Me coming to military backwater Fort Carson after two wars, high combat honors and considerable achievements,  publishing widely read articles, professional and popular, redefining future wars for the Secretary of Defense, proving TET was a Communist failure, and winning virtually all of my combat battles?

And to a virtually unknown outfit called the 5th Mech Division - to work for a less-than-rising-star general, just because he wanted me to help him command?

But little did I (or he) know that big changes were in the wind for Fort Carson, Army realignment of combat units, the selection of Fort Carson for a great National Military Policy experiment - elimination of the Draft, and the impact of the 60's culture. All of which would greatly influence what I went through the challenging next 4 years. 

I said later, I served in three wars - Korea, Vietnam, and Fort Carson.

But that glorious Colorado morning in July, 1968 driving westward over a rise on US 24 highway from the Eastern Plains, with our entire family in our car towing the little Morris Minor with dog Sam visibly sitting up in its front seat, the morning sun at our backs illuminating bright shining Pikes Peak ahead, and hearing out the open car window, for the first time in decades the field song of a Meadow Lark - I knew I was home in my Colorado. I was thrilled for my family who had never really known my wonderful state.

In swift order I was processed in, having arrived before my 1 August 1968 orders deadline and happily learned that, indeed General Gleszer had ordered that his battalion and  higher commanders live in quarters on post. For he had decided that I should command a Mechanized Infantry Battalion for at least enough time to learn the core unit of the Division, and so was slated to 'command' - again.

So we soon were able to move into Quarters - as I recall 10B - on Ticknor Drive right on the post. A modern building but small for a 5 member family. 

Here is one of the few pictures I have of General Gleszer, at some civic award involving school kids event in 1969. Rebecca is on the left and I am at the extreme right

And so swiftly that I don't even remember the details, I was ordered to take command of the 2d Battalion, 11th Mechanized Infantry Regiment of the 5th Mech Division.

Fort Carson's Military Future 

Now is a good time to explain what had been happening to the US Army. 

It was becoming clear that Vietnam was a lost American cause after 8 years of costly war, political change, and rising anti-war sentiment in the American public. So we would sooner or later withdraw our main military forces. At the same time the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which still posed a large ground threat to Europe, would require American readiness to deter conventional war or go to the aid of NATO there in the event of hostilities.

So where should the traditional military divisions in Vietnam be relocated?

Well several things happened in a short span of time.

First of all, Secretary McNamara was determined to close down military bases that were cost-ineffective. Fort Carson, which had been only a foot infantry Division Post since 1942, only expanded during the Korean War, then cut back afterward, was on the chopping block. For there WERE no more plain Infantry Divisions. Only Airborne, Air Mobile, Tank, or Mechanized Infantry were needed.

But he sent out senior generals to survey all the Army Posts, such as Fort Riley, Hood, Polk, Carson to see whether they had a role in the future ready-army.

Then an Army Major General Heintges visited Fort Carson. He saw a pro-military City of Colorado Springs - even during the anti-military sentiment of the Vietnam War - he saw large tracts of Federal and marginal ranch land outside Carson's boundaries - which had long been sufficient for training boots-on-the-ground Infantry Divisions. He saw the coming Federal Reservoir south on the Arkansas River. And he knew that the longer range Army weapons and increasing reliance on air support, would need ground and air space. And he saw little of the 'encroachment' and political constroversies against both .civilian air fields and military bases caused by civilian growth in eastern states where most Army units were stationed.

He sent back a glowing report that called backwater Fort Carson, if it were to remain and even expand, an Army post of the Future, rather than of the past.

His report was decisive. McNamara decided to retain what was once called 'Camp' Carson and turn it into a permanent, and modern-construction, 'Fort' Carson. Still in  early 1968, before I got there,  more senior Army officers, such as Lt General Palmer, flew out to evaluate it for themselves. And the Department of the Army started pouring construction money into Fort Carson to modernize it from its 30 year old wooden frame construction era. Which delighted the Colorado Springs Chamber of Commerce. 

And politicians of El Paso County and Pueblo County 'promised' they would support physical 'expansion' of Carson to permit the much more training-space-using  Mech Division to train properly.

So the Army they activated the 5th Mechanized 'Red Diamond' Infantry Division, at Carson, having already determined that the famed 4th Infantry Division still in Vietnam, which landed on Utah Beach on D-Day WWII, and whose history went back to WWI, would replace the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, as troops were drawn down in Vietnam. At some near date the Colors of the 4th 'Ivy Leaf' Division would be transferred to Fort Carson, and the 5th Mech would de deactivated and its men and equipment, and units would became the 4th Mech.

Later everyone in the 5th Mech, including me who, was by that time in 1969 the Division G-3 - Plans and Training Officer - would take off the red diamond 5th Division patch, and put on the 4th Divisiom Ivy Leaf patch.

So I first was ordered to command the 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment, of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division. The 2/11th.

