Military Years

Vietnam War (1)

2011-09-17T12:58:12-06:00

War Again - Vietnam

Knowing my War College year would be coming to an end in June, I took the initiative to influence my next assignment. The Vietnam War was on, I am a Soldier, so I reasoned I should enter the fray as soon as I graduated from the War College.

I learned from DSOPS - the Army staff section that knows such things, that a Major General John Tillson was going to Vietnam to command the 1st Infantry Division - the Big Red One.

So I wrote him on the 3d of January 1967 to request that he accept me as a Battalion Commander when I get there that the Army was willing to honor my request to be assigned to Vietnam and would even assign me to the 1st Division. And I laid out my credentials.

He answered me on the 1st of February, saying he would be glad to accept me, but that he was being changed to command the 25th Division, instead of the 1st. And would arrive in March, That he asked General Seitz - the Personnel chief in the Army Staff whether I could be assigned to the 25th - that he wrote Seitz that "I would like very much to have you as one of my battalion commanders". Seitz said he could arrange it if I wanted that division.

I did. I had served in it before, it was the 'Tropic Lightning' division out of the Pacific WWII, Korea, and Hawaii, worked with Australians and New Zealanders - while the famed 1st Division had always served in the European Theater and would attract those who served there. I liked the 25th's lineage better.

So Gen Tillson arrived in Vietnam in March, I got there on the 1st of July.

But before I even had finished up my War College last requirement - help design with other classmates an academic "War Plan" assuming one against the Soviets - I started reading even more about Vietnam - the actual war we had - and that I predicted to the Secretary of Defense - the kind of wars we WOULD have. I especially read of the French Colonial experience, through the battle of Dien Ben Phu which they lost. I read the classic "Street Without Joy" and "Hell in a Very Small Place" by Bernard Fall who had been critiquing US Policy over Laos.

Even while I had ordered those books - about Vietnam, Bernard Fall was killed on February 21st, 1967 while reporting and observing with US Marines in Vietnam.

He was a great loss - one of the very few men who understood the Communists and their attempt to take over South Vietnam. He knew insurgency and counterinsurgency. While supporting the US intervention in South Vietnam, he was so critical of what and how we were doing it, he predicted failure. He was right.

I wrote a letter of condolence to his wife in the US, praising his work. I still have that letter and her nice response.

The Wolfhounds - Again

I arrived at Bien Hoa airport on July 1st, went to the Replacement Battalion at Long Binh. At at 4PM the 25th Division sent a helicopter to pick me up and fly me to Cu Chi, 20 miles northwest of Saigon, where General Tillson greeted me and spent 2 hours with me. He assigned me to command the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. The Wolfhounds again!

I was thrilled. I wrote Patsy that that battalion was "The nastiest, toughest, dirtiest battalion in the whole Division with the best reputation and least 'garrison' personality. It lives in water waist-high and operates in Han Nghia Province. Name means 'little province'

Great. I was ready to go.

First, Tillson wanted me to spend 3 days with LTC Frank Goodnough's 1st Bn. 5th Mech Infantry ( 1/5) and fly out on an operation with LTC Ed Peters 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry 2/7 to familiarize myself with operations before assuming command of my 1/27.

I did, and as Peters with me aboard landed his Huey near his walking battalion, we landed right on top of 3 Viet Cong - which we promptly captured!

I wanted to see what the soldiers were going through. I quickly learned. Heat, swamps, bugs, fungus and hard work moving through the mud. Some men had not been in 'base camp' for over 30 days. While the Brigade and Division staffs slept in sheeted beds, showers, and ate at tables in mess halls in the Cu Chi 'base camp'. Only risking being hit by mortar fire when Viet Cong guerilla's got close enough to set up, fire, and run away. Or from occasional rockets.

I would be, as a lieutenant colonel battalion commander, sleeping under a poncho and maybe on a rubber air mattress when the 1/27 was on a mission.

Airmobile without being Air Cav

The 7th Cav Regiment - Custer's outfit - that I served and fought with in the Korean War had been foot infantry in the Pacific in WWII and in Korea. But by the early 1960s, the whole of the American Army effort in Vietnam had gone air mobile largely carried by Army Helicopters supported by Gun Ships and large Chinooks. The 1st Cav Division was stationed further north in mid Vietnam.

The 27th Infantry Wolfhounds - stationed in Cu Chi - north west and pretty close to Saigon - were supposed to be foot Infantry as they always had been since 1918. That made very little difference. By 1967 the All the Army had to do was assign separate Aviation companies, flying ubiquitous Huey helicopters which could carry 8 -10 Infantrymen each to the battlefield and back in support of Infantry battalions, further supported by Helicopter Gun-ships to deliver firepower from the air, add to it large support Chinook helicopters which could carry many more troops, but also supplies enough to support a Battalion - food, ammunition - in a relatively remote encampment, and voila! The Wolfhounds were just about as air mobile as the Air Cav.

But I just had to learn - as I had to in Korea - OJT (On the Job) and during combat rather than by air cav unit training in the US - how to fight the Vietcong, or the North Vietnamese regular troops (NVA) from the air.

Since the Vietnam War had already dragged on for 5 years, the decision was made to 'rotate' everyone back to and from the US every year. So there was turnover of Battalion Commanders - a choice assignment for mid grade officer - every 6 months or so.

I was happy to get that command in competition with lots of other lieutenant colonels - there were just so many battalions to go around.

Obvious - to me - Flaws in the US Military Approach

But I knew several things from my previous 4 years studying Insurgent Wars, and how the US should fight them - tactically and strategically. One thing about the nature of 'asymmetric' warfare between conventional Armies and locally rooted insurgents was that the insurgents, fighting 'protracted' wars lasting decades, sometimes lifetimes, with guerilla units very rooted - even raised from - local people and populations, 'knew' everything about the people, as well as the terrain they fought from. While outsiders, like Americans in Army Battalions - Air mobile or on foot, not only didn't know the local languages they knew very little except from maps, and what could be seen from the air, about the politics on the ground. Those Americans who did, were usually 'Province Advisors' to local Vietnamese government forces, with a totally separate chain of command back to Saigon. Yet there was little direct coordination between those US Army advisors on the ground below, and a heliborne force above - unless in the wake of very well planned 'joint' operations.

And to make things worse - the US decided to 'turn over' the entire US Military personnel in Vietnam every 12 months. Rotation. While limiting commanders of Battalions to 6 months before being replaced. Believe it or not that latter policy was in order to train by combat experience - lieutenant colonel commanders - so that the Army would 'build up' a large enough corps of battle tested commanders for the REAL war (against, presumably the Soviets in Europe) we would have to fight.

Instead of tailoring personnel policies to the war we were fighting - a Communist Insurgency where North Vietnamese commanders had been at it for decades - we were partly in training for the war we didn't.

The contrast between the way the Colonialist British fought their successful Insurgent Wars in places like Malaya and Kenya was pronounced. Some of their officers spent their entire careers in the same local areas in places like India. And only took occasional trips back to England. They lived, with immediate family, there where they operated. Americans only 'sent' their Army to Vietnam for 1 year stands, and neither encouraged nor permitted their families to accompany them in country.

My Assigned Mission

On a smoke-marked Landing Zone, trying to get oriented

Learning Curve - how to command from 1,500 feet up with 1:50,000 scale map, while turning in the air.

My mission was to conduct operations - sometimes in follow up to very specific intelligence about where suspected Viet Cong guerilla forces were, or where they were going. But also from just flying over a wide 'operational area' designated by the Regimental or Division commander as a kind of airborne 'patrol' - then striking any discovered enemy units in place or on the move. It was called 'Search and Destroy' - and being airmobile - as much by 'Combat Assault' from the air, as by attacking from the ground.

It was clear to me that the Airmobile commander in the Air above had no means or mission to try to 'win the hearts and minds' of Vietnamese below his flights. Sooner or later a vital task to change the minds of the Vietnamese caught between the terrorizing and propagandizing Viet Cong, the Vietnamese active Army forces on the ground, and the Heliborne Americans overhead. And the Vietnamese Army commander on the ground below, had very few advances weapons with which to battle, and win, over guerilla forces which stood and fought - or sprung ambushes.

Had I been the Division Commander I would have put the US Army Advisors in each 'geographical operating area' assigned to an airmobile battalion, AND the Vietnamese Army and Police units under the direct command of the 25th Division airmobile battalion commander and charge that battalion commander to 'win the hearts and minds' of the people while trying to find, fix, and destroy the Viet Cong operating in the area.

But that would upset the entire Saigon 'MACV' to the lowest rank soldier on the ground organization for what was becoming essentially two wars - one against the armed guerillas and NVA - and one 'for' the hearts and minds of villagers. Violating one of the prime Principles of War - Unity of Command right down to the rice paddy level.

But I wasn't even the Regimental Commander (Colonel) so I was compelled to follow under the 'search and destroy' doctrine that Westmoreland had decreed was the order of the day and the conventional-war generals at Corps and Division level ordered it carried out.

This 'split' that in effect had us fighting two, and little coordinated, parallel wars, in the same area of operations, while the Viet Cong, for all their lack of military resources, tightly integrated their political and insurgent operations to pursue their goals.

Which is a large part of why we lost that war.

Learning Curve

So I had learn, as quickly as I could, how to command a de-facto Airmobile Infantry Battalion. My immediate predecessor was a Lt Col - promoted to Colonel named Fuller and made 2d Brigade commander.

