was Operation Commando, planned by Eighth Army.  The strategic goal was to reach Line Jamestown across the front, which would force the Chinese Armies back across the Imjim River.  And put great pressure on the North Korean Truce delegation, which was dragging its feet, back to the negotiating table at Panmunjom.

The following is a copy of part of what I wrote in the February, 1952 8 page letter to Captain Flynn

“Company K jumped off on 3 October with the 4th Battalion - the Greek Expeditionary Force, on the right of us, and Company L on our left.

More on the Greeks: While we were here fighting, one of their units close to us got surrounded by the Chinese. They radioed me to see if I could help out their beleaguered unit. I ordered lots of 81mm and 4.2inch mortar fire on the Chinese surrounding them, which let them fight their way out. The commander of the Greek Expeditionary Force, after the battles were over, awarded me and another company commander the Greek Cross of War.

Which was a high honor coming from descendants of the Spartans at Thermopylae.  I wore that medal's ribbon next to my combat ribbons for several years.  

Unfortunately when I went later to get the Army to enter that in my permanent records, the Greek Government said they had no record of it. Which they had to acknowledge before the US government would accept it. Even though I also had (and still have) the letter from the Commander awarding it. Seems like, after the commander returned to Greece there was a political upheaval. And that combat commander was on the wrong end of the political winner. So they conveniently 'forgot' anything he did. Except win battles in Korea. Which they did. They were great fighters.

Objective RYE

At the end of the first day's fighting on October 3d trying to take Objective Rye, the rest of my 1st Platoon was destroyed and two of my officers had been critically wounded. Company G had taken 130 casualties, including 4 officers, on Hill 418, and the Greek company on my right had taken 135 casualties. No units had gained their objectives. The 2d Battalion won and lost Hill 418 five times.

On the 4th of October we did the same thing with all the support we could muster, but again we were in the trenches and the Greeks were in theirs, but the tremendous mortar fire and unlimited number of enemy through us out with still more casualties.

I got 30 replacements that night, and never saw their faces in the light, before sending them into the attack. That was a terrible decision by higher headquarters to send me replacements, at night, while we were in the midst of combat. I had to send them down and distribute them to my platoons though I knew they would be forced to attack at dawn, before even getting to know their buddies they would be depending on. I could not hold them there, right in an open area near my exposed CP, which in daylight was in view of the enemy on higher ground. I had no shelter, and they did not have tools to spend the rest of the night digging foxholes. I swore I would never the rest of my career, send green replacements down to a unit while it is engaged in close combat.  

On the 5th of October, the Greeks made it and we tried again. We couldn't make it until all the companies of our battalion attacked just after dark.  We managed to capture the two little hills that were called 'Objective Rye' while suffering 17 more casualties, many in the trenches, including our artillery and 4.2-inch mortar forward observers.

On the 6th we reorganized while the Chinese threw 3,000 rounds into the Regimental zone. I only had two under strength rifle platoons and a mortar section left to fight with.

The REALLY Hard Fighting for 347

On the 7th of October we advanced on Hill 347, from Rye. all the elements of the battalion committed.

We, Company K, did a right hook into and up  Hill 347. We reached the trenches and then were blown off the hill, losing another officer and 20 more men. Company L and I were on the other side of the peak, while Company L was fighting up the hill, Company I had to stop a counterattack against the battalion OP (observation point) behind them. The more senior officers and men in the OP were fighting off grenade attacks on their flank and were not much help to me or Company K.

The second time up we fell short of the trenches again, and were grenaded, machine gunned, and mortared off the hill, losing another officer and more men.

The third time we assaulted the same thing happened, and my last officer was wounded by a grenade and our attack was broken.

I had only six riflemen and Master Sergeant McKenzie left up on the hill, so I took all the rest of my small headquarters, the mortar crew as riflemen, and the remaining FO's. Loaded down with grenades, we all went forward.  That was all who were left standing in Company K - 30 men. I would have to lead the last possible assault myself and stop trying to coordinating fire support against the defenders on top of the hill from my observation post

Some of the trenches that were on 347. Short tunnels branched off the trench line that circled the top of the hill.

“There were about 30 of us in all, when we hit the hill. I could see one mistake earlier assaults had made. The men were not charging up over the trench at all costs and then turning and working down from above. The Chinese [many, many more than should have been there] were standing in four-foot trenches, where the direct fire from below, even tank fire, didn't bother them. They just threw an unlimited supply of grenades, including big anti-tank grenades, down the slope.

So when I took the last of Company K up - effectively just one platoon - I ordered everyone to run through the grenade fire and cross the trench, and try to keep their enemies down by massing our, largely carbine and submachine gun fire - (few riflemen were left.) I also radioed Sgt Chyzy's M Company Heavy Machine gun section which was down near the bottom, providing overhead fire for us and told him to keep firing, and not to hesitate if some of us got up on top and the Chinese came out of their holes and trenches to fight hand to hand. Fire at em even if we risk getting hit too.

It worked, sort of. Once I got on top alone after my Thompson sub machine gun ran out of ammunition, I suppressed the last resistance from bunkers with my grenades (and by throwing back some of theirs) my surviving 15 men followed. Chyzy stopped firing.

Two more FO crews had been killed by the rain of antitank grenades, and we lost about 10 more men who didn't make it. But we got across, and above that trench. The firing died down. Then lead men of Company L were able to come up the other side, once my remnants of Company K were in control on top.

I called the heavy machine gun section of Company M under Sgt Chyzy,  to come forward to the top of the hill also after the firing died down. He still had 14 men left. 

We threw all our remaining grenades in the battle on top, which forced the remaining Chinese back into their tunnels.

Then, one tunnel by one tunnel, we got them out as prisoners or dead men.

By dark we had 192 Chinese prisoners just from the area above the perimeter trench, which was only about 10 yards down, and 200 yards around the hilltop.

With all the attachments, including Chyzy's 14 man Company M machine gun attachment which joined us on top, I had 37 men, only about 15 left from Company K.

We discovered why they had held out so long. We had captured a Chinese division and regimental artillery headquarters, their supplies, and one, perhaps two battalion's guarding them. The senior Chinese commanders had bugged out the day before and a few hours before we got the hill. They left all the ammunition supplies for those two regiments. We counted 250 dead in the exposed trenches alone. Days later a clerk of the Chinese battalion defending the peak was captured. I still have his exhaustive report confirming that we had attacked a reinforced battalion he was in and captured or killed all but 80 men.”

Three of the 192 Chinese Prisoners we took off Hill 347.

To my surprise their soldiers were so psychologically defeated by our relentless attack that they did not attempt to escape, either when all 192 squatted in a large circle on the flatter ground on top - and they saw we only had a handful of men left - or even when we had to march them, single file 2 miles down the mountains in dusk and then darkness to where the closest 2 1/2 ton trucks and Regimental Military Police could get to 347. While we had only 15 men spaced out along that column.

Some of my surviving men were so angry and emotional, some crying, on top, after seeing so many of their buddies killed and wounded in that huge fight for 347, they wanted me to let them  kill - execute - our prisoners. 

I understood their state of mind. But I said no, don't shoot unless they try to escape. Not just because the Geneva Convention said not to, but as American soldiers, it was not the thing we do - kill prisoners. While I was at the extreme limits of stress I could take, I still remained in control of myself and my sense of right and wrong. West Point had long ago helped instill that self-discipline and emotional control in me.

The only laugh of the day came when one Chinese soldier came out of his hole, cradling the tube of a 60mm mortar in his arms. He approached me and presented the mortar like a surrender sword from the Middle Ages - or as Confederate Commanders surrendered their swords to Union Commanders in the Civil War. Sergeant Kaser, who made it all the way from the Pusan Perimeter in July 1950 to being the last NCO standing - on Hill 347 with me on October 7th, 1951, reminded me of that laugh a few years ago, at a 7th Cav reunion.

But he also never forgave me for making him lead the long, long single file of prisoners over 2 miles down the mountain, after dark, with them at his back, and possible ambushes in front. while I was in the middle of the line and  Sgt Chyzy's men were at the rear. In fact it was one of Chyzy's soldiers who took the only pictures of the prisoners, one of which I posted above. None of the Chinese soldiers tried to escape, even in the dark, so mentally dominated were they.

Aftermath

After we were relieved on the hill we went back to another part of the regimental front where the 1st Battalion had just been overrun; it was left with a captain as commander and had only 200 men.

Then we stayed rather stationary on the hills, except for a few more ordered patrols into enemy territory while the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments took ten more days to catch up and get their objectives. On one of those patrols, one of my soldiers, 'George' Pickett (a distant relative to THE George Pickett of Pickett's Charge' who lost at Gettysburg) got shot through the eye. He lived, but his eye did not. While we were fighting up Hill 347, the week before, PFC Pickett stepped in front of me to shield me and kicked a grenade aimed at me away down the slope before it exploded. Which is one reason I survived and got to the top before anyone else.

When we were on top after the battle, he took a leather belt off a dead Chinese soldier, and used it to hold up his pants. Even after he was wounded on that patrol, he kept hold of that belt, which had some Chinese markings on it.

Years later at a Company K reunion, Pickett, with a patch over his eye, came up to me and handed me that belt, asking me to keep it 'For Company K and the 7th Cav'

I still have it, and when my youngest son married the Chinese daughter of her Retired Chinese Army Colonel father (surgeon) I asked her to translate it. She did, and it only had the markings on the unit which existed when it was made.

The last of the men who had been with us at the peak of the fighting were rotated then, and the last of the old Company K was gone. I was the only officer in the company for a while longer until they brought in a few. Then I was made assistant Regimental S-3 (operations officer).

And that's how we were when the division went into reserve, and got ready to ship out to Japan. The 1st Cavalry Division had taken a real pounding; it never suffered more casualties in an equal period during its tour in Korea. “

My Company K, lost 167 men and 6 officers over the 15 days of action, even though we won both big battles for Hills 339 and 347. 

I was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for my actions, including arriving as the first American on top of 347 with only grenades, (having dropped my trusted Cal .45 Thompson machine gun on the slope after it ran out of ammunition) ending the battle.

The Map below summarizes the route and two major actions Company K was engaged over those last 15 days. The maximum successful defense, and maximum successful attack.

The After Truce Layout of Where We Had Been

The map section overlays those battle points in relationship to the southern half of the final Truce Demilitarized Zone (green lines) that still exists 60 years later.

Another irony was that when I got to the top of Hill 347 and looked down to the north across the Imjin River which the Chinese unit remnants had to escape across, I saw a group of  misshapen hills in the lowland below. They were later named "Pork Chop Hill' - which US troops fought over for the next year and a half, using Hill 347 as the staging base. Only then in 1953, was the Truce signed and shooting stopped.

I am proudest of the fact that Hill 347 is in the Demilitarized Zone, roughly on the 38th Parallel that still divides the North Korean dictatorship from the free, prosperous, South Korea republic.

Who said we did not 'win?' We went to war in 1950 to throw back the North Koreans and Chinese who had invaded South Korea, beyond the 38th Parallel -the original, internationally-recognized (UN) boundary between South and North Korea which was settled at the end of World War II. On October 7th, 1951 Company K, 7th US Cavalry, did so on Hill 347.

I never went back to visit Korea after the war. If I had I would wanted to stride on both Hill 339, now south of the DMZ, and 347 inside it.

But anyone who goes in there, gets shot.

Ironically that 2 1/2 Mile wide Demilitarized Military Zone, stretching from waters edge on the East to West Coast, with barbed wire fencing on both sides, wherein no-one is ever allowed to go, is one of the lushest environmental 'green zones' in the world today. Supporting small wildlife and birds.

Go figger.

I was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for that Battle

See DSC under http://www.davehugheslegacy.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225:me

Next Korean War (26)

At Sea on the Oturu Maru out of Japan

KWP - this is the letter I wrote (typed out hunt and peck) while on the boat Oturu Maru out of Japan back to the States in Feb, 1952, after a year in combat in Korea. I mailed it when we landed in Seattle. It was to my first combat company commander - Captain John R Flynn, who had been my company commander of Company K, 7th Cavalry Regiment thru the winter of 1950 and spring of 51, before he became a battalion S-3, was wounded and sent home to teach at the Infantry School.

I had forgotten the letter entirely until then retired Lt.Col. Flynn returned it to me, - 45 years later! just before the 1995 Korean War Memorial's dedication, and a reunion of the Korean Chapter of the 7th Cavalry.

I had forgotten the letter entirely, but since it is a vivid and accurate report of what one company went through during the violent days of September and October, 1951, as both armies battled to control the best terrain as the armistice talks went on.

I have the original typed text.

David R Hughes

------------------------------

7 Feb 1952
Capt Flynn:

There is lots to say in bringing you up to date since you left. Here beside me I have several false starts on letters to you.

But they were inadequate and out of perspective. So I will not say I am sorry I did not mail a letter sooner, for I am glad I held off until this day, when I am sure unhurried and can write one letter for 15 days with no place to mail it [on this boat] and can now speak from more authority and experience.

I changed jobs at a lucky time. In the S-3 shop, [Regimental headquarters operations staff] I was in one the post-battle discussions and writings of the Regiment, and talked with the generals and the staffs, and read. So now I can say what there is to be said.

I learned and saw enough since you left to write ten books, all of them different. Personalities rose and fell, battles swelled and diminished, boys became men, and men became memories.

The Regiment fought like a demon for some pieces of ground and suffered incredible casualties defending it. And then, partly because of the casualties, the division was pulled out and replaced. It was time. The 1st Cav Division was left only with a smattering of real strength.

In the big picture, of course, the whole Army moved forward in the October [1951] offensive. Before that time, the fighting had diminished in the west, where we were, to constructing a great series of barbed wire obstacles and extensive patrolling. When I left the division, the Army was still in the same area, the same front as when you were there.

After you were hit, the division went back to the Kansas line and dug and wired in for a few weeks. The 25th Division had our sector. The 24th Regiment had the old 7th Cav sector and fared pretty badly. When we came back up they had lost the patrol base on the 487-477 hill mass, which the 3d Battalion had for so long. We were not to get that hill mass back until four months later after five well planned attacks - two of them regimental size - had failed.

Actually , in the final analysis we prepared the Wyoming line more thoroughly than we did the Kansas line. As a matter of record, the 7th laid more wire on that line than the 8th and 5th together. We had up to ten double aprons all across the MLR (main line of resistance), 20 in places, and six on the OPLR, not counting protective and tactical wire. It was never tested.

The Chinese started digging in on a line from Hill 487 in front of Hill 347 and on down to the Imjin. So we kept patrolling out farther and farther until that line was established; then we sent out the patrol bases again. That set the stage for the offensive.

Back in Company K, I was getting the outfit shaken down and ready to fight. A few of the tactical ideas I told you about, such as numbering the draws, later paid off. My real problem, of course, was getting those squad leaders, platoon leaders, and riflemen who were left after rotation into the proper jobs. At one time I was the only officer left in the company, but I got a few shortly before the big fight.

We were involved in one of the battles for 487. The line generally paralleled the road to from Yonchon to Chorwon, and at this time the 3d Division had the sector down to opposite 477. The 3d Battalion of the 7th was given the job of a dawn attack in a flanking move around the north and east of 487. It was up the two tough sides of the mountain, but was probably the least defended too.

We moved and jumped off on schedule; at least Company K did. Companies L and I were late, and we had seized our first objective before they reached the line of departure. But we pulled up and soon were on the two fingers. The peak and its approaches had been plastered day and night for a long time by weapons of all calibers up to 8-inch. The peak was bare, but the Chinese were too well dug in. Three thousand rounds of 4.2-inch mortars were used in preparation.

Up we went and learned the defenses were simply impregnable. On K Company's approach, the last 300 yards was a 45 degree slope, with no cover. The Chinese laced into us with five machine guns, and we were so placed that we were attacking the rim of a teacup from inside the bottom. At the high point of the attack, 200 yards from the top, the whole assaulting platoon was under direct observation on a concave slope, I had everything in the book going in at the bunkers - precision registered 155mm, direct fire from five tanks, and all the rest - but not one machinegun was silenced.

We were ordered off in late afternoon with 23 casualties, 20 of them gunshot. Company L had about the same. Two weeks later the entire 65th Regiment tried to take the peak and failed.

One of my platoon leaders was badly shot up in the arm, which left Lieutenant Radcliffe, 1st Platoon leader, and me again. But the new Company K had been bloodied; the men were more ready to fight and knew what to expect.

For another couple weeks, we ran patrols from near Yonchon, and I got in five good officers.

Then we watched the two patrol bases out in front of us get it in the neck. One was on Hill 343 and the other on 339. Hill 339 was key, and about halfway between lines. It was lost and gained by patrols every few days. One day Company C was sent out to hold a perimeter on it, which they did for two days and on the night of the third was completely overrun in a mass attack. We got the hill back again with the 2d battalion and then they were ordered off. This yo-yo game continued until 21 September when they ordered the 3d Battalion out to hold a patrol base from 339 to 343 and back over to 321, a 4,000 yard perimeter.

Company K got the delightful mission of holding 339, and 1,000 more yards of perimeter.

We moved out and after plastering the hill from an OP [observation post] on 321, 1,500 yards away, we went up, but the Chinese set off a red flare and pulled off. I topped the peak and about five minutes afterward learned what the score was going to be for the next two weeks. They suddenly began shelling us and mortaring until I thought the roof was going to come off the hill.

They kept working the front slope over with a battery of 75mms and self-propelled artillery and they shook us to pieces with more 120mm mortars than I thought we had in 4.2-inch. The rain of 82mm and 60mm was just incidental. The fewest incoming rounds we ever reported for 24 hours was 350, and we estimated 1,200 on the second day.

It took me until the second day to see why they had targetted us while hardly touching the rest of the perimeter. Once on the peak OP, I could see more of their positions and gun positions and access routes than they could afford to have me see.

So it went. We dug in amidst dead enemy troops from earlier battles and tried to organize the hill. They watched us like hawks, though, and could see our rear slope from the flanks. We could not top the ridge or put a single man in position on the forward slope during daylight; they would just open up with the SP [self-propelled] and dig him right out of the hole. From bombardment alone, with very little movement on the hill, we took 33 casualties in a week from direct hits on holes with mortars and the midnight dose of 120's.

The first night, we had a scrap. They came across a little saddle from which they had hit Company C, and they came down the road on the extreme right flank. On the road they ran into a tank, and it scattered them while the mortar fire kept them dispersed. But on the peak they plastered us with everything they could, and came in right under their own mortar fire to hit the right shoulder of the hill and smack into Sergeant Malloy's machine gun. He waited until they were ten yards away and then cut loose. They did not definitely locate him in the confusion and noise, and he stopped them cold. They crawled around and poured machinegun fire on us for a few more hours and then pulled off their dead and withdrew. In the morning there were five dead enemy within those ten yards of Malloy, and one had his hand draped over the parapet. We took no casualties from the small arms.

This cat and mouse game went on for seven days while we took the brunt of all the fire in the battalion.

I made out a little card on the company positions and numbered the draws and worked the 60mm gun crews until they could get a round off on any concentration in 30 seconds. We were all up on the peak. It was only about 1,000 yards across the high ground, and nobody was more than ten yards from the crest, including the mortars. That paid off later too.

We sent out daily patrols that only got 600 yards before getting hit. On the 25th, I had to send out a platoon toward positions I knew were there. I didn't like it at all because the enemy had been gotten cagier and cagier and had been holding their fire. But out went Lt. Radcliffe and his 1st Platoon. The Chinese let them get 200 yards from the peak before opening up with cross-firing weapons. Radcliffe was killed instantly. The platoon sergeant, a corporal, didn't hesitate. He ordered marching fire , and the platoon took half the peak so the rest could get out. There were three dead. Sergeant Brown was cut down by a grenade near Radcliffe. He rolled over and took Radcliffe's .45 pistol and the maps and took them all back as he himself was carried out. A machine gunner who could not find a vantage point to set up his machinegun went up with it cradled in his arm with one belt of ammunition. He had to be evacuated for the burns on his arm.

Every night, enemy patrols would crawl up and feel us out. They plotted our weapons and counted our men. Every night I would have to get up and calm down a squad that thought the whole Chinese Army was out there. But this had one good effect. The men dug in tight. They kept their weapons spotless. They slept in the daytime and watched at night. The 60mm mortar crew got faster and faster under colored platoon leader Lieutenant Walker. I collected heavy machineguns and on the 28th had five heavies and seven lights across the front. But because of the fire and dwindling number of men, we had been able to put out only a few rolls of concertina wire on the two easy approaches. The engineers all but refused to work laying mines in front of us.

The night of the 28th came. The day had been quiet and it seemed as good a time as any for the big show.

At 2330 a bombardment came in. It was deadly accurate and concentrated on the positions controlling the two approaches. It continued until 2400 and then, for a few minutes, stepped up to a frenzied firing of all kinds of shells.

Then I heard the rip of a burp gun on the left. At the same time, just as I popped out of my bunker, a purple flare went off on both flanks of the peak. I yelled off a series of concentrations to the FO's (forward observers), and the first sergeant roused the 60's on the phone. But before I had even given a command to the 60's, two plop plops came out, and in a second a flare was burning over each flank. They had fired in about 20 seconds from the enemy flares.

All hell broke loose. A company hit each flank, and even with the 4.2's dropping right in the draw they came up, they overran the tie-in with Company L and rolled up the flank of the understrength 1st Platoon. On the right they were stopped for a while by the automatic weapons and the 81mm and 60mm mortars, but there again they punched through a squad front and overran that squad turning toward the peak through the 2d Platoon. Not a man bugged out, and all our dead soldiers in the morning were found in their holes.

By this time, all the defensive fires were going full blast, but I was waiting for the Sunday punch. It came in about 20 minutes later at 0110. The Chinese only had a strip of our territory about 150 yards long on the right and 200 yards on the left, but they sure filled it up. They moved a mortar onto the ridge of each flank and began peppering the CP (my command post). They got a couple of machineguns up there and fired overhead for their next attack. And they never stopped pounding the top of the hill with those 120s. Then they jumped off again. The Chinese companies that had penetrated sent people around behind us,, and they raked the back slope with small arms and cut off our communications with battalion.

I did not know this at the time, but two things had happened. One was that they had attacked neatly, the first time, just to the left of the two machineguns on the right flank and thus never touched any part of the 3d Platoon. Only two rifle platoons were involved all night long! The second thing was that at the beginning of the attack, the battalion S-2 (intelligence) section had been monitoring the SCR 300 (captured US radio) stations, and their Chinese interpreter picked up the command channel of the battalion that was attacking my company. So all night long battalion headquarters had a running account of the battle and knew how we stood, from the talk on the company radios the Chinese used and their command radio.

When the big attack came at 0110, the two companies on the ridgeline on both flanks started the attack toward the peak. Just when they were exerting maximum pressure on the heavy machineguns at the shoulder of the peak on each flank, two more companies came at us on those two saddle approaches we had wired in. I was waiting for that, and on the left, as they started across the wire, we opened up with the 57mm (recoilless rifle) at 20 yards on the wire, and I called in the 155s at a range of 150 yards from us and the two fires caught the company on the move.

On the right they attacked across that little saddle, and we were waiting there too. At the first sign of the attack I called in the 4.2 mortar fire to 125 yards, and it played havoc with the supporting troops. I started the 60mm mortars firing at top speed (by this time we were getting artillery flares) and then, as the first grenade throwing wave hit our positions, we turned on the two flame throwers. The first wave just expired [fried] where it was. In a short time we were out of flame thrower juice, but it had scared them and the next waves walked across instead of running. I kept dropping the 60mm fire closer and closer until we went to 83 degrees - firing nearly vertically - when firing on a gun to target range of 65 yards and we were dropping shells only 15 yards in front of the machinegunner. It finally broke them, but only after they had got the 2d Platoon CP and had the platoon backed up to our mortar position.

On the left they got much closer. They killed the crew of one of our heavy machinegun sections, broke through the refused flank, and came steaming up the hill at our CP about 35 yards up. I had every man I could spare on the perimeter, including the 5th Platoon (South Koreans) which did good work that night, so I asked my personal radio operator to commit the reserve. That consisted of one heavy machinegun that was sitting on top of my CP bunker. He set it up and stopped the attack 15 yards from the CP, which was full of wounded. Then I sent my first sergeant to the 57mm recoiless rifle section, which was now in an untenable position. As the section soldiers came up the hill a Chinese soldier came up with them, and after a tussle was killed in the CP. [I shot him with my submachine gun after he jumped into the hole with me].