General Gleszer wanted me to command, at least for 4-6 months a Mechanized Infantry Battalion so I could learn what made it tick. For I sure didn't know.

Now by the mid 1960s Mech Infantry Battalions were equipped with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. 

Now they were NOT Tanks. And they were NOT trucks. But they were Armored - against small arms, machine gun fire, and shrapnel from close by artillery or mortar fire explosions, and some of the effects of battlefield nuclear blasts -  Personnel Carriers.

They were designed to hold exactly one 12 man squad of Riflemen, with one extra man as driver and the NCO (or officer) commander inside also the one who was up in the open hatch as Track Commander who told the driver what to do and where to go. They could be buttoned up completely so that only the track commander and the driver could see out through periscopes.

AND they were amphibious! They could - within limits - swim across rivers and bodies of water on or near their battlefields.

EVERY 4th Mech Infantry Division's fighting man from every Infantry Battalion rode in M113s or like armored tracked vehicles. It was that characteristic that made those units so equipped to be designated as Mechanized Infantry Companies, Battalions, and Divisions.  

Their military tactical essence were that Infantry soldiers so equipped RODE to battle - inside mechanized carriers, but FOUGHT ON FOOT. Mech-Infantry

BUT THE REST OF THE STORY

That also meant that those MII3 APCs were organic to every rifle company - they 'owned' them, they had to maintain them, store them, train in them.

And it was the great amount of maintenance required  and the different tactics required to use them at their maximum effectiviness that posed a real challenge to company and battalion commanders when they were assigned to units having them.

For the soldiers and officers who served in combat in Vietnam, with the exception of those in the few Mech Infantry Battalion units that were deployed also - such as the one battalion in the 2d Brigade of the 25th Division, along with the two Wolfound straight Infantry battalions, knew a lot about marching through jungles and rice paddies, and how to make combat assaults by helicopter. But very FEW soldiers in Vietnam had any real contact with tracked vehicles, much less how to fight from them.

And those who had served in the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam, and who were assigned to it in the US, really were'nt prepared to go to mechanized war against the Soviets in Europe.

I recognized quickly when I took command of the 2/11th just how little my officers, NCO's, or men knew about them. For the 5th, then 4th Mech was being filled up with Drafted soldiers who had gone through Infantry Basic training, then fought in Vietnam for a year - not in mech units - and came back to the US, for their remaining time in the Army on their first, obligatory 2 year enlistment, had to start training on this new mode of going to battle.

And even fewer men in each unit were mechanics, or natural aptitude mechanical whizzes, who were good at, or liked, to maintain their M113 vehicles.

In my brief time commanding that 2/11 Battalion before Gen Gleszer pulled me up to the G-3 position on the Division Staff, I saw what was needed in the way of Training, and how much reliance the Division would have on the 'Logistical' - maintainance and supply functions in every unit.

But I immediately became enmeshed in the larger problems of guiding development of the Training areas and programs for this "Mech" division, and in dealing with the huge problem of specific standard 'combat readiness' that had to be reported to higher headquarters every month. Which was my responsibility to prepare.

On top of all this, the Division had a large Race problem, Drug problem, and anti-Vietnam war Political problem among the 18,000 men who would compose, not only the 4th Mech Division, but all the other type of units stationed at Carson.

It did not take long for me, once I was installed as the 4th Mech Division G-3 at the Post Headquarters to learn just how combat UNREADY the outfit was to take on its new and most challenging mission - be ready to move to, and immediately fight a conventional war - in Europe.

In fact the Army plans and scheme was that, if the balloon went up,  and troops from Fort Carson's 4th Division had to get to Europe fast, that the men of the lead brigade consisting of at least 3 Mech Infantly battalions would have to pack only their duffle bags, carry their individual weapon, dash to Peterson Field, climb aboard C-141's WITHOUT any of their mechanized equipment, be flown to Germany, get off the plane, go into large warehouses where ALL the mechanized equipmenf for a Mechanized Infantry Division was prepositioned and stored. Get into those trackend vehicles, turn the key, and drive off immediately and into that war!

THAT is a tall order even for highly trained troops.  

And it was not just from the lack of mechanized tactical training that the 4th Division was not prepared, but the whole Division was seriously undermanned in many key jobs, and the entire Command was turning over at the rate of 25% or higher EVERY QUARTER! Turnover was the killer factor. And that came about because the bulk of the division consisted of 2 year enlisted and drafted men, who had only gone through 6 months of Basic and Advanced training and travel, then spent exactly 1 year in Combat in Vietnam, and got to Fort Carson with only 6 months to do left in the Army after their war. Carson was a swinging door to civilian life! Any wonder trying to train them for new military equipment and mission was all but hopeless?n\

Gen Gleszar was almost apopletic every month when I had to sit down with him and other staff officers and show him - to sign the 'Readiness' report.