He had, by all reports, been an outstanding Commander. He was now at the Field Force II level - a kind of 'Corps' Command in the G-3 Planning Office, under three star General Weyand.

On my way down to Cu Chi and my battalion, he asked me to see him in his office. He was very helpful in his advice, the most important one of which was his saying that he too had to learn how to operate Air Mobile - and that it would take me at least a month of almost daily air mobile search and destroy missions while I was in a command chopper, before I would master how to coordinate fire and maneuver from the air. He was right.

He seemed to like me right off. He was not a West Point graduate, but came up through ROTC. He obviously knew my combat record from Korea. But he also, like any commander who moves on from having led 1,000, then 2,000 soldiers and officers at brigade level in combat, he wanted the best for 'his' men, and so wanted me to learn well.

I appreciated that. And six months later after I had served 'my battalion command tour' alloted to me, he requested I be assigned to his staff section at Field Force II Headquarters. Which is where I made as much contribution to the US war effort in Vietnam after the controversial Viet Cong TET offensive as I did commanding the 1st Wolfhound Battalion in successful Search and Destroy missions north west of Cu Chi the six months before.

Vietnam War (2)

2011-09-17T16:20:45-06:00

Airmobile Search and Destroy missions puts some real demands on the Lt Col Battalion Commander and his operational staff - his operations officer (S-3), generally a Major, intelligence officer (S-2) generally a Captain, and his Fire Control Officer - usually a Captain from the supporting Artillery battalion. Because they have to do and coordinate everything from the air, and by radio - usually at about 1,500 feet up - just out of effective range of small arms fire from the ground from the enemy.

Me with my Battalion Command Huey, from which I controlled 70 Combat Assault Missions from July to December 1967. Had a couple of them shot out from under me.

Most search and destroy missions require that gun ships fly out there in front of the lift of any units, or even my command helicopter, sometimes with intelligence that predicts where the enemy might be, to see what they can, get fired on which often confirms that there is a concentration of enemy around.

Then, if there is the likelihood there are armed enemy at one or more locations, I have to decide, not only whether to swoop in for the kill, or to plan exactly - by grid coordinates - where the lead helicopters with most or all of a rifle compay should be inserted, what direction they should move, and when. Meanwhile planning for the second company to be picked up by the returning Hueys', AND plan for any preparatory fires - such as an artillery barrage, while I am trying keep under the gun-target line (so my helicopter doesn't get hit by a 105mm shell arcing its way to the target area,) followed by gun ship strikes, and then door gunners firing down, keeping them from firing into another company's sector, or coming inbound to land.

And me trying to read the coordinates on a 1:50,000 scale grid map while turning in the air, while the Huey pilot ducks any firing coming up from the ground. And my operations officer taking into account the remaining flying time (fuel) on the 10 Hueys that have to shuttle the companies from the base camp to the hot combat zone.

And all of us adjusting for the times when medivac helicopters have to swoop in to pick up wounded men.

Yep, it took me quite a few combat search and destroy missions, before I mastered all the added skills to my already good grasp from Korean War days, of how to order the fight on the ground to defeat the enemy with the fewest casualties to our own men.

Air Medals

I was surprised - hadn't really thought about it before - to learn that, as Air Mobile Mission commander, even though non 'flight-rated' (with wings) I was entitled, as all combat pilots are in the Air Force as well as the Army, to 1 Air Medal, for every 5 aerial combat missions.

Before I was done with my command tour in November 1967 I had earned 14 Air Medals, denoting 70 combat search and destroy missions in 5 months. That was more than many an Air Force Pilot had flying long missions over North Vietnam.

Ever after that, especially when back in the US close to the Air Force Academy, I liked to rib Air Force Pilots on the Faculty there by saying "I could conduct 3 combat assaults before breakfast, before you could get one of your F-4's into the air over Hanoi." Rankled a few of them, who had many missions, but almost all of them, much longer range ones, so had fewer missions.

But the Flawed War

Even when I had mastered how to command a battalion at 1,500 feet, and I was carrying out the strategy and tactics set down for me, whether I liked it or not - and I did not have the authority to break out of the conventional approach to search and destroy, do body counts as a substitute for measuring progress in the political side of the war even in a small South Vietnam Province, I did well at what I was tasked to do. We killed Viet Cong, captured some - and detailed many 'suspected' VC operating out of our Cu Chi base, temporarily and made it difficult for armed Viet Cong to move through the AO, without being spotted and hit.

As an example of how much effort - men, equipment, costly operations - often got very little return for the US 'investment' - on one early operation while I was on a search and destroy mode, we flushed out 7 Viet Cong from a Pineapple field. It took me four hours, maneuvering all three of my companies before we killed 5 of the 7 VC. The other 2 got away.

I left my .45 caliber - my normal 'issue' weapon for a commander - back at base camp, and armed myself with an AR15 rifle, carrying tracer rounds. So I could not only defend myself out to 50 or 100 yards, but 'point' to my troops, often from my hovering command helicopter where we detected hidden Viet Cong, or a place to search.

First Blood

My first real action came on July 12th when one of my Air Cobra gunships discovered the VC in a marshy area. It was the 269VC battalion - 250-300 men. We engaged.

It was a 9 hour battle. I had two command helicopters shot out from under me. When I brought in B Company for a heliborne assault to add to Company A, already engaged, eight of their ten helicopters were hit. When medivac 'dustoff' helicopters came in to get our wounded, they got so much fire, I tried to get down to suppress their fire from our right door gunner fire. I also was shooting with my automatic M-16. But we took so many hits, they knocked out my radio consoles.

So I flew back to get a second command helicopter, and led in my third rifle company. As they were landing, my young Captain S-2, named Moran, sitting next to me got an AK47 sized bullet up his back. I quickly bandaged him and the helicopter was in questionable condition. So I told the pilot to put me on the ground and fly Moran back to aid and repair. We had taken 15 hits.

They did, so I fought along with A Company on the ground like a rifleman until they could not advance any more and had taken 13 casualties.

The Brigade tried to get the other battalion 2/27 to trap the enemy unit when they attempted a breakout. I swam across the Rach Loch river three times in the night to arrange my part of the trap. But by the time Peter's 2/27 Battalion got there, the Viet Cong had fled across the border into Cambodia - where we could not pursue them.

I had lost 7 killed, and 29 wounded. When agents came in to report they said the 269 VC battalion had carried at least 30 dead and over 100 wounded out. So we hurt them hard.

I was able to take the battalion back to Cu Chi for a needed rest.

I also did two other things. I put together an outdoor briefing for the battalion, with charts and maps so they could understand what happened and how we fared and hurt the Viet Cong. And I had a lieutenant tape it to show to the men in the hospital.

Learning what they accomplished that they had no way to knowing from where they were in the action, raised their morale. The assistant Division Commander saw it too.

I also had a memorial service for the 7 dead soldiers.

By that time, after 7 days of my command I had conducted 14 combat assaults, 5 of them under fire.

I felt I was in command of the battalion, and myself.

BELOW IS THE REMINISCENCE OF A SOLDIER - JAY LAZARIN - IN THAT SAME OPERATION - HOW HE REMEMBERED IT - 47 YEARS LATER FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A GRUNT

I was in the 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, 1/27th. that day. We were airlifted (without any information/intel at our

squad level) into an open field with a canal on our left and a thin hedgerow next to the canal. We were then

ordered to head straight towards a deep, thick hedgerow or forested area perpendicular (“T”) to the canal).

Of course, that’s where the VC 269th was laying in wait for us.

Being in the lead squads of the platoon, (I carried the M60) as we neared the hedgerow ahead we were ambushed with machine-gun,rifle and grenade launchers, possible some RPG’s also. My platoon had a large group of guys trapped in the open field while the rest scrambled over the dike and into the canal of waist to chest deep muddy water. The guys in the field were mostly wounded and (I believe) a couple were already KIA.

The point of my retelling this day from my perspective is to get onto the “record” that we literally stayed in this one spot for almost 6-8 hours, getting more guys wounded and killed trying to retrieve the wounded from the field or from concealed VC fire coming from the head of the canal. The men of squads just in the front of my position bravely went head to head with the hidden VC, keeping the VC from firing directly down the canal which would have been disastrous for us. Other platoons edged their way through the canal behind us, inflated air mattresses and actually floated wounded men away from our positions.

At no time did our Lt’s, Captain or any of the command relay information to us regarding what the hell we were supposed to be doing except (as usual), trying to kill unseen VC ahead of us and trying to protect ourselves and our platoon members.

We all know now that the large VC force was slipping away as we laid there, never advancing, never moving at all for all of those hours. Keep in mind that the VC who were firing on us from the wood-line were “just” a few dozen meters away. We were never ordered to advance to that wood-line, even as other platoons reinforced our position and had the firepower to make the effort to do so.

Why that was not done is beyond me although it might have risked more lives in a direct assault on their positions. After many, many hours, Phantom jet bombers arrived and the VC fire mostly died down and in the end they seemed to have just left their positions.

We were ordered to leave the canal position by the end of the afternoon, the platoons started to reverse direction and move backwards down the canal. I was in the last group of guys wading backwards at our position and as we did we could see VC watching us from the tree-line. A few guys fired at them but most of us had pretty much run low on ammo. I had just one belt of M60 rounds left with none extra in the squad to be found. The VC had obviously been watching us while we left and one of those faces still haunts me today.

I have no idea what is to be in command of a platoon, company or battalion, but I could tell you that the account written by LTC Hughes is sure as hell different from my experiences as a common grunt that day. That is not to demean his account, his command abilities nor his bravery as a soldier or decisions of that day. I would not liked to have been in his boots that day.

I’m sure that other guys reading this will have differing accounts due to exactly where they were that day, exactly in what location and relation to that wood-line. All of us were in deep that day, and I don’t mean the deep muddy water of the canal with the leeches sucking on our legs.

Take care fellow Wolfhounds.

Jay Lazarin

And HERE Is a Story of that operations from a Lieutenant Platoon Leader who was there.

A lot less critical of the operation.

I WAS 1ST PLATOON LEADER9 (MUSTANG CHARLIE ONE),CHARLIE COMPANY 1/27TH INFANTRY "WOLFHOUNDS".
AT THE BATTLE OF THE RACH LACH CANAL,7/12/1967, IN HAU HGHIA, PROVINCE NEAR CU CHI.

OUR PLATOON WAS DOING PLATOON SIZES EAGLE FLIGHTS ASSAULTS FROM THE 116TH "HORNETS", WE HAD MADE ABOUT
3 OR 4 LZ'S THAT MORNING, WITH NO CONTACT.

THE TACTIC THAT DAY WAS THAT AFTER THE PLATOON,HIT AND LZ, IT WOULD ASSAULT AN OBJECTIVE (A CANAL,
OR OTHER VC HIDE OUT). AND AS SOON AND THE CHOPPERS LEFT OUR LZ THEY WOULD GO AND PICK UP ANOTHER
PLATOON TO BE USED AS A REACTION FORCE. IF NO VC'S WERE FOUND AT THE 1ST LZ, THE SECOND LIFT WAS THEN
DROPPED IN A NEW AREA. THE 3RD PLATOON OF THE COMPANY WAS WAITING AS A REACTION FORCE.

ON OUR 3TH OR 4TH LZ OF THAT DAY, I HAD TOLD MY PLATOON THAT AFTER THAT LZ WE WOULD BREAK FOR LUNCH.

BUT AS SOON AS WE HIT THE LZ THAT WAS COLD, WE BEGAN ASSAULTING THE RACH LACH CANAL. WE MIGHT HAVE HEARD A CALL THAT THE GUNSHIPS HAD SEEN MOVEMENT IN THE CANAL.

AS WE ASSAULTED THE CANAL WE RECIEVED INCOMING FIRE. I CAN RECALL SEEING VC RUNNING ALONG THE CANAL AS
AS WE WERE MOVING TOWARD THE CANAL. WHEN WE GOT TO THE CANAL, WITH NO WOUNDED OR KIAS, WE GOT PINNED
DOWN. DURING THE FIGHT ONE OF MY SGTS WAS HIT IN THE HELMENT WITH AN AK-47 ROUND THAT CIRCLE THE
HELMET AND LINER AND EXITED THE REAR OF THE HELMET ( HE CONTINUTED THE FIGHT)

ANOTHER MAN IN THE PLATOON WAS HIT IN THE LEG, FROM GUNSHIP FIRE. THE GUNSHIPS WERE SUPPORTING OUR
OPERATIONS, BUT WE WERE IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE VC.

THE MAN THAT WAS SHOT WAS LATER EVACATED. 2TH AND 3TH PLATOON (THE COMPANY COMMANDER CAPT. STILLMAN
HIS COMMAND,F/O GROUP OF CHARLIE COMPANY WAS A RICE FIELD BEHIND OUR PLATOON'S POSITION.

AFTER THE FIGHT, OUR PLATOON EVAUATED AND MOVED BACK ACCROSS THE TO THE MAIN BODY OF THE COMPANY USING
COVERING FIRE FROM OUR PLATOON, THE GUNSHIPS, AND OUR COMPANY. WHILE MOVING ACCROSS THE RICE FIELD,
MY SELF AND WOLFOUND NAME "PLUNKETT" FROM HAWAII WAS HIT WITH A SMALL PIECE OF METAL FROM A RIFLE
GRENADE FIRED BY THE VC. THIS GRENADE LANDED ABOUT 10 TO 15 FT. IN THE WATER OF THE RICE FIELD NEAR US.
PLUNKETT WAS CARRYING AN M-79, AND HE WAS VERY GOOD WITH IT.

AFTER WE REJOINED THE MAIN BODY OF CHARLIE COMPANY WE EVACUATED THE WOUNDED. THE VC CONTINUED TO SNAP
THROUGH THE CANAL AND ONE OF MY WOLFHOUNDS WAS HIT AND KILLED BY SNIPER FIRE. HE HAD ONLY BEEN IN THE
PLATOON FOR FEW WEEKS. AFTER THE ACTION, I RECALL SERVERAL PILOTS FOR THE HORNETS TALKING OVER
OPERATIONS WITH US TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS OF WORKING WITH GROUND TROOPS.

IF ANYONE RECALLS THIS DAY AND BATTLE I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU. I JUST RETURNED FROM MY
1ST WOLFHOUND REUNION, AND I MET A FEW OF THE WOLFHOUNDS THAT WERE AT THE BATTLE OF THE RACH LACH CANAL,
12 JULY 1967

LT WILLIAM I. BROWN MUSTANG CHARLIE ONE

Vietnam War (3)

2011-09-19T14:21:54-06:00

Yeah, Wet Vietnam - Routine Patrol

It itleMy First Heavy, Costly Operation

It happened on the 12th of July. I had inserted Company A into a area where our Cobra gunships spotted more Vietnamese 'civilians' in the fields than should have been there. Immediately Company A ran into a buzz saw- the farmers were all Viet Cong! A big firefight started right off.

I quickly called for my other two companies - B and C to join the fight. We only had 10 Hueys to shuttle them in with. I finally got them in, but not before I had my first command helicopter got shot up so bad I had to tell them to just put me in the ground so they could go back for another bird. Before it was over 10 of our choppers were hit. And my second command helicopter was shot down too - so I fought the rest of the evening into the night on the ground.

The fight lasted 9 hours. We had tangled with the 269th VC Battalion, at least 300 strong. It was bad. We lost 7 killed, and 23 wounded.

I thought we took the worst of it, but after they retreated into Cambodia where we could not pursue them, agents told me that we had killed at least 30, and they dragged over 100 wounded across the border.

I was all over the place, doing what I knew, from commanding in Korea, was necessary - concentrate all our firepower to supress the Viet Cong fire while inflicting as many casualties on them that we could. While it would have been good had we captured at least 2 or 3 VC, but the shoot out, even into the night, was at a range of 100 to 300 meters, so there little opportunity to take a prisoner.

I didn't think I did any more than what I was supposed to do as a battalion commander, but somebody put me in for a Silver Star. So several days later after we held a Memorial Service for the 7 killed Wolfhounds, General Tillson pinned it on me. Making it my 3d Silver Star over two wars. Here it is below.

This operation happened so quickly that there was no time for the Army photographer from Cu Chi to fly out and film or photo shoot the operation. So there just is one photo saved showing me, and the Memorial Service.

Not mentioned before, was the fact that the 27th Infantry Wolfhound Regiment, was among the first American Army units to occupy Japan after we defeated them. The destruction of the country and its people was widespread, many institutions were severely damaged - including a Catholic Orphanage in Osaka, Japan.

When the first Christmas of 1945 came around, soldiers of the 27th Infantry visited the damaged Orphanage, where the staff, including nuns, were destitute, and there was little food for the orphan Japanese children. The Wolfhounds took up a collection, and, starting that year the soldiers paid for food for the children every year. And every year, taking contributions from the soldiers pay, the orphanage was gradually rebuilt. The tradition has continued for 63 years, from whereever the Wolfhound regiment is stationed - Japan, Korea during its war, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and thruout the War in Vietnam.

When I joined the Wolfounds, and became the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, it seemed appropriate for our battalion, in combat, to honor our fallen soldiers by accepting soldier donations in their memory, and send all of them to the Orphanage at Osaka.

The photograph below is a ceremony we held after two of our troopers were killed in action during Operation Kole Kole. The rifles where placed with the helmets of the two men killed and between them is the contribution stand.

The short PDF file below the photograph tells the rest of the story.

The article which was run in the Tropic Lightning Newspaper - the 25th Infantry Division's paper following the Ceremony described in the pdf file on the right. Click on the word Ceremony.

Ceremony

Life for a Battalion Commander - and Wife

Because I had a wife and three children - two of whom - David and Rebeclca - were well old enough back home in Annandale, Virginia watching nightly TV that covered the war in excruciating and nasty detail - which greatly contributed to turning the public against the war - I wrote home as often as I could. Patsy saved all 60 of my letters I wrote her during that year in Vietnam. Much of the operational detail I go into here came from those letters.

Of course there WERE moments when pretty ladies showed up in the field.

I wanted to reassure them as best I could - and discussed my and my men's living condition often.

One item - I and Ed Peters as battalion commanders were out on operations so much of the time, that we lived no better than the lowest rank soldier. In the rain, mud, and on the ground in the jungle or on rice paddies. If I were lucky I had a pup tent over me at night. If not the cover was a poncho hung on sticks.

In several letters, the handwriting was red. I explained this way "I am lying on my back on a poncho liner under a tent so low it almost touches my face. My head is propped up on a hard field pack and my clothes are wet; only my feet seem dry. By using a clipboard as my writing table and putting my flashlight under my left armpit I can see to write. But the light is dull red color - I have a red filter in the flashlight so the Viet Cong can't see well."

Much about Patsy's and the kids life, with photos and what they were doing while I was in Vietnam and what Patsy and I discussed by letter is in the Married Life section of this biography.

Contrasted with the very slow mail turnaround time during the Korean War, mail was very efficient and fast to and from Vietnam and the US.

Since the administrative battalion and higher headquarters were in well appointed Cu Chi, while the battalions operated out of rough field camps, it was possible for the units to have some life of their own center at Cu Chi.

For example it was possible to publish a battalion newspaper - 1000 copies being circulated each time. I wrote a front page piece for the troops in the July '67 issue.

The Wolfhound Regiment since they occupied Japan after World War II, had 'adopted' a poor orhanage in Osaka, Japan, and supported it financially ever since. Recurringly the men contributed to it, and the sisters who ran it wrote faithfully to keep the soldiers informed. I was able to read the latest letter thanking the Wolfhounds for the latest sending on money collected in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, and now Vietnam. So long as that 27th Infantry Regiment exists in one form or another, that orphanage will be the beneficiary.

But something else had been started in Vietnam. "Lady Wolfhounds" became the Officer's Wives Club whose men were in the 1st or 2d 27th Infantry outfits. So all the officers wives and their addresses were gathered, and periodically a newsletter about what the outfit was doing in Vietnam, was mailed to all of them. And with the high, and usually annual turnover of all the officers, the ladies were urged to contact each other wherever they lived in the US. Wife Patsy Hughes became the Commander's Wife - so she wrote to - exchanged - letters and photos with many of them.

We Can Ambush Too

My Battalion field base camp was, for a while near the town of Duc-Hoa, off the Oriental River. I sent the sketch, a photo and a description of one of my multi-faceted-operations in mid July to my wife and kids.

I really had quite a Wolfhound operation going. For I had access to helicopters, gunships, four 27 foot power boats , - my own navy - national police, and ARVN intelligence specialists as we tried to protect Duc-Hoa from Viet Cong shakedown forays into the town.

I sent B Company as an ambush patrol down the Anwa Canal in power boats at 3AM to the intersection of the Canal and Oriental River. A stream - the real water 'highway' connected Duc Hoa to the Oriental.

As morning broke and sampans began to move, three sampans with VC in them came up the stream. Company B captured them without a shot being fired.

I then moved my entire battalion to that intersection.

Then an old woman came down from Duc Hoa in a sampan the next night with a note for my interpreter that said if we would not 'cut off their ears and tongues' that they would bring four "Choi Hois" - willing converts to the government side. I said yes. Next morning in came 5 Viet Cong to give up.

I then, sent Company A in boats into the 'Horseshoe' area where Viet Cong hung out. And put Company B on patrol of the Oriental in boats too. By 10AM we contacted a 4 man VC squad, killed one and wounded one. 2 others escaped. Then I flew in a dog tracker team to follow the blood trail and used a speaker on the Helicopter to tell the wounded man to give up. He did.

With this kind of operation, plus a psyops team and a civil affairs unit, we started catching as many VC as when we only combat assaulted from helicopters.

As I thought, the closer we could integrate our military operation into the local 'civilian' efforts to keep safe, the more we would undercut the un-obstructed actions in population centers by the Viet Cong.

But there just were not sufficient resources or plans to do the amount of the kind of 'counterinsurgency' to make a big difference. EVERYTHING the Viet Cong did had a 'civilian' component.

Into the Mekong Delta

Then we got a new mission. And through it I was able to get an idea what Counterinsurgency by the 9th Division in the waterlogged Mekong Delta was like.

Between the South Vietnamese Army units operating in the Delta - a vast area most of which was under water most of the time and the commander of the US 9th Division, a plan was hatched to saturate a substantial area where the Viet Cong had built up a substantial force protected by the network of waterways - with US heliborne forces working in conjunction with the 'Riverine' units of the US division.

Fighting in the Delta, required lots of well armed motorized boats carrying small US Army units who had learned novel 'Riverine' instead of 'Heliborne' tactics.

The plan envisioned the water-borne 9th Division men together with South Vietnamese soldiers, marines and officers who knew the Delta - to attack the area where two Viet Cong battalions were supposed to be concentrated in, while at least two Battalions of the 25th Division would fly into the Delta and land on dikes and patches of dry land by helicopter setting up a 'blocking position' against which the Riverine force would push retreating Viet Cong, who would, according to their own tactics, run rather than fight. While gun ships would patrol the waterways the Viet Cong would try to get away over by getting into their own boats and sampans. Gun ships to shoot up and sink the boats, loaded with Viet Cong or not - so they would be trapped. And the riverine force would have a killing ground.

My battalion was one of the two 25th Division unit which flew it and blocked. 16 large Chinooks with my 1/27th and 2d of the 14th Infantry from the 1st Brigade flew down there 80 kilometers.

Then there was shuttling with Hueys covered by Cobra gunships to our blocking area. We did it so professionally that we arrived just at dark, where the last five hueys had to land by hand held strobe light.

In the night the Vietnamese Marine unit got hit, but we did not. (did they fear our Wolfhound reputation, which was good in Southern South Vietnam?)

Me mucked through the delta mud the next two days, killed a few VC and captured some weapons. But the Viet Cong battalions never materialized.

Me on a river boat seeking the Viet Cong.

My memory of that operation is dim - for it only lasted about 5 days - and we did our part and inserted platoon sized units where we were told to. We got into very few firing actions, as the Viet Cong fled in many directions and did not attempt to cross our 'lines' but headed east and west to try and escape (we were north of their area.) The gunships seemed to have a field day however, as they were constantly firing at something - either empty boats or ones with a few VC in them.

I had a half hour with Lt Col Blackie Bolduc who was the 9th Division G-3 - operations officer. He was a classmate who also was at West Point teaching French while I taught English.

The Vietnamese senior commanders thought the mission was a success, and awarded the Vietnamese Army equivilant to the US Army Distinguished Unit Citation to our Battalion. More show than substance.

CBS and NBC television crews were with us. Dunno what they reported.

Then we flew back to Cu Chi and told each other how radically different Riverine Warfare was from what we were doing - Jungle, Rice Paddy and Heliborne warfare.

And the next day set out on another typical Search and Destroy mission.

This all happened between July 27th and August 2d.

On the 8th of July I was handed a plaintive letter, carefully but neatly hand written in broken English, from farmer NGUYEN VAN MAI pleading for permission to 'transplant' his rice crop in a sector. Said they were afraid of the machine guns, M113 (personnel carrier) and helicopters that fired at night.

I approved what I could. The price of war for the rural South Vietnamese.

Vietnam War (4)

2011-09-19T15:07:36-06:00

During a routine heliborne search and destroy mission straddling the Oriental River, one of my Huey's took a round in the engine, killed it, and the chopper dropped into the river. Only by a mad scramble did the four men on it - pilot and co-pilot and two door gunners get out as it sunk - in at least 40 feet of water. With help from my Wolfhounds they got to dry land.

But then the Division wanted to save that chopper. So required me to stay in place an 'secure' that bird - 40 feet down where nobody could possible steal anything on it - all miserable night. Rather than my company of guys being able to fly back to Cu Chi and sack out the rest of the night, before another mission in the morning.

So I stayed with the company. Next morning a crane helicopter came with crews, and they took much of the day to finally lift it out while we stood guard with one company, but I continued search and destroy operations out to about a mile and a half radius the rest of the day.

I also took the time to fly across the river to an isolated Special Forces camp. Where its commander was a Captain Williams who I had as a Sergeant in Hawaii at the NCO Academy in 1960. He went to OCS and got commissioned. Old home week. While there I worked out a plan with him to rescue the team if the Viet Cong attacked them with more than they could handle.

And on the way back I had my command chopper circle the area where on one Huey extraction one man dropped and lost his rifle when trying to climb aboard.

It took a while before we got the rifle back while the pilots were very nervous that we hovered low enough I could spot it, before landing and then my radio man Sgt Jobe jumped out and recovered it.

While we were there a call came in that a Company A man was shot through the chest, and they wanted a medical dustoff mission. But we were much closer, so we flew there, got him into the chopper, and made it for the Cu Chi hospital pad, where medics were waiting. It took only 16 minutes to get him from lying in the field to surgery. It would have taken well over 30 had a dustoff flown out.

He lived.

Battalion Expansion

The 20th of August was a big day for the 1/27 Wolfhounds. As planned for some time the Infantry Battalions like mine, which had 3 rifle companies with a total of 690 men were to be expanded with enough men for a new 4th Rifle Company and more officers, bringing my battalion to 924 men, and 155 of 164 authorized officers. So Company 'D' was added to A,B, and C. That gave me 13 rifle platoons to fight with rather than the 9 I had earlier.

Planners had came to conclusion that VC hunting took more manpower than firepower, so beefed up all the rifle battalions.

This change was accompanied by a big ceremony I planned. The only one during the months I was in the Battalion. I made sure it was as good as one at West Point.