That was the high point of the attack. They had captured three of our men on the left. One of them they took off the hill immediately; the second and third were pushed up in front of them toward us during the attack, but one - seeing that heavy machinegun kill all of their mortar crew and cut down on the attack wave - kicked his captor, jumped over the side of the steep ridge, and escaped. The third GI went on up and was killed by our fire.

At about 0330 the artillery was out of flares, we were low on ammunition, even with our stockpile, when a flare ship arrived and helped us see to counterattack the high points of the attack.

The reserve heavy machine gun had done its work, but its water cans were full of holes. Our urine had run out, but a can of cold coffee lasted the rest of the night.

The enemy radios had reported that three of their company commanders had been killed and they could not get the GIs off the hill. They asked permission to withdraw but were told they had to have the hill "tonight." Then the reserve company, the fifth one, claimed they had so many wounded from the artillery that they could not carry them back and therefore could not attack. Of course we didn't know any of this.

Then our Regimental Commander hailed a flight of B-26s, and under flare light and by radar they dive bombed the ridge 600 yards in front of us.

We drew up in a tight perimeter at 0430 and waited out the day. In the morning we cleared the the flanks and bombarded many enemy trying to flee over the hills with their wounded and dead.

We still could not move around very well, because the enemy fire was still coming in, but by 0800 we counted 77 dead within our positions. We had suffered 10 killed, 15 wounded, and 1 captured.

We were pretty beat up by this time, having taken - with attachments - 54 casualties in the seven days on Hill 339. On the 29th, we were rotated around the battalion perimeter and Company I took over.

Four days and no replacements later, we jumped off in the attack launched by the Eighth Army.

Company K had a series of objectives that culminated in Hill 347. We jumped off on 3 October with the 4th Battalion - the Greek Expeditionary Force, on the right of us, and Company L on our left.

At the end of the first day's fighting, the rest of the 1st Platoon was destroyed and two of my officers had been critically wounded. Company G had taken 130 casualties, including 4 officers, on Hill 418, and the Greek company on my right had taken 135 casualties. No units had gained their objectives. The 2d Battalion won and lost Hill 418 five times.

On the 4th of October we did the same thing with all the support we could muster, but again we were in the trenches and the Greeks were in theirs, but the tremendous mortar fire and unlimited number of enemy through us out with still more casualties.

I got 30 replacements that night. [and never saw their faces in the light, before sending them into the attack]

On the 5th, the Greeks made it and we tried again. We couldn't make it until all the companies of the battalion attacked just after dark, and we captured the two little hills with 17 more casualties including the artillery and 4.2-inch mortar FOs (forward observers). Sgt Malloy was wounded, shot through the shoulder that day.

On the 6th we reorganized while the Chinese threw 3,000 rounds into the Regimental zone. I only had two rifle platoons and a mortar section left to fight with.

On the 7th of October we advanced on Hill 347, all the elements of the battalion committed.

We, Company K, reached the trenches and then were blown off the hill, losing another officer and 20 more men. Company L and I were on the other side of the peak, while Company L was fighting up the hill, Company I had to stop a counterattack against the battalion OP (observation point) behind them. And the senior officers and men in the OP were fighting off grenade attacks on their flank.

The second time up we fell short of the trenches again, and were grenaded and mortared off the hill, losing another officer and more men.

The third time the same thing, and my last officer was wounded by a grenade and our attack was broken.

I had six riflemen left up on the hill, so I took all the rest of headquarters, the mortar crew as riflemen, and the remaining FO's. Loaded down with grenades, and unable to coordinate distant fires anymore, up we all went. All that was left of Company K.

There were about 30 of us in all, and we hit the hill. I could see the mistake earlier assaults had made. The men were not charging up over the trench at all costs and then turning and working down from above. The Chinese [many, many more than should have been there] were standing in four-foot trenches, where the direct fire from below, even tank fire, didn't bother them. They just threw an unlimited supply of grenades, including big anti-tank grenades, down the slope.

So when I took the last of Company K up - effectively just one platoon - I ordered everyone to run through the grenade fire and cross the trench, and try to keep their fire down by massing our, largely carbine, fire.

It worked. Two more FO crews were killed by the rain of antitank grenades, and we lost about 10 more men who didn't make it. But we got across, and above that trench, and then met the lead men of Company L coming up the other side.

We threw all our remaining grenades in the battle on top, which forced the Chinese back into their tunnels.

Then, one tunnel by one tunnel, we got them out as prisoners or dead men.

By dark we had 192 Chinese prisoners just from the area above the perimeter trench, which was only about 10 yards down, and 200 yards around the hilltop.

With all the attachments, including a 14 man Company M machinegun attachment which joined us on top, I had 37 men, only about 15 left from Company K.

We discovered why they had held out so long. We had captured a Chinese division and regimental artillery CP, and supplies. The commanders had bugged out a few hours before we got the hill. We counted 250 dead. Days later the clerk of the Chinese battalion defending the peak was captured. I still have his exhaustive report confirming that we had attacked a reinforced battalion, and captured or killed all but 80 men.