The Army had a rating system, that went from 1 (not combat ready) to 4 (fully combat ready) in every catagory - Personnel, Equipment, Training, Supplies.

We had to report a 1 or 2 in almost every catagory for each major unit, and thus overall.

Moreover, as the months went by, even though the numbers of soldier bodies needed kept pouring in - and then leaving the Army within 6 months, and new equipment, from M113s, artillery pieces, radios, ammunition kept coming in to fill out the 4th Mech Divisions Requirement - it could never get ahead then of the sheer turbulance and turnover to settle down to become a combat ready Division.

Then, utterly apart from Combat Readiness, there were other, huge problems that reflected what had been building up and was going on in the rest of American Society in the late 60's that made for more difficulties.

The Cultural Clash at Carson

One has to understand that Fort Carson was inevitably caught up in the same anti-war, anti-government- racially tense, drug and generational 60's cultural wars that the rest of the Country was.

Those societal-wide problems were exaggerated greatly among the 18,000 soldiers and their families at Carson. And that exaggeration came from a number of unique military characteristics.

First of all, the soldiers coming back from a year fighting in Vietnam's savage insurgency war - which eventually cost 54,000 American lives - had become increasingly rebellious of all authority - military, police, local and national government. Even the egregious practice of 'fragging' had started in Vietnam - soldiers killing their own officers. Drugs had started permeating soldier ranks, first in Vietnam, then carried back to the US at Carson.

Returning soldiers spent all their off-duty time outside dull Fort Carson, shacking up with whatever girls they could attract - they bought cars and motorcycles and drove recklessly, often drunk, getting ticketted, and - especially on the stretch of Interstate 25 between Colorado Springs and Pueblo, 40 miles south causing major accidents killing themselves and civilians.

And there were high racial tensions between whites and blacks, and especially between blacks and hispanic soldiers.

Charts maintained by the Fort Carson Staff showed the high arrest and incident rate by soldiers outside the gates.

And there were civilian organization outside the gates that were specifically designed to attract soldiers into civil as well a military disobedience

Change of Command

General Gleszer was flummoxed by all the trends that were contrary to his entire life and the men he had commanded in World War II.

He tried to deal with it 'statistically' by getting computer printouts of incidents and targetting units and places off Post with command efforts to cut them down.

But he simply was not the man for the youth of that culture of the 60s.

I am not sure whether he asked to be relieved or was fired for his poor record while as Commander of both Fort Carson as a post and the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, but before we switched  to being the 4th Mech Infantry Division, he was gone. (his next command was the Military District of Washington - where more order prevailed, and commanding the Old Guard which protects the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was hardly culturally challenging)

A very different new Commanding General was assigned to command Fort Carson and the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division.

I still had at least 3, or pehaps 4, more years at Fort Carson - which had all the problems America had, in its Army. So, if I was to become more the solution than perpetuate the problems, I would have to use all my military education and experience AND my understanding of the changing American Culture to find, and help lead, an 18,000 man Combat Division which had its 'Readiness' mission for any war that came along.

I

'Bernie' Rogers arrived at Fort Carson as a Brigadier General, but was promptly promoted to Major General, commanding Fort Carson AND the 5th - soon 4th - Mechanized Infantry Division.

He was a remarkable man and soldier. He was Class of 1943 at West Point, where he had become 'First Captain' - highest ranking cadet. He became a Rhodes Scholar, and he served in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam as its Deputy Commander where he won his only combat medal - a Silver Star.  And he did not follow the footsteps of  many others by becoming Airborne or Ranger qualified, a distinction he and I shared. Before he was selected for command at Fort Carson and its Mechanized Division, he had been Commandant of Cadets at West Point.

It was that last assignment that prepared him for the challenge of Fort Carson and its great turbulence and soldier, even officer, problems more than any other prior assignment.

That was because, even at West Point, by the late 60's he saw how the youth of American, even as  incoming carefully selected cadets, had changed, had become resistant to arbitrary authority, traditional rules and regulations they thought irrelevant, and were more free spirited. He saw that they were a mirror of the changes going on in society - good and bad. They were from a different, newer generation of Americans.

Rogers was smart enough to apply that insight to the tough job of running both Fort Carson, with its several thousand Federal civilian employees, its specialized units like the 43d Logistical Support Group, the independent 52d Construction Engineer Battalion, separate Aviation Company with military helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, apart from the 16,000 man 4th Mechanized Infantry Division itself which had the largest number of returning draft soldiers who greatly reflected the societal changes going on.

He brought two key officers to Fort Carson.

One was Brigadier General Dewitt Smith, a non West Pointer who even had an unusual background, having been a writer for the New York Times in his younger days. He was a quiet officer and an original thinker who would give his best independent advice to General Rogers. And he had served in Armored forces in Europe. So knew tracks.

Then Rogers had asked the Army Chief of Information to send him the best Public Information Officer he could find. For Rogers was acutely aware of how Fort Carