Details

Written by dave

Category: Vietnam 1967-1968

Published: 17 September 2011

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Airmobile Search and Destroy missions puts some real demands on the Lt Col Battalion Commander and his operational staff - his operations officer (S-3), generally a Major, intelligence officer (S-2) generally a Captain, and his Fire Control Officer - usually a Captain from the supporting Artillery battalion. Because they have to do and coordinate everything from the air, and by radio - usually at about 1,500 feet up - just out of effective range of small arms fire from the ground from the enemy. 

Most search and destroy missions require that gun ships fly out there in front of the lift of any units, or even my command helicopter, sometimes with intelligence that predicts where the enemy might be, to see what they can, get fired on which often confirms that there is a concentration of enemy around.  

Then, if there is the likelihood there are  armed enemy at one or more locations, I have to decide, not only whether to swoop in for the kill, or to plan exactly - by grid coordinates - where the lead helicopters with most or all of a rifle compay should be inserted, what direction they should move, and when. Meanwhile planning for the second company to be picked up by the returning Hueys', AND plan for any preparatory fires - such as an artillery barrage, while I am trying keep under the gun-target line (so my helicopter doesn't get hit by a 105mm shell arcing its way to the target area,)  followed by gun ship strikes, and then door gunners firing down, keeping them from firing into another company's sector, or coming inbound to land. 

And me trying to read the coordinates on a 1:50,000 scale grid map while  turning in the air, while the Huey pilot ducks any firing coming up from the ground. And my operations officer taking into account the remaining flying time (fuel) on the 10 Hueys that have to shuttle the companies from the base camp to the hot combat zone. 

And all of us adjusting for the times when medivac helicopters have to swoop in to pick up wounded men.

Yep, it took me quite a few combat search and destroy missions, before I mastered all the added skills to my already good grasp from Korean War days, of how to order the fight on the ground to defeat the enemy with the fewest casualties to our own men.

Air Medals  

I was surprised - hadn't really thought about it before - to learn that, as Air Mobile Mission commander, even though non 'flight-rated' (with wings) I was entitled, as all combat pilots are in the Air Force as well as the Army, to 1 Air Medal, for every 5 aerial combat missions.

Before I was done with my command tour in November 1967 I had earned 14 Air Medals, denoting 70 combat search and destroy missions in 5 months. That was more than many an Air Force Pilot had flying long missions over North Vietnam.

Ever after that, especially when back in the US close to the Air Force Academy, I liked to rib Air Force Pilots on the Faculty there by saying "I could conduct 3 combat assaults before breakfast, before you could get one of your F-4's into the air over Hanoi." Rankled a few of them, who had many missions, but almost all of them, much longer range ones, so had fewer missions.

But the Flawed War

Even when I had mastered how to command a battalion at 1,500 feet, and I was carrying out the strategy and tactics set down for me, whether I liked it or not - and I did not have the authority to break out of the conventional approach to search and destroy, do body counts as a substitute for measuring progress in the political side of the war even in a small South Vietnam Province, I did well at what I was tasked to do. We killed Viet Cong, captured some - and detailed many 'suspected' VC operating out of our Cu Chi base, temporarily and made it difficult for armed Viet Cong to move through the AO, without being spotted and hit.

As an example of how much effort - men, equipment, costly operations - often got very little return for the US 'investment' - on one early operation while I was on a search and destroy mode, we flushed out 7 Viet Cong from a Pineapple field. It took me four hours, maneuvering all three of my companies before we killed 5 of the 7 VC. The other 2 got away.

I left my .45 caliber - my normal 'issue' weapon for a commander - back at base camp, and armed myself with an AR15 rifle, carrying tracer rounds. So I could not only defend myself out to 50 or 100 yards, but 'point' to my troops, often from my hovering command helicopter where we detected hidden Viet Cong, or a place to search.

First Blood

My first real action came on July 12th when one of my Air Cobra gunships discovered the VC in a marshy area. It was the 269VC battalion - 250-300 men. We engaged. 

It was a 9 hour battle. I had two command helicopters shot out from under me. When I brought in B Company for a heliborne assault to add to Company A, already engaged, eight of their ten helicopters were hit. When medivac 'dustoff' helicopters came in to get our wounded, they got so much fire, I tried to get down to suppress their fire from our right door gunner fire. I also was shooting with my automatic M-16. But we took so many hits, they knocked out my radio consoles. 