We soon were relieved on the hill and went back to another part of the regimental front where the

1st Battalion had just been overrun; it was left with a captain as commander and had only 200 men.

Then we stayed rather stationary on the hills while the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments took ten more days to catch up and get their objectives.

The last of the men who had been with us at the peak of the fighting were rotated then, and the last of the old Company K was gone. I was the only officer in the company for a while longer until they brought in a few. Then I was made assistant Regimental S-3 (operations officer).

And thats how we were when the division went into reserve, and got ready to ship out to Japan. The 1st Cavalry Division had taken a real pounding; it never suffered more casualties in an equal period during its tour in Korea.

Company K, which ran about fifth in casualties, lost 167 men and 6 officers.

But we won all our battles.

Although I held down a captain's vacancy for six and a half months straight, the Army did not promote me, so I am still a first lieutenant. But I am on my way home and hope to see you soon.

Lt David Hughes

Co K, 7th Cavalry

------------------------

Postscript : The portion of this letter above, describing our defense of Hill 339 has been reproduced and included in the 2002 Book by David Lowenherz, "The 50 Greatest Letters From America's Wars." Crown Publishers

The Fickle Gods of War

The Burning Headquarters of the 7th Cavalry in Hokkaido, Japan, March 1952, which destroyed all 22 of my recommendations for combat awards for Company K defending Hill 339 and taking Hill 347.

This picture was taken by an M Company soldier who had fought in support of Company K during the toughest fighting, then was assigned to Japan, while I was back in the US. He did not find me to give me the above photo until 2005.

Master Sergeant Monroe MacKenzie, Company K, 7th Cav and MG Thomas Harrold, Commanding General 1st Cav Division

Msgt Monroe McKenzie just before Hill 347

-------------------------------------------------------

PFC Julius Citino and MG Harrold who autographed the photo

Company K of the 7th Cav suffered 67 men Killed in Action, 247 Wounded  and 1 man Captured, during the war from August 1950 through November 1951.

There is more information on my old web site.

http://intothefire.oldcolo.com/

PFC Julius Citino's Last Stand Machine Gun defense of Hill 339

The Chapter held annual meetings in various cities, tied together by the spirited ‘Garry Owen’ 7th Cavalry traditions and esprit. A newsletter was published. Over 1,092 7th Cav Troopers died in the 18 months it served in Korean combat. (67 were from my Company K)

I became a member, and attended perhaps 8 to 10 of their annual ‘reunions’

By 2012, the membership, had dwindled – as all were in their late 70s and early 80s, to the point, even with  wives and other family members attending the 3-5 day reunions had dipped below 40 or so. In 2013 the Reunion was held here in Colorado Springs. And apart from their telling war stories in the hotel “Hospitality Room” where the beer flowed, trips in rented vans were taken to local tourist attractions, like the Air Force Academy, they enjoyed the Rockies, but they knew little about the local active duty military units.

Because I knew that none of the attending members, long distant from their war-years, knew what the current Army, especially the Infantry (that most of them served in) I was able to arrange, through my new grandson-in-law SSGT Jason Stacy, recently married to my granddaughter Lindsey Clark, daughter Rebecca’s Daughter, a visit to Fort Carson. Where Sgt Stacy – who had had two tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan and was a member of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Carson could put on a demonstration of the current Infantry weapons AND the monstrous 3 Million dollar Bradley Fighting Vehicle that Infantrymen now fight from.  30 old, crippled up, 7th Cav Veterans got to see Sgt Stacy’s presentation, right in the Motor Pool area of a Battalion, and learned, saw, and put hands on what the current ‘All Volunteer’ Army was like.

It was a winner. Other than from television, none of the attendees except me had ever seen up close the Army’s key Mechanized Infantry equipment. It was such a great presentation, I wrote to Stacy’s Battalion Commander praising him. The Commander was so impressed he put the letter in a frame, put it in his office, and was going to carry it to Kuwait where his Battalion, including Sgt Stacy would serve another Middle East tour of 9 months. I understood someone else in Association also wrote to him.

September 3d, 2013

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, Commander,  2d, Bn, 8^th Infantry, 4^th Infantry Division

Dear Colonel Bailey:

I recently became the grandfather-in-law of SSgt Jason Stacy of your command. Since I am a retired Infantry Branch Colonel who commanded units in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and commanded and trained both a Mech Infantry Battalion and the 2d Brigade of the 4^th ID while I was assigned to Fort Carson in the late 1960s I have closely followed Jason’s career. Of course I am happy he has made a fine husband for Lindsey, one of my granddaughters, but I also have been professionally interested in what kind of an NCO he was, and potentially could become.

When I learned that he did well in a competitive series of tests concerning the Bradley Fighting Vehicle – and I knew that the Korean War Chapter of the 7^th Cavalry was coincidentally going to have a 4 day Reunion in Colorado Springs, I asked Jason whether he could get permission to prepare a demonstration of the Bradley and its weapons for KW Vets, all of whom are in their 80s. They all served in combat in Korea, and nearly all of them earned the Combat Infantry Badge  – as well as many Purple Hearts. But none of them really knew today’s Army – its weapons and volunteer soldiers - much less the Bradley Fighting ‘Infantry’ Vehicle. Which, of course they never fought from. They were boots-on-the-ground all the way in the Korean War.   

So SSGT Stacy got your unit’s permission, the POST PIO authorized bringing the ‘civilian’ Veterans to visit Carson to receive the briefing on the 21^st of August. The KW Chapter accepted my invitation to attend as one of their reunion events.  Twenty nine attended. Even one Army wife.

I want to tell you that SSgt Stacy did a superb job, from planning and preparation to delivery and demonstration, aided by other men from his unit whom he prepared. That is not only my professional opinion, but at least 10 of the 29 Vets who attended (several severely crippled from 63 year old war wounds) came up to me (the only ‘Colonel’ in the Chapter) and praised not only the demonstration and Jason’s hands-on lecture – while he answered many sharp questions - but SSgt Stacy’s quality as an NCO. That is high praise from old veterans who saw the best and worst leaders, in combat and during peacetime, during their time in service.      

Personally, I would like to have had Stacy in any of my combat commands. Which given the extreme combat we went through in two wars – Korea and Vietnam - is as high a recommendation I could ever give a fellow soldier.

I just want to thank you on behalf of the 7^th Cav Korean War Veterans for your unit’s support for SSgt Stacy’s program, and urge you to take an interest in the further NCO development of a fine soldier who - as the best NCO’s have ever been – the ‘backbone’ of the Army.

David R Hughes Col (Ret)

A page from the newsletter of the Korean War 7th Cav Association. I am standing addressing the Vets before the show began.

Just click on the item below.

7thcav001.jpg

I find it ironic - and illuminating - that South Korea has developed such a 
nationally complete, useful, fast and enviable Internet service. 

As one of just a handful of Americans who are still living (I am 87) I fought in
the Korean War from soon after the North Koreans invaded in June 1950.

I have often ruminated on how South Korea which was a very backward,
Japanese dominated, poor agrarian Asian country while I was retreating from
the Yalu River  before the Chinese and Soviet backed North Korean Army in
the bitter winter of November 1950, has become so modern today.

With two Purple Hearts to show for it, together with the memory of 34,000 of 
my fellow American soldiers dead, and 8,000 still missingI left Korea in 1952 
 as it began to transform into, not only a free nation, protecting itself, supported by only a diminishingly small deterrent US military presence, but also it has 
become in the decades following the 1953 Armistice, a prosperous,
Democratic, technological, thoroughly modern, nation-state.

I pondered how that transformation took place from its impoverished darkest
days with a defeated Army and corrupt government, until it recovered to 
become a prosperous independent state.

Know how? South Korea is a textbook case of Technological Transfer 
between US military forces with its American military and industrial culture to 
the large South Korean Army during a relatively brief US occupation. 
Large numbers of poorly educated South Korean soldiers learned how to drive and maintain US Army trucks from our  soldiers, how to use and repair American military radios. They observed the relationship between American soldiers and officers and their civilian   -  including Congressional - elected,  leaders. They observed how our market economy produced abundance, while they were trying to build their own  independent nation and its military - yet subservient to their elected leaders. 

So whom do you think set up the first civilian car repair shop in teeming Seoul as the Korean Army was greatly reduced in size after the 1953 Armistice? Whoopened the first civilian AM radio store in Taegu, to sell and repaire radios?
 
What was the genesis of the trained work force working in small, then large, 
private companies and then spawned corporate leaders? 

They and their fathers first learned skills as South Korean solders supplied by American industry, after being trained by their counterpart - mostly low ranking drafted Sp4's - US servicemen - who taught them a lot beyond mere technical military skills. American soldiers taught them American know how and our
political culture.

Few Americans even knew where 'South Korea' was on a map in 1949. 
65 years later we envy their national public high speed Internet and Wi-Fi 
mastery - buy their Samsung smart phones and even cars - from their free
market economy.

Many Americans argue that the US Military should be withdrawn from all 
over the world, especially from 3d World countries. But they rarely understand,much less observe or study, how  US military intervention - in our, and not just
their - national interest has had very long term transforming effects. Much of it coming from our Military and Political Technology Transfer.  We dismiss 'nationbuilding' by US military as policy,  while never studying where and how it 
actually works.

I never returned to visit my battlefields, because the last hill I took fighting with my rifle company against an enemy  battalion - "Bloody Baldy" Hill 347  - at a
cost of all 6 of my officers and 165 enlisted men killed or wounded while we 
captured 192  Communist Chinese soldiers and drove their government's 
forces back north of  the 38th parallel. That Hill - 347 -  is now in the middle of
the De Militarized Zone (DMZ). If I tried to go back there I would be shot by
North Korean soldiers from their side of their failed dictatorship line.

So I admire from a distance, what we soldiers accomplished by just going to
defend South Korea long ago. A war that ended in a 'truce' but which we 'won' in more ways than one. 

To continue with my Military Years click… NEXT, Fort Benning (1)