By this time General Tillson was gone to J-3 of MACV in Saigon, and new Major General F. K. Mearns, West Point Class of 1938 took over the 25th Division. I formed the battalion in a hollow square so all the men could see what was going on. Besides me being handed a new Company D gideon to hand to the new Company Commander, we also held a Combat Awards Ceremony, and Gen Mearns pinned 7 Silver Stars on my deserving men.

Then we handed him a captured Viet Cong pistol, with a Wolfhound crest pounded into its handle.

Then he and Col Emerson, the Brigade Commander handed out 22 Bronze Stars for Valor and Army Commendation Medals for Valor to my troopers.

Then we held the traditional Memorial Service for the dead Wolfhounds since the last one we had. And Col Emerson spoke, detailing what the 2d Brigade had accomplished in comparison to the other Brigades. By the time he finished the men were practically cheering.

New General Mearns got the message.

That evening we had a big sit down dinner, having invited 50 to our 40 officers, secretaries and nurses from Saigon. I had to drink the helmetful of champagne before I could have my name inscribed on it, as the CO of the 1st of the 27th Infantry.

Then we had several days training, with the new Company, while refreshing the old timers. That ended with every man, with his weapon, on a night perimeter of our base camp, and ordering them all to fire their weapons outward, surprising any Viet Cong around, and probably upsetting the whole civilian area thinking a big battle was on. But lots of weapons in the hands of administrators got fired, or fixed to fire. I believe in the Marine Corps motto 'Every man a rifleman'

Next day we started heliborne operations again, expecting some heavy fighting later.

With my added company "D" I was able to change my tactics on my heliborne assaults. They worked. I could box in suspected VC hideouts better. We killed 15 VC and captured 21 in a surprise attack without suffering a single casualty. I then followed it up with a night ambush and killed 3 more and captured 6.

It was the most successful day for me to date.

Then Several Small Operations

In the span of just about a week, we had a series of combat assaults that drew fire. The Viet Cong, backed up by NVA units were getting more aggressive and penetrating across the border further.

I got intelligence where a VC platoon was. I went after it, found it, and got into quite a fight. While we killed 9 VC and captured the Platoon Leader, we took 2 men killed and 13 wounded before the remnants fled into Cambodia.

With information we got from the platoon leader we went after another location. I inserted a platoon and flushed out 30-40 VC. We were able to kill 15, capture 20. We came back that night as an ambush, and killed 3 more.

All that without suffering a casualty. Following up on that, we made a dusk raid , killing two VC - one of which I shot with my M-15 rifle with tracer ammunition, and we captured a wounded one.

I flew out into our operational area one day in a little OH-23 chopper when my command huey was unavailable. Enroute to one of my companies sweeping an area, I spotted what I was sure was a VC running across a rice paddy. I closed up on him and with my M-16 rifle and hand signals made him my prisoner at the point of my gun pointed down from the hovering helicopter and forced him to walk into the arms of Company B half a mile away while we flew behind him.

Then, next morning we flew into a small village, 2 men started running. We killed them and got papers off of them showing one was a finance clerk.

By this time in my first 25 days commanding the 1/27, I had conducted 50 combat assaults - and got orders showing I had earned 10 Air Medals - 1 for each 5 combat missions.

Before we reorganized and I got more men, I had conducted heliborne operations with a maximum of 175 men. Now I could fight with 550 men - when we were allocated enough helicopters.

On one mission when we were put under operational control of the 1st Brigade, instead of under our parent 2d Brigade. We went out on missions in their operating area, but our production went down. The 1st Brigade commander and staff simply couldn't mount as effective operations as we were getting used to.

The rest of September, after there was a reorganization of the boundaries of our operating areas our production under the 1st Brigade plans went way down.

By this time in the Vietnam War 'body count' seemed to be the only measure of success. It was a lousy one.

Over a 5 day period, the 'rest' of the 2d Brigade - the 2/27 heliborne battalion and the 5th Mech battalion only killed 4 VC, took 1 PW and some weapons. While my 1/27 killed 14 VC, took 4 prisoners, and captured 8 weapons. We remained more effective than other units.

Morale, training, and good operational planning counted for the difference.

But as I have said before in this treatise, just getting body count every day in small numbers and capturing some weapons, requiring thouands of American soldiers, is NOT going to win this war.

So on the side, and in order to try, even on a small scale, an effort to be more effective within the South Vietnamese population in our assigned area, I formed a 'Vietnamese Civil Affairs' Platoon, and put a Lieutenant in charge of it who had 2 years in the Peace Corps in Brazil before joining the Army. And though Col Emerson, my Brigade Commander didn't feel like this would do any good - while he pursued Body Count that was reported to Division headquarter, I was trying get something started that would directly compete with the Viet Cong in winning over - one way or another - the loyalty of people in the villages.

Without backing my efforts didn't go very far beyond competing at the propaganda level in some of our villages.

Frankly, I thought less and less of Col Emerson as a Brigade Commander. He had little imagination on how we could clear out the Viet Cong better than what we were doing at high cost.

In between Missions there was time at Cu Chi Base camp to hold brief ceremonies.

LINK ME: Photo of me awarding a medal to a soldier for his bravery back at Cu Chi base camp

If you scroll down below the Collections Photograph page you will see a piece of the South Vietnam Map, where Cu Chi was northeast of "Ho Chi Minh City" - previously when we were there at war 'Saigon.'

Vietnam War (5)

2011-09-19T20:56:06-06:00

Increasing Battles from VC and NVA Actions

The end of September saw my Wolfhound battalion get into a heavy engagement, that beat up Company B.

It was becoming clear that, not only the local Viet Cong were beginning to get more aggressive, but regular North Vietnamese Army units and supplies were coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Cambodia in greater volume and mounting operations across the border more frequently.

On the last day of September, I was ordered to operate closer to the Cambodia boarder west of a place called the "French Fort" - from the days when the French Army colonized Vietnam. When I landed Company B in the afteroon only one Kilometer from the Cambodia border they ran into a hornets nest.

Two Viet Cong Companies were there, and they put up a fierce fight the minute Company B landed. They even had anti-aircraft weapons which managed to shoot down three assault helicopters, heavily damaged three others. and hit five others, mine includned.

Even Col Emerson's Brigade Command helicopter had to emergency land and division commander General Mearn's who flew in while the fight was building up had to stand off, and fly high to avoid getting hit.

I landed at dusk with two companies to reinforce Company B and take the initiative. We fought our way to B Company and then turned on the VC. We had a terrible time getting the wounded out by medivac helicopters while the landing zone was under both direct and mortar fire. A soldier using a strobe light to guide the choppers after dark was shot.

The fighting went on until 2AM, by which time we were beginning to envelope the VC to wipe them out before they started escaping into Cambodia.

This was the first big test for Captain Wroblewski, B Company Commander.

Wroblewski was an Annapolis graduate who wanted to be an Army officer so bad he was willing to serve on ship board off the Vietnamese Coast for two years before his transfer to the Army was approved. I had offered him the command of a Rifle Company in the 1/27th while he was still in the 1st Brigade. So he became B Company commander, already a good company after its commander rotated back to the states.

In the battle that day and night we killed 21 Viet Cong, but took 3 dead and 23 wounded. Captain Wroblewski and a Sergeant from my Reconnaisance platoon were so outstanding under the fire of 12.7mm machine guns while they criss-crossed wide open areas that I recommended them both for spot Silver Star Awards by the Division Commander General Mearns who had the authority to do that. He agreed, and General Abrams who was visiting Cu Chi pinned it on them both 2 days after the battle.

Rare photo of 4 Star General Abrams, Armored Battalion Commander under George Patton who relieved the bottled up 'Nuts' Airborne Unit at Bastogne in WWII. He was doing the rounds of Vietnam Units before taking over from Westmoreland when 2 days after the battle he was at Cu Chi and did the honor pinning on the Silver Star I recommended for both Wroblowski and a Recon Sergeant

I had submitted Wroblewski for the Distinguished Service Cross - DSC - superceding the Silver Star which he later got when at Fort Benning (learning how to be a company grade infantry officer - ha ha) And I do not pass out high awards easily. He became a great company commander.

All this was during a buildup time for the Viet Cong. They virtually surrounded the Trung Lap Vietnamese Ranger Training center - which the 1st Brigade was supposed to keep clear of Viet Cong - but they caught few Viet Cong all around them. We came in and imediately found and hit building-up Viet Cong. We even liberated two South Vietnamese agents who were captured at the Trang Bang Special Forces camp. They were shackled and were being led away to be shot when we surprised the 8 VC at 4AM, killing four of them.

About that time I tried another new tactic against Viet Cong who would crawl up at night in jungle areas and try to harrass the encampment or gather intelligence. I had a 105mm howitzer flown in with crew by heavy lift Chinook every night where we were encamped.

I had them lower their gun to almost level with the ground and set 105mm howitzers rounds with their timed fuzes, so that if we were getting harrassing night fire, we would fire that artillery piece at the sound of the VC over the heads of our men, so that the shell, with its very large blast radious exploded a few feet off the ground outside our perimiter.

Then in the morning we would fly it back to Cu Chi until the next night.

Vietnam War (6)

2011-09-21T15:21:03-06:00

R & R

Like all other men fighting in Vietnam, I was entitled to one 5 day Rest and Recreation break - R&R - outside of Vietnam during the year I was there.