So I flew back to get a second command helicopter, and led in my third rifle company. As they were landing, my young Captain S-2, named Moran, sitting next to me got an AK47 sized bullet up his back. I quickly bandaged him and the helicopter was in questionable condition. So  I told the pilot to put me on the ground and fly Moran back to aid and repair. We had taken 15 hits.  

They did, so I fought along with A Company on the ground like a rifleman until they could not advance any more and had taken 13 casualties.

The Brigade tried to get the other battalion 2/27 to trap the enemy unit when they attempted a breakout. I swam across the Rach Loch river three times in the night to arrange my part of the trap. But by the time Peter's 2/27 Battalion got there, the Viet Cong had fled across the border into Cambodia - where we could not pursue them.

I had lost 7 killed, and 29 wounded. When agents came in to report they said the 269 VC battalion had carried at least 30 dead and over 100 wounded out. So we hurt them hard. 

I was able to take the battalion back to Cu Chi for a needed rest. 

I also did two other things. I put together an outdoor briefing for the battalion, with charts and maps so they could understand what happened and how we fared and hurt the Viet Cong. And I had a lieutenant tape it to show to the men in the hospital. 

Learning what they accomplished that they had no way to knowing from where they were in the action, raised their morale.  The assistant Division Commander saw it too.

I also had a memorial service for the 7 dead soldiers. 

By that time, after  7 days of my command I had conducted 14 combat assaults, 5 of them under fire.

I felt I was in command of the battalion, and myself.

BELOW IS THE REMINISCENCE OF A SOLDIER - JAY LAZARIN - IN THAT SAME OPERATION - HOW HE REMEMBERED IT - 47 YEARS LATER FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A GRUNT

I was in the 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, 1/27th. that day. We were airlifted (without any information/intel at our

squad level) into an open field with a canal on our left and a thin hedgerow next to the canal. We were then

ordered to head straight towards a deep, thick hedgerow or forested area perpendicular (“T”) to the canal).

Of course, that’s where the VC 269th was laying in wait for us. 

I  WAS 1ST PLATOON LEADER9 (MUSTANG CHARLIE ONE),CHARLIE COMPANY 1/27TH INFANTRY "WOLFHOUNDS".
AT THE BATTLE OF THE RACH LACH CANAL,7/12/1967, IN HAU HGHIA, PROVINCE NEAR CU CHI. 

OUR PLATOON WAS DOING PLATOON SIZES EAGLE FLIGHTS ASSAULTS FROM THE 116TH "HORNETS", WE HAD MADE ABOUT 
3 OR 4 LZ'S THAT MORNING, WITH NO CONTACT. 

THE TACTIC THAT DAY WAS THAT AFTER THE PLATOON,HIT AND LZ, IT WOULD ASSAULT AN OBJECTIVE (A CANAL,
 OR OTHER VC HIDE OUT). AND AS SOON AND THE CHOPPERS LEFT OUR LZ THEY WOULD GO AND PICK UP ANOTHER 
PLATOON TO BE USED AS A REACTION FORCE. IF NO VC'S WERE FOUND AT THE 1ST LZ, THE SECOND LIFT WAS THEN 
DROPPED IN A NEW AREA. THE 3RD PLATOON OF THE COMPANY WAS WAITING AS A REACTION FORCE. 

ON OUR 3TH OR 4TH LZ OF THAT DAY, I HAD TOLD MY PLATOON THAT AFTER THAT LZ WE WOULD BREAK FOR LUNCH. 

BUT AS SOON AS WE HIT THE LZ THAT WAS COLD, WE BEGAN ASSAULTING THE RACH LACH CANAL. WE MIGHT HAVE HEARD A CALL THAT THE GUNSHIPS HAD SEEN MOVEMENT IN THE CANAL. 

AS WE ASSAULTED THE CANAL WE RECIEVED INCOMING FIRE. I CAN RECALL SEEING VC RUNNING ALONG THE CANAL AS 
AS WE WERE MOVING TOWARD THE CANAL. WHEN WE GOT TO THE CANAL, WITH NO WOUNDED OR KIAS, WE GOT PINNED 
DOWN. DURING THE FIGHT ONE OF MY SGTS WAS HIT IN THE HELMENT WITH AN AK-47 ROUND THAT CIRCLE THE
HELMET AND LINER AND EXITED THE REAR OF THE HELMET ( HE CONTINUTED THE FIGHT)

ANOTHER MAN IN THE PLATOON WAS HIT IN THE LEG, FROM GUNSHIP FIRE. THE GUNSHIPS WERE SUPPORTING OUR
 OPERATIONS, BUT WE WERE IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE VC.

THE MAN THAT WAS SHOT WAS LATER EVACATED. 2TH AND 3TH PLATOON (THE COMPANY COMMANDER CAPT. STILLMAN 
HIS COMMAND,F/O GROUP OF CHARLIE COMPANY WAS A RICE FIELD BEHIND OUR PLATOON'S POSITION.

AFTER THE FIGHT, OUR PLATOON EVAUATED AND MOVED BACK ACCROSS THE TO THE MAIN BODY OF THE COMPANY USING 
COVERING FIRE FROM OUR PLATOON, THE GUNSHIPS, AND OUR COMPANY. WHILE MOVING ACCROSS THE RICE FIELD, 
MY SELF AND WOLFOUND NAME "PLUNKETT" FROM HAWAII WAS HIT WITH A SMALL PIECE OF METAL FROM A RIFLE 
GRENADE FIRED BY THE VC. THIS GRENADE LANDED ABOUT 10 TO 15 FT. IN THE WATER OF THE RICE FIELD NEAR US. 
PLUNKETT WAS CARRYING AN M-79, AND HE WAS VERY GOOD WITH IT. 

AFTER WE REJOINED THE MAIN BODY OF CHARLIE COMPANY WE EVACUATED THE WOUNDED. THE VC CONTINUED TO SNAP 
THROUGH THE CANAL AND ONE OF MY WOLFHOUNDS WAS HIT AND KILLED BY SNIPER FIRE. HE HAD ONLY BEEN IN THE
PLATOON FOR FEW WEEKS. AFTER THE ACTION, I RECALL SERVERAL PILOTS FOR THE HORNETS TALKING OVER 
OPERATIONS WITH US TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS OF WORKING WITH GROUND TROOPS. 

IF ANYONE RECALLS THIS DAY AND BATTLE I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU. I JUST RETURNED FROM MY 
1ST WOLFHOUND REUNION, AND I MET A FEW OF THE WOLFHOUNDS THAT WERE AT THE BATTLE OF THE RACH LACH CANAL, 
12 JULY 1967 

LT WILLIAM I. BROWN MUSTANG CHARLIE ONE

Details

Written by dave

Category: Vietnam 1967-1968

Published: 19 September 2011

Hits: 5275

During a routine heliborne search and destroy mission straddling the Oriental River, one of my Huey's took a round in the engine, killed it, and the chopper dropped into the river. Only by a mad scramble did the four men on it - pilot and co-pilot and two door gunners get out as it sunk - in at least 40 feet of water. With help from my Wolfhounds they got to dry land. 

But then the Division wanted to save that chopper. So required me to stay in place an 'secure' that bird - 40 feet down where nobody could possible steal anything on it - all miserable night. Rather than my company of guys being able to fly back to Cu Chi and sack out the rest of the night, before another mission in the morning.

So I stayed with the company. Next morning a crane helicopter came with crews, and they took much of the day to finally lift it out while we stood guard with one company, but I continued search and destroy operations out to about a mile and a half radius the rest of the day.

I also took the time to fly across the river to an isolated Special Forces camp. Where its commander was a Captain Williams who I had as a Sergeant in Hawaii at the NCO Academy in 1960. He went to OCS and got commissioned. Old home week. While there I worked out a plan with him to rescue the team if the Viet Cong attacked them with more than they could handle. 

And on the way back I had my command chopper circle the area where on one Huey extraction one man dropped and lost  his rifle when trying to climb aboard.

It took a while before we got the rifle back while the pilots were very nervous that we hovered low enough I could spot it, before landing and then my radio man Sgt Jobe jumped out and recovered it.

While we were there a call came in that a Company A man was shot through the chest, and they wanted a medical dustoff mission. But we were much closer, so we flew there, got him into the chopper, and made it for the Cu Chi hospital pad, where medics were waiting. It took only 16 minutes to get him from lying in the field to surgery. It would have taken well over 30 had a dustoff flown out.

He lived.

Battalion Expansion

The 20th of August was a big day for the 1/27 Wolfhounds. As planned for some time the Infantry Battalions like mine, which had 3 rifle companies with a total of 690 men were to be expanded with enough men for a new 4th Rifle Company and more officers, bringing my battalion to 924 men, and 155 of 164 authorized officers. So Company 'D' was added to A,B, and C. That gave me 13 rifle platoons to fight with rather than the 9 I had earlier.

Planners had came to conclusion that VC hunting took more manpower than firepower, so beefed up all the rifle battalions.

This change was accompanied by a big ceremony I planned. The only one during the months I was in the Battalion. I made sure it was as good as one at West Point.

By this time General Tillson was gone to J-3 of MACV in Saigon, and new Major General F. K. Mearns, West Point Class of 1938  took over the 25th Division. I formed the battalion in a hollow square so all the men could see what was going on.  Besides me being handed a new Company D gideon to hand to the new Company Commander,  we also held a Combat Awards Ceremony, and Gen Mearns pinned 7 Silver Stars on my deserving men. 

Then we handed him a captured Viet Cong pistol, with a Wolfhound crest pounded into its handle.

Then he and Col Emerson, the Brigade Commander handed out 22 Bronze Stars for Valor and Army Commendation Medals for Valor to my troopers.

Then we held the traditional Memorial Service for the dead Wolfhounds since the last one we had. And Col Emerson spoke, detailing what the 2d Brigade had accomplished in comparison to the other Brigades. By the time he finished the men were practically cheering.

New General Mearns got the message.

That evening we had a big sit down dinner, having invited 50 to our 40 officers, secretaries and nurses from Saigon. I had to drink the helmetful of champagne before I could have my name inscribed on it, as the CO of the 1st of the 27th Infantry. 

Then we had several days training, with the new Company, while refreshing the old timers. That ended  with every man, with his weapon, on a night perimeter of our base camp, and ordering them all to fire their weapons outward, surprising any Viet Cong around, and probably upsetting the whole civilian area thinking a big battle was on. But lots of weapons in the hands of administrators got fired, or fixed to fire. I believe in the Marine Corps motto 'Every man a rifleman'

Next day we started heliborne operations again, expecting some heavy fighting later.

With my added company "D" I was able to change my tactics on my heliborne assaults. They worked. I could box in suspected VC hideouts better. We killed 15 VC and captured 21 in a surprise attack without suffering a single casualty. I then followed it up with a night ambush  and killed 3 more and captured 6.

It was the most successful day for me to date. 

Then Several Small Operations

In the span of just about a week, we had a series of combat assaults that drew fire. The Viet Cong, backed up by NVA units were getting more aggressive and penetrating across the border further.

I got intelligence where a VC platoon was. I went after it, found it, and got into quite a fight. While we killed 9 VC and captured the Platoon Leader, we took 2 men killed and 13 wounded before the remnants fled into Cambodia.

With information we got from the platoon leader we went after another location. I inserted a platoon and flushed out 30-40 VC. We were able to kill 15, capture 20. We came back that night as an ambush, and killed 3 more.

All that without suffering a casualty. Following up on that, we made a dusk raid , killing two VC - one of which I shot with my M-15 rifle with tracer ammunition, and we captured a wounded one.

 I flew out into our operational area one day in a little OH-23 chopper when my command huey was unavailable. Enroute to one of my companies sweeping an area, I spotted what I was sure was a VC running  across a rice paddy. I closed up on him and with my M-16 rifle and hand signals made him my prisoner at the point of my gun pointed down from the hovering helicopter  and forced him to walk into the arms of Company B half a mile away while we flew behind him.

Then, next morning we flew into a small village, 2 men started running. We killed them and got papers off of them showing one was a finance clerk.

By this time in my first 25 days commanding the 1/27, I had conducted 50 combat assaults - and got orders showing I had earned 10 Air Medals - 1 for each 5 combat missions. 

Before we reorganized and I got more men, I had conducted heliborne operations with a maximum of 175 men. Now I could fight with 550 men - when we were allocated enough helicopters. 