I had several choices - Manila, Tokyo, Hawaii, or Bankok. Patsy and I discussed meeting in Honolulu, but given where she lived in Virginia, with our three children, it would have been very costly and difficult for just her to get there for just five days. I was sure I would be back in the US within 5 more months or so. 'Extending' my stay in Vietnam past a year to help win the war seemed less and less attractive.

So I chose Bangkok. Ever since I passed through it during Operation Cobra back from Hawaii in 1962, I was fascinated with its unique brand of the Orient.

I was there October 12th to 17th. I chose a better hotel than the contract ones most men were offered. It had airconditioned rooms, nice dining room, view of the city.

I also did not hang out with other officers as some did, although I ran across several classmates. And several officers who had been in the Pentagon when I served there.

Mostly I slept, and lazed around reading all the material I could get my hands on. And I shopped to send goodies home. I promised myself I would go to church on the Sunday I was there, but I was so tired, I overslept and never made it.

And I had a wonderful telephone call home, even though it was in the middle of the night, and all three kids who talked with me were sleepy heads.

I got a typewriter from downstairs and used it to write a longer than usual letter home.

I also went to a jewelers shop, and since the stone I had in my class ring I got in 1950 was badly chipped, I bought a dark star sapphire stone. Unfortunately the only ones they had were slightly too small for the opening in my ring, so they built it up with metal - badly- around the opening. I took it anyway and its still on my hand.

I shipped several items from stores home for Christmas for the kids. And it was there I got three great 'Tomb Rubbings' to hang on our home walls.

Next Job

Patsy, on the telephone, was curious what my next 'job' would be after I had commanded a battalion. I knew I was being talked about to become a Division level 'G-3' plans and operations officer. A significant 'ticket punch' in a career.

The more interesting part of my R&R trip was that when I passed through Saigon enroute back to Cu Chi, I ran across a number of War College classmates there. Most of them were in the newly formed 'Revolutionary Development' division. - At last, but too late to save the war, serious efforts to support 'developmental' programs were getting started. What I had studied and written about for McNamara while at the War College.

I also visited with Bob Montague who was Ambassador Komer's military assistant. He said I could be a Province Advisor if I wanted - which of course would be closer to the real Vietnam 'people level' where I knew the war will be won or lost.

Unconsciously I knew we were losing the war, for 90% of our efforts - purely military operations - were aimed at defeating 10% of the North Vietnamese and South Korean Viet Cong effort - their 'military' forces. The massive political subversion of people in the south went on virtually unapposed.

I had to think about it.

Meanwhile I had to get back to command my Battalion and the war. around Cu Chi.

I just wasn't sure what was in store for me, whether I was able to influence it or not.

Vietnam War (7)

2011-09-25T17:08:30-06:00

The Perfect Operation

Now is the place I can brag a little bit about one of my operations in that War. So long as defeating Viet Cong, killing or capturing them - thereby driving them out of South Vietnam, so its people and its instruments of government, may live in peace was the measure of success that the chain of command up to the Commander in Chief, I can point to one Perfect Operation.

After 4 months of operations while I learned my military craft, at last my commanding the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment resulted in a perfectly executed military operation that met my standard of excellence. It was successful in destroying a Viet Cong unit which was intent on disrupting the fair and open Elections in Tay Ninh Province. All part of the Viet Cong strategy.

It took place on October 20th, west of Tay Ninh city, very close to the Cambodian border. That was the planned Election Day in Tay Ninh Province. A standard tactic by communist Viet Cong and NVA forces is to disrupt elections by the people, both to intimidate them into NOT voting, or to prevent the 'people' from holding fair democratic elections. All part of the effort to take over the country and impose a communist regime on them.

Combat operations in war that are not only totally successful against a determined and experienced foe, but also result in few or no casualties to one's side, are rare. In this case it was rare enough that I was ordered to write up a detailed report, which was read and applauded, not only at the Brigade and Division - 2 star - Command level, but also at Field Force - 3 star -(Corps) and MACV - 4 star - (Country Highest military) level.

Here is that report, complete with maps. It is in PDF format. I will discuss, and in some cases I can illustrate it. There are very helpful maps with sketches overlaying them attached to the 7 pages of text.

THE WHOLE REPORT

http://davehugheslegacy.net/images/PDFs/vietnamassault.pdf

One humerous side note

Captain Wroblowski, the Navy grad who transferred to the Army to become a fighting Infantry officer, as I, tongue in cheek in my official report reported that he lost his Annapolis class ring when he fell in mud during the assault in 1967 still lives in Texas.

I learned from him a few months ago (2007), that about 3 years ago, the Annapolis Association of Grads sent him a letter that a farmer in Tay Ninh province had found his ring in the field (38 years later), took it to a Vietnamese jeweler who figured out what it was – with his name engraved in – wrote to the US Navy, who got the message to him. And offered to sell it back to him – for $5,000.

Since he had long since gotten a replacement, he declined.

The Battle Field

Names here

This was near the climax of the operation, as I had my command chopper drop me off right behind my small force that was already in contact with the enemy. The enemy is to the left, and I am getting ready to join the assault while the lead is really beginning to fly. It is not considered the proper - safe - thing to do for a Lt Colonel Batallion Commander (of 800 men) to plunge right into the middle of a firefight with only a handful of my soldiers - but it was now or never for us to overrun the enemy and I felt I needed to be at the 'point of the sword' to insure it was inserted perfectly.

Below the assault that I joined (just beyond the furthest man, while a combat photographer who got off my chopper with me took this very rare shot, for the enemy infantry was just to the left, as we swept over them, killing all of them.

Below, is me with my Brigade Commander, who watched the entire operation from about 1,500 feet up above the fight. Here is some of the weapons we captured

The Viet Cong were totally annhilated - no prisoners.

Thats how the Wolfhounds voted against the Communists on Election Day!

Vietnam War (8)

2011-09-27T10:18:55-06:00

Bloody Fight in Boi Loi Woods

I always hated to be attached to another Brigade for operations. Lots of the procedures between my Battalion and my 2d Brigade and its key personnel which had been built up get shattered, and we have to start all over again. The theory of the Army is that the Battalion is the key - always intact - fighting unit. But it, and other battalions, can be attached and detached at will to other Brigades. Simple plug-and-play. Right? Not in my experience.

So in late October my 1/27th was attached to the 3d Brigade, which was given the mission to try and destroy the Viet Cong force that had hit the 1st Division and had holed up in the black Boi Loi woods.

My mission became one of first, finding that unit, then attacking it in conjunction with the battalions of the 3d Brigade.

I did that. In fact we made contact three times, including NVA regular forces while nobody else did three times in four days. And we had a pitched battle in their trenches each time.

I lost four company commanders in one company - five officers in total. Each time I called in 750 pound air strikes and fired over 1,000 rounds of 8 inch, 155mm, and 105 fuze delay artillery on them. My command helicopter got shot up and so did the gun ships.

When we cornered one VC Battalion, I hollard for the brigade commander to surround the force, but he wouldn't send in another battalion, but wanted to wait until morning' by which the Viet Cong battalion had escaped across the border into Cambodia.

We blew up three enormous camps. It was violent, bloody, and exhausting.

But we lost 16 men killed, and 63 wounded in the four days of running battles. Three D Company Commanders.

One of my Chinook resupply helicopters was shot down (my personal gear in it was crushed including my camera) There were no accompanying Army photographers along during this bloody campaign.

I was so intense one night, while one man was missing after a shoot out in the black woods, and after two attacks I sent in failed to find him, I personally led my great small Recon Platoon in past his outguard bunkers at 11PM crawling on our bellies until we found him and got him out, but losing another man killed in the process.

I spent the rest of that night bringing precision artillery on him, and then had one company fire 100 LAW's into one small defended key patch of the woods to defeat him, which we did.

We killed over 100 Viet Cong and wounded over 250.

But I couldn't get a sense of urgency out of any other US Unit. I am surprised I did'nt get nailed during that four days while I lost my S-2 and S-3 officer and my Headquarters Company commander wounded.

General Gleszer's son, whom I made 'A' Company Commander, did well with his company

When I got back home to my own Brigade and Cu Chi to recuperate, I forcefully told my own Brigade Commander that the only way to clear out Viet Cong and NVA coming across the Cambodia Boarder was to surround and annihilate them.

I don't think he appreciated my opinions. Since I was being nominated to become the G-3 of the Americal Division when I completed my command tour I don't think he was eager to keep me on.

I had in my personal effects in my field pack the bayonet off an AK-50 carried by a NVA who tried to shoot me, but I killed, and told my wife in a hand scrawled note at the bottom of a typed letter in November to her that if anything happened to me, to give that bayonet to young David.

I still have it.

Vietnam War (9)

2011-09-27T13:16:37-06:00

Rushing to Song Be

Well the 1st Division to our west, had a series of set backs, including the Battalion Paul Gorman commanded. The NVA has started crossing more into South Vietnam with Regular North Vietnamese forces, so they had to concentrate their forces to deal with the threats, and the good old 25th Division was tasked to cover some of their bases.

My 1/27th Battalion was ordered to fly over into their sector and secure the Air Strip at Song Be.

I was there for a week after flying in by C-123s, after clearing the area out by heliborne combat assault with the lead company. We then got mortared nightly. Few casualties because we took over, and expanded, more fortified bunkers.