On one mission when we were put under operational control of the 1st Brigade, instead of under our parent 2d Brigade. We went out on missions in their operating area, but our production went down. The 1st Brigade commander and staff simply couldn't mount as effective operations as we were getting used to. 

The rest of September, after there was a reorganization of the boundaries of our operating areas our production under the 1st Brigade plans went way down. 

By this time in the Vietnam War 'body count' seemed to be the only measure of success. It was a lousy one.

Over a 5 day period, the 'rest' of the 2d Brigade - the 2/27 heliborne battalion and the 5th Mech battalion only killed 4 VC, took 1 PW and some weapons. While my 1/27 killed 14 VC, took 4 prisoners, and captured 8 weapons.  We remained more effective than other units.

Morale, training, and good operational planning counted for the difference. 

But as I have said before in this treatise, just getting body count every day in small numbers and capturing some weapons, requiring thouands of American soldiers, is NOT going to win this war.

So on the side, and in order to try, even on a small scale, an effort to be more effective within the South Vietnamese population in our assigned area, I formed a 'Vietnamese Civil Affairs' Platoon, and put a Lieutenant in charge of it who had 2 years in the Peace Corps in Brazil before joining the Army. And though Col Emerson, my Brigade Commander didn't feel like this would do any good - while he pursued Body Count that was reported to Division headquarter, I was trying get something started that would directly compete with the Viet Cong in winning over - one way or another - the loyalty of people in the villages.

Without backing my efforts didn't go very far beyond competing at the propaganda level in some of our villages. 

Frankly, I thought less and less of Col Emerson as a Brigade Commander. He had little imagination on how we could clear out the Viet Cong better than what we were doing at high cost. 

In between Missions there was time at Cu Chi Base camp to hold brief ceremonies.

LINK ME: Photo of me awarding a medal to a soldier for his bravery back at Cu Chi base camp

If you scroll down below the Collections Photograph page you will see a piece of the South Vietnam  Map, where Cu Chi was northeast of "Ho Chi Minh City" - previously when we were there at war 'Saigon.'

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Written by dave

Category: Vietnam 1967-1968

Published: 19 September 2011

Hits: 9758

Yeah, Wet  Vietnam - Routine Patrol

It itleMy First Heavy, Costly Operation

It happened on the 12th of July. I had inserted Company A into a area where our Cobra gunships spotted more Vietnamese 'civilians' in the fields than should have been there. Immediately Company A ran into a buzz saw- the farmers were all Viet Cong! A big firefight started right off.

I quickly called for my other two companies - B and C to join the fight. We only had 10 Hueys to shuttle them  in with. I finally got them in, but not before I had my first command helicopter got shot up so bad I had to tell them to just put me in the ground so they could go back for another bird. Before it was over 10 of our choppers were hit. And my second command helicopter was shot down too - so I fought the rest of the evening into the night on the ground.

The fight lasted  9 hours. We had tangled with the 269th VC Battalion, at least 300 strong.  It was bad. We lost 7 killed, and 23 wounded.

I thought we took the worst of it, but after they retreated into Cambodia where we could not pursue them, agents told me that we had killed at least 30, and they dragged over 100 wounded across the border.

I was all over the place, doing what I knew, from commanding in Korea, was necessary - concentrate all our firepower to supress the Viet Cong fire while inflicting as many casualties on them that we could. While it would have been good had we captured at least 2 or 3 VC, but the shoot out, even into the night, was at a range of 100 to 300 meters, so there little opportunity to take a prisoner. 

I didn't think I did any more than what I was supposed to do as a battalion commander, but somebody put me in for a Silver Star. So several days later after we held a Memorial Service for the 7 killed Wolfhounds, General Tillson pinned it on me. Making it my 3d Silver Star over two wars. Here it is below.

This operation happened so quickly that there was no time for the Army photographer from Cu Chi to fly out and film or photo shoot the operation. So there just is one photo saved showing me, and the Memorial Service.

Not mentioned before, was the fact that the 27th Infantry Wolfhound Regiment, was among the first American Army units to occupy Japan after we defeated them. The destruction of the country and its people was widespread, many institutions were severely damaged - including a Catholic Orphanage in Osaka, Japan.

When the first Christmas of 1945 came around, soldiers of the 27th Infantry visited the damaged Orphanage, where the staff, including nuns, were destitute, and there was little food for the orphan Japanese children. The Wolfhounds took up a collection, and, starting that year the soldiers paid for food for the children every year. And every year, taking contributions from the soldiers pay, the orphanage was gradually rebuilt. The tradition has continued for 63 years, from whereever the Wolfhound regiment is stationed - Japan, Korea during its war, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and thruout the War in Vietnam. 

When I joined the Wolfounds, and became the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, it seemed appropriate for our battalion, in combat, to honor our fallen soldiers by accepting soldier donations in their memory, and send all of them to the Orphanage at Osaka.

The photograph below is a ceremony we held after two of our troopers were killed in action during Operation Kole Kole. The rifles where placed with the helmets of the two men killed and between them is the contribution stand.

The short PDF file below the photograph tells the rest of the story.

The article which was run in the Tropic Lightning Newspaper - the 25th Infantry Division's paper following the Ceremony described in the pdf file on the right. Click on the word Ceremony.

                                                                 Ceremony

Life for a Battalion Commander - and Wife

Because I had a wife and three children - two of whom - David and Rebeclca - were well old enough back home in Annandale, Virginia watching nightly TV that covered the war in excruciating and nasty detail - which greatly contributed to turning the public against the war - I wrote home as often as I could. Patsy saved all 60 of my letters I wrote her during that year in Vietnam. Much of the operational detail I go into here came from those letters.

Of course there WERE moments when pretty ladies showed up in the field.

I wanted to reassure them as best I could - and discussed my and my men's living condition often.

One item - I and Ed Peters as battalion commanders were out on operations so much of the time, that we lived no better than the lowest rank soldier. In the rain, mud, and on the ground in the jungle or on rice paddies. If I were lucky I had a pup tent over me at night. If not the cover was a poncho hung on sticks. 

In several letters, the handwriting was red. I explained this way "I am lying on my back on a poncho liner under a tent so low it almost touches my face. My head is propped up on a hard field pack and my clothes are wet; only my feet seem dry. By using a clipboard as my writing table and putting my flashlight under my left armpit I can see to write. But the light is dull red color - I have a red filter in the flashlight so the Viet Cong can't see well." 

Much about Patsy's and the kids life, with photos and what they were doing while I was in Vietnam and what Patsy and I discussed by letter is in the Married Life section of this biography. 

Contrasted with the very slow mail turnaround time during the Korean War, mail was very efficient and fast to and from Vietnam and the US.

Since the administrative battalion and higher headquarters were in well appointed Cu Chi, while the battalions operated out of rough field camps, it was possible for the units to have some life of their own center at Cu Chi.

For example it was possible to publish a battalion newspaper - 1000 copies being circulated each time. I wrote a front page piece for the troops in the July '67 issue.

The Wolfhound Regiment since they occupied Japan after World War II, had 'adopted' a poor orhanage in Osaka, Japan, and supported it financially ever since. Recurringly the men contributed to it, and the sisters who ran it wrote faithfully to keep the soldiers informed. I was able to read the latest letter thanking the Wolfhounds for the latest sending on money collected in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, and now Vietnam. So long as that 27th Infantry Regiment exists in one form or another, that orphanage will be the beneficiary.

But something else had been started in Vietnam. "Lady Wolfhounds" became the Officer's Wives Club whose men were in the 1st or 2d 27th Infantry outfits. So all the officers wives and their addresses were gathered, and periodically a newsletter about what the outfit was doing in Vietnam, was mailed to all of them. And with the high, and usually annual turnover of all the officers, the ladies were urged to contact each other wherever they lived in the US. Wife Patsy Hughes became the Commander's Wife - so she wrote to - exchanged - letters and photos with many of them.

We Can Ambush Too

My Battalion field base camp was, for a while near the town of Duc-Hoa, off the Oriental River. I sent the sketch, a photo and a description of one of my multi-faceted-operations in mid July to my wife and kids.

   I really had quite a Wolfhound operation going. For I had access to helicopters, gunships, four 27 foot power boats , - my own navy - national police, and ARVN intelligence specialists as we tried to protect Duc-Hoa from Viet Cong shakedown forays into the town.

I sent  B Company as an ambush patrol down the Anwa Canal in power boats at 3AM to the intersection of the Canal and Oriental River. A stream - the real water 'highway' connected Duc Hoa to the Oriental.