But when some shells landed close by where one of the kitchens were, one of my men dug out mortar fragments I sent home attached to a letter - one fragment for each of our three kids. Still have them. The Brigade had 1 killed, 6 severely wounded and 21 lightly wounded.

I met one classmate Dick Wyrough who was eager for a battalion, while John Wickham, who became much later the Army Chief of Staff, was wounded badly enough he was sent to Walter Reed Hospital in the States.

The Iron Triangle

After mid November, the 2d Brigade was tasked to go into the Iron Triangle, where the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had spent decades digging tunnels to hold their units who came down the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos where, again according to US Policy, they couldn't be attacked.

The question became how to root out the enemy and any supplies they put in the tunnels. The Commanding General was convinced the only way to clear them out was to flood them. While I just shrugged and did it - bringing in pumps and pumping over 1,000 gallons a minute - with yellow dye - into tunnel entrances I was assigned, classmate Walt Adams, commanding the 2/27 didn't - instead getting the Air Corps to come over and drop 750 pound bombs on where the tunnels were supposed to run. That made the General mad at him until he complied.

I don't know how much good either did.

1st Division versus 25th Division (at least my) Tactics

Then is was back to more Search and Destroy Missions.

The 1st Division already had the reputation of putting their efforts into heavy fortifications. I am not sure how much energy that left them for ranging out to find the enemy. Instead they dug in - reminding me of Dien Ben Phu.

At one time, knowing how Viet Cong take their time to plan attacks on small isolated US units at night, then strike, I decided to substitute rapid movement of the maneuver units of my battalion. Rather than sally forth all day and then return to our fixed base at night - which base could be, over time, struck by well planned attacks, I started planning to stay in the middle of our rather large and spread out AO at night. By a very calculated tactic.

After a day of search and destroy, often with few results, I would pick out an 'instant base camp' by ordering by encrypted radio messages each of my maneuver companies to converge on the area I selected, putting them down in a star, spider, not circular configuration, with platoons even stretching out further in such a way that if the Viet Cong approached, they would be engaged from two, not one direction. With my very small, one tent battalion command center. And so time the landing at an overnight camp, that the Chinook supporting us could come in just at dusk, off load cooked meals for each company, in two trips, while the 1st Sgts and Administrative clerks would get off the first trip and as rapidly as possible deliver mail, take back reports, including the sacrosanct Morning Reports - which is THE way the Army tracks the location of every soldier. And then at the end of the second delivery trip, run to get into the Chinook and take off just as it was too dark, and fly back to Battalion Base at Cu Chi to complete the administrative work.

We did NOT dig in deeply then. We arranged everyone including indirect mortar and registered artillery fire to cover the perimeter by a simple numbering system more than map coordinates.

Then when dawn broke the Chinook would fly back in to take out the 'dirty dishes' so to speak, the same adminitrative persons would run to their companies, and the battalion cp and pick up any papers we prepared at night. And drop any ammunition that had been expended over night - which my Supply officer would radio in for the dawn Chinook. Then fly off.

Then my Huey's - already inbound - would fly in along with my command helicopter, to pick up the first company for the day's search and destroy day, and me, and we would be off, with everyone gone from that patch of ground by 7am or so.

Now my uninaginative Regimental Commander did not like my Muhammid Ali tactics - float like a butterfly, then sting like a bee. Then fly off, with minimum digging in. Made him nervous, worrying what would happen if we were heavily attacked while on the ground, not well dug in.

But I calculated, I could use mobility for my security more than sandbags, and that I could fly in, stay the night, and fly out before any Viet Cong commander could plan an attack, much less assemble the men and then carry it out.

My proof of the pudding was in the eating. NEVER in my six months of command was I caught defending from a surprise Viet Cong attack on our overnight camp, while many 'bases' were attacked, even if not overrun.

I had to laugh, when a West Point Classmate of mine, who commanded a Battalion in the 1st Division (Big Red One) operating area, next to our 25th Division, flew in to visit me early one morning. He was appalled at my lack of fortifications. Seemed like the rule in the 1st Division was to dig in deeply, everywhere, and turn the AO into a fortress. That was where Paul Gorman was.

Vietnam War (10)

2011-09-27T14:04:24-06:00

Change of Command

There was more a fuss over my next assignment in other people's minds than in mine.

I did not know that 3 star General Palmer, for whom I worked in the Pentagon and was on Westmoreland's MACV staff nominated me to be the G-3 of the Americal Division. That irritated 3 star General Weyand, who was the IIField Force Commander (the Corps around Saigoon that controlled the 1st Division, the 25th Division, the 9th division in the Delta, and the 101st Airborne Division ) who, on Colonel Fuller's recommendation wanted me at Field Force Headquarters. And Ambassador Komer wanted me for a Province Advisor - where the real war was taking place. Even John Vann, who was reputed to be the most savvy counterinsurgent expert, got in the act. General Weyand went to the MACV Chief of Staff, declared I was an 'indispensible' battalion-commander-experienced and he desperately needed me.

Nobody bothered to ask me what job I wanted.

I was not particularly interested in going to the Americal Division in any capacity. It already had a questionable professional reputation. It was the same outfit that the My Lai massacre came out of.

Col Fuller, G-3 who had commanded the 2d Brigade of the 25th Division before I got there, and gave me good advice before I took over my battalion, had obviously been following my combat record on the ground while I commanded it. He really wanted a combat tested battalion commander. He fought for me.

Fuller through Weyand won. I was assigned to II Field Force Headquarters just north of Saigon, on something called "The Plantation" at Bien Hoa,under Colonel Fuller the G-3. I was made 'Chief of Plans, G-3, assigned 3 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors including one Australian. My job would be to make war plans for American and allied forces in the southern half of Vietnam. (IField Force would plan for the northern half.) .

The change of command of the 1/27 from me to the incoming commander was on the 6th of December. I left for my new job immediately. Patsy was, in her letters, greatly relieved. For I didn't have to wear a helmet, or carry a gun. I was that remote from likely VC attack. I ate in the officer's mess, had a cubicle BOQ, a maid, and electric lights. Most of the boys in the headquarters, sunbathed over lunch hour.

And for the first time I listened to some music.

Christmas gifts and cards came to me there from home. The US might not know how to win the war in Vietnam, but it sure knew how to deliver soldier's mail.

New Duties

As in most every 'S-3 or G-3' unit office in the Army, I had first to read the current war plans, attend every evening's briefing for Lt General Weyand, the Commander of all forces in southern Vietnam, listen to his 'guidance' on what the effort of US forces should be over the next six months, then go back and draft the implementation plan for units to obey in order to carry out the missions assigned. And coordinate the plan with both the threat analysis by the G-2, intelligenc chief, and the capabilities and limits of the G-4 - who was the logistics chief.

Having spent a year going through the Command and General Staff school at Fort Leavenworth, I had a good handle on how such war plans should be made.

And by attending the briefings, where much of the 'immediate' news of the results of NVA or Viet Cong attacks througout IIField Force's area of operations came from, and reports about progress in operations undertaken by subordinate units were described (most by Col Fuller who had to monitor all operations) I learned how the war was progressing.

Of course all the briefings were classified Secret, and some were even more Secret, especially about operations directly against Viet Cong organizations.

Vietnam War (11)

2011-09-28T13:44:20-06:00

TET

January 31st, 1968 was TET - Below is Verbatim, the letter I wrote home just hours after it hit - right where I was in II Field Force Headquarters. I still have the original letter. This was OCR scanned in.

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"31 Jan 68

Dear Ones

Funny thing happened at my “safe" headquarters last night. I wrote Aunt Arleen a letter before 10:00 PM telling her how I was out of the war now, went to bed, and at 3:05 WHAM! The 122 mm rockets began hitting the headquarters. All the officers who have never heard a shot fired in anger before started running toward the bunkers and ditches with ludicrous results- running into clothes lines, one guy burst through a screen door, several conked heads trying to get into the same bunker, half clothed, shorts with helmets, rifles without shoes etc etc.

By the time the third rocket hit I figured I had better get on the ground floor, at least, since this wooden building isn't very sturdy. So I put on my pants(another rocket hit), I put on my boots(another rocket hit), I grabbed my helmet, camera and pistol and found a pile of sandbags. I got on the side of the barracks right behind the perimeter defense where I could see Bien Hoa airbase and watch the fireworks. There were plenty. I judge about 50-75 rockets hit Bien Hoa, and big fires were started and a couple of planes went up in balls of fire. Every few minutes another one would hit our headquarters, and three of them made rocks and metal rain down on the tin roofs of my billet. One hit in front of the mail shack and the Signal headquarters and blew in all the windows and put holes in the walls. Nothing critical was destroyed, however.·

The last round landed right across the road from me, the sparks flew and the stuff rained down. We took about 10 rounds. Haven't heard incoming rockets since 1951 in Korea when the 7th Cav CP was hit.

All around this area helicopters, gunships, “spooky”ships flares and artillery scrambled. I could even set my camera by flare light.

Then things quieted down while fires burned here and there. I went back to bed about 4:00, fell asleep, then at about 4:45 crack!

The ground attacks began. Tracers were everywhere, spent rounds caroomed off the tin roof and once again everybody scrambled into bunkers. From then on until now(10:30 AM) its been one big war around Saigon, the headquarters, the air bases and the ammo dump.