As morning broke and sampans began to move, three sampans with VC in them came up the stream. Company B captured them without a shot being fired. 

I then moved my entire battalion to that intersection. 

Then an old woman came down from Duc Hoa in a sampan the next night with a note for my interpreter that said if we would not 'cut off their ears and tongues' that they would bring four "Choi Hois" - willing converts to the government side. I said yes. Next morning in came 5 Viet Cong to give up. 

I then, sent Company A in boats into the 'Horseshoe' area where Viet Cong hung out. And put Company B on patrol of the Oriental in boats too. By 10AM we contacted a 4 man VC squad, killed one and wounded one. 2 others escaped. Then I flew in a dog tracker team to follow the blood trail and used a speaker on the Helicopter to tell the wounded man to give up. He did. 

With this kind of operation, plus a  psyops team and a civil affairs unit, we started catching as many VC as when we only combat assaulted from helicopters.

As I thought, the closer we could integrate our military operation into the local 'civilian' efforts to keep safe, the more we would undercut the un-obstructed actions in population centers by the Viet Cong.

But there just were not sufficient resources or plans to do the amount of the kind of 'counterinsurgency' to make a big difference. EVERYTHING the Viet Cong did had a 'civilian' component.

Into the Mekong Delta 

Then we got a new mission. And through it I was able to get an idea what Counterinsurgency by the 9th Division in the waterlogged Mekong Delta was like.

Between the South Vietnamese Army units operating in the Delta - a vast area most of which was under water most of the time and the commander of the US 9th Division, a plan was hatched to saturate a substantial area where the Viet Cong had built up a substantial force protected by the network of waterways - with US heliborne forces working in conjunction with the 'Riverine' units of the US division.

Fighting in the Delta, required lots of well armed motorized boats carrying small US Army units who had learned novel 'Riverine' instead of 'Heliborne' tactics.

The plan envisioned the water-borne 9th Division men together with South Vietnamese soldiers, marines and officers who knew the Delta - to attack the area where two Viet Cong battalions were supposed to be concentrated in, while at least two Battalions of the 25th Division would fly into the Delta and land on dikes and patches of dry land by helicopter setting up a 'blocking position' against which the Riverine force would push retreating Viet Cong, who would, according to their own tactics, run rather than fight. While gun ships would patrol the waterways the Viet Cong would try to get away over by getting into their own boats and sampans. Gun ships to shoot up and sink the boats, loaded with Viet Cong or not - so they would be trapped. And the riverine force would have a killing ground.

My battalion was one of the two 25th Division unit which flew it and blocked. 16 large Chinooks with my 1/27th and 2d of the 14th Infantry from the 1st Brigade flew down there 80 kilometers.

Then there was shuttling with Hueys covered by Cobra gunships to our blocking area. We did it so professionally that we arrived just at dark, where the last five hueys had to land by hand held strobe light. 

In the night the Vietnamese Marine unit got hit, but we did not. (did they fear our Wolfhound reputation, which was good in Southern South Vietnam?) 

Me mucked through the delta mud the next two days, killed a few VC and captured some weapons. But the Viet Cong battalions never materialized. 

Me on a river boat seeking the Viet Cong.

My memory of that operation is dim - for it only lasted about 5 days - and we did our part and inserted platoon sized units where we were told to. We got into very few firing actions, as the Viet Cong fled in many directions and did not attempt to cross our 'lines' but headed east and west to try and escape (we were north of their area.) The gunships seemed to have a field day however, as they were constantly firing at something - either empty boats or ones with a few VC in them.

I had a half hour with Lt Col Blackie Bolduc who was the 9th Division G-3 - operations officer. He was a classmate who also was at West Point teaching French while I taught English.

The Vietnamese senior commanders thought the mission was a success, and awarded the Vietnamese Army equivilant to the US Army Distinguished Unit Citation to our Battalion. More show than substance.

CBS and NBC television crews were with us. Dunno what they reported. 

Then we flew back to Cu Chi and told each other how radically different Riverine Warfare was from what we were doing - Jungle, Rice Paddy and Heliborne warfare.

And the next day set out on another typical Search and Destroy mission. 

This all happened between July 27th and August 2d.

On the 8th of July I was handed a plaintive letter, carefully but neatly hand written in broken English, from farmer NGUYEN VAN MAI pleading for permission to 'transplant' his rice crop in a sector. Said they were afraid of the machine guns, M113 (personnel carrier) and helicopters that fired at night. 

I approved what I could. The price of war for the rural South Vietnamese.

Details

Written by dave

Category: Vietnam 1967-1968

Published: 19 September 2011

Hits: 4159

Increasing Battles from VC and NVA Actions

The end of September saw my Wolfhound battalion get into a heavy engagement, that beat up Company B.

It was becoming clear that, not only the local Viet Cong were beginning to get more aggressive, but regular North Vietnamese Army units and supplies were coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Cambodia in greater volume and mounting operations across the border more frequently.

On the last day of September, I was ordered to operate closer to the Cambodia boarder west of a place called the "French Fort" - from the days when the French Army colonized Vietnam. When I landed Company B in the afteroon only one Kilometer from the Cambodia border they ran into a hornets nest. 

Two Viet Cong Companies were there, and they put up a fierce fight the minute Company B landed. They even had anti-aircraft weapons which managed to shoot down three assault helicopters, heavily damaged three others. and hit five others, mine includned. 

Even Col Emerson's Brigade Command helicopter had to emergency land and division commander General Mearn's who flew in while the fight was building up had to stand off, and fly high to avoid getting hit.

I landed at dusk with two companies to reinforce Company B and take the initiative. We fought our way to B Company and then turned on the VC. We had a terrible time getting the wounded out by medivac helicopters while the landing zone was under both direct and mortar fire. A soldier using a strobe light to guide the choppers after dark was shot. 

The fighting went on until 2AM, by which time we were beginning to envelope the VC to wipe them out before they started escaping into Cambodia. 

This was the first big test for Captain Wroblewski, B Company Commander. 

Wroblewski was an Annapolis graduate who wanted to be an Army officer so bad he was willing to serve on ship board off the Vietnamese Coast for two years before his transfer to the Army was approved. I had offered him the command of a Rifle Company in the 1/27th while he was still in the 1st Brigade. So he became B Company commander, already a good company after its commander rotated back to the states.

In the battle that day and night we killed 21 Viet Cong, but took 3 dead and 23 wounded. Captain Wroblewski and a Sergeant from my Reconnaisance platoon were so outstanding under the fire of 12.7mm machine guns while they criss-crossed wide open areas that I recommended them both for spot Silver Star Awards by the Division Commander General Mearns who had the authority to do that. He agreed, and General Abrams who was visiting Cu Chi pinned it on them both 2 days after the battle. 

Rare photo of 4 Star General Abrams, Armored Battalion Commander under George Patton who relieved the bottled up 'Nuts' Airborne Unit at Bastogne in WWII. He was doing the rounds of Vietnam Units before taking over from Westmoreland when 2 days after the battle he was at Cu Chi and did the honor pinning on the Silver Star I recommended for both Wroblowski and a Recon Sergeant

I had submitted Wroblewski for the Distinguished Service Cross - DSC - superceding the Silver Star which he later got when at Fort Benning (learning how to be a company grade infantry officer - ha ha) And I do not pass out high awards easily. He became a great company commander. 

All this was during a buildup time for the Viet Cong. They virtually surrounded the Trung Lap Vietnamese Ranger Training center - which the 1st Brigade was supposed to keep clear of Viet Cong  - but they caught few Viet Cong all around them. We came in and imediately found and hit building-up Viet Cong. We even liberated two South Vietnamese agents who were captured at the Trang Bang Special Forces camp. They were shackled and were being led away to be shot when we surprised the 8 VC at 4AM, killing four of them.

About that time I tried another new tactic against Viet Cong who would crawl up at night in jungle areas and try to harrass the encampment or gather intelligence. I had a 105mm howitzer flown in with crew by heavy lift Chinook every night where we were encamped.

I had them lower their gun to almost level with the ground and set 105mm howitzers rounds with their timed fuzes, so that if we were getting harrassing night fire, we would fire that artillery piece at the sound of the VC over the heads of our men, so that the shell, with its very large blast radious exploded a few feet off the ground outside our perimiter. 

Then in the morning we would fly it back to Cu Chi until the next night.