About 7 I went up to the office(the cooks wern't feeding yet and except for gun ships throwing down rockets off in the distance it looked like it might quiet downbut it didn't. First thing that happened was the armored personnel carrier platoon that was guarding the headquarters made a sweep across the road in front of the head quarters to check out a shantytown. An RPG rocket hit the platoon
leader's PC, wounding him and knocking out the PC. So since then there has been a battle royal going on across the road as Huey Cobras, the newest gunships have been plastering the area. It is so close that when the gunships make their machine gun runs, the cases and links fall down onto the tin roof of the barracks, scaring hell out of everybody.

Then I was standing out between my building and the TOC when the Long Binh ammo dump went up with an enormous explosion as big as a small atomic bomb, with the same mushroom cloud and all. I first saw the shock wave coming at us across the valley, called everybody out to see the huge ball of fire, then the wave hit, shattering windows and knocking things off the shelves, and fluorescent tubes out of their sockets onto the floor

So I decided it would not be a business as usual day after all, and sent all my section back to their barracks and bunkers. On the way the mess hall had opened, we served ourselves(the waitresses all were off for TET(and I suppose, to carry ammo for the Viet Cong.) I had a good breakfast- coffee, cheese omelet, sweet roll, tomato juice-with - all my section, and the mess hall was full, when wham!

The gunships opened up on a section of woods right behind the headquarters, and the explosions rattled the tea cups. It (a shell) just ricocheted off the roof above me) It was amusing to watch the administrative types wearing flack vests and helmets to breakfast. Any way that didn't seem like a very good idea, to crowd into the mess hall, so we dispersed to our various billets.

You may wonder why I am not doing something important, but this headquarters is so big that when the planners are through and the shooting begins we are just in the way. Actually we may help man the TOC and the alternate OP which Gen Ware has just been told to set up-in case this one goes out of action.

The VC are making a desperate bid to hit everywhere-they claymored III Corps headquarters, got 100 men onto the airstrip at Ton Son Nhut, attacked the Embassy (A platoon of the 101st Airborne was landed on the roof of the Embassy at first light and believe it or not it was a ‘hot’ LZ.

An ammo carrying chopper got shot up getting a resupply to the Marine guards. 'The headquarters of JGS (Vietnamtop staff) is under attack, as are a number of other headquarters. Of course every big district or province headquarters is under attack too, as you have undoubtedly heard, but "the war around the perimeter of IIFFV

Headquarters is infinitely more interesting right now. If my ears are right I can hear a 10 ship combat assault coming in now.

When I got back to my room after the 8 AM attack the shock of the explosion had knocked down the small colored picture of David, Becky and Edward which I had stuck in the molding in the wall.

But other than that, no damage done to either me or my few possessions 'The war continues in Vietnam. I think I will go to lunch.

Love s/David"

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So TET officially started.

Vietnam War (12)

2011-09-30T14:39:00-06:00

Almost as soon as the Shooting phase of TET was over, the larger question - in each command area, like the southern half of Vietnam which was the responsibility of II Field Force - was 'what got hurt - US and South Vietnamese?'

From the hectic tumble of messages that came in the first three days, I had concluded a far different result from the Tet 'offensive' than the frantic Press - who made out as if the whole nation had collapsed and US and Vietnamese military with it.

In my first quick letter home after Tet, I wrote "...this is the biggest blunder the VC could ever have been made. They failed everywhere, militarily, took enormous losses (the reported US casualties and Viet Cong body counts were quite accurate), they failed to win any support in the cities...I think they beat themselves and shortened the war by years"

Of course it did, but the OTHER way - we quit in the end. Why? Because the Vietcong objective was NOT the destruction of US and Vietnamese Forces, even though they tried - but the WILL OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

As I have repeatedly said ever since Vietnam, the greatest ally Insurgents have is the US PRESS AND MEDIA.

While in point of fact, not a SINGLE US Miltiary Army or Platoon was defeated or overrun, the US Press declared TET as a US 'MILITARY' disaster, when it was only a VC POLITICAL victory.

You have to credit the Communists who undertand the American public AND its Press better than they do.

The 'VC TET OFFENSIVE RESULTS BRIEFING'

There were so many places simultaneously hit by the Viet Cong, that it would take more than a few staff officers just scanning incoming messages to get the 'bigger' picture. For the corollary question was 'Who won what and who lost what' from this countrywide series of small attacks.'

So, no surprise to me, I and my G-3 Plans section was tapped to do a rapid study and prepare a comprehensive briefing for General Weyand and the senior commanders and staff in II Field Force.

It took time - more than a week - to gather all the facts - reports from every US unit, and all the South Vietnamese Units who take longer to report, analyse them, put them all into a fully illustrated - map and charts - briefing.

But when it was done - reflecting exactly what I had concluded two days after TET - that the Viet Cong suffered an overwhelming military defeat - the briefing I gave to General Weyand was so convincing, he wanted General Westmoreland to see it Westmoreland wanted General Wheeler - Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Washington - to see it (and he took back a book of it I prepared) which started the most amazing series of briefings by me to every Military AND US Civilian VIP AND the world Press over the next month.

I was dubbed in Saigon by the end of March as "The greatest living expert on the VC TET Offensive"

Before I was done I had briefed US Ambassador Bunker, the Saigon staffs of the Embassy, US AID, USIS (Information Service), Ambassador Laise, the CIA, General Lansdale, biligually to the Senior Vietnamese Government and Military Command, the 7th Air Force Commander General Momeyer - and before I was done he asked me to come back to Ton Son Nhut Airbase and breif it to General Ryan the Air Force Commander of all the Pacific (PACAF). There were 23 Air Force Stars in that room that date. They asked if they could video tape it and take it back to Honolulu. The still classified version.

Westmoreland was so exited about what it showed - and proved - he sat in a second time himself as I briefed it, and when Barry Zorthian, head of Information asked if it could be 'sanitized' enough to be given to the Press, he said yes.

So I had to revise the classified portions, and then to an absolutely packed room (perhaps 100 journalists - and I was sure some Communist Agent 'Press') during one of the "5 O'Clock Follies' - which the press dubbed their daily briefing by MACV, I delivered it yet again - and handled all their questions.

It was the hottest property in the Pacific, and I was the star.

But of COURSE, the Press and Media had already made up THEIR minds - regardless of the facts - that it was major defeat for the US, preferred to run on television news in the US, repeatedly, the scenes of the Viet Cong getting inside the wire of the US Embassy (never inside the buildings) and declared it a disaster.

But YOU can read the long Unclassified Press Briefing (without maps, but plenty of facts) right here - which, in summary showed that we killed over 12,000 Viet Cong during TET while suffering only 300 killed US soldiers during the same 20 day period.

Just click on the PDF file below and read what the Press Corps got about TET from the US perspective.

http://davehugheslegacy.net/images/PDFs/tetbrief0001.pdf

Vietnam War (13)

2011-09-30T16:27:11-06:00

NEXT ASSIGNMENT ???

All during this period January through April, 1969, and right in the middle of my TET Briefing Road Show I got notifed and the Powers that Be thought I should be assigned to be put on the Faculty, as an Army representative, at the Naval War College.

Big Surprise. It may have come from my long and complex article about the emerging new Spectrum of War - from an Army perspective - that was accepted and run in the prestigious periodic US Naval Institute Proceedings. The Navy's think book.

So in late March I got Official Orders for the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Sounded like a cushy assignment after a year of war. I would lecture Naval War College students.

I spent the next 3 months, long distance to Patsy by mail, going over what she has to check out for our Move there. Housing, schools, what to do with our house.

But then on the 20th of April, I was visited, at II Field Force Headquarters by none other that Major General Roland Gleszer, Class of 1940 West Point, whose son Captain Peter Gleszer had been under my Wolfhound battalion command in Vietnam just months before.

Gleszer wanted to tell me he had been assigned to command the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and he wanted me for HIS 'G-3'!

Wow, what a switch! War College to another Army War-Fighting Unit.

He got my Army orders changed! He did not know I was from Colorado, but I knew he knew my combat record in Korea, and Vietnam. And when he had been a Tactical Officer at West Point in 1958, and I was an Instructor there, he heard my presentation about 'combat leadership' to a whole class of new Plebes at West Point. Which was cited as outstanding.

So my changed orders were to the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado, just outside Colorado Springs.

Back home, but also back into another busy Army command.

Later I wondered if he thought that I had been able to turn his son - who, though also a West Point grad Captain did not look or seem like a cracking combat infantry leader - . While his dad had been just that, as a battalion commander at Normandy. I think Gleszer thought I made son Peter into a combat leader.

And I wondered if Gleszer's wife - Peter's mother - was grateful I didn't get him killed on the many heliborne combat assaults I sent him out on.

Whatever. My orders required me to report to Fort Carson by August 1st, 1968.

What I knew about Mechanized warfare units you could put on the tip of a bayonet. And I doubted Gen Gleszer knew much more. So once again here comes a steep learning curve assignment. From a boots on the ground Infantry unit in Korea, Airmobile Infantry unit in Vietnam, and a Mechanized Infantry Division in Colorado.

Cest la guerre.

With all that, my combat tour in Vietnam came to an end, and I flew back to America - into as I recall, the Washington DC airport, where Patsy, and all three of my kids - David, Rebecca, and Edward met me. Also relieved that I made it through another year of war virtually unscratched.

To continue with my Military Years click… NEXT, Fort Carson (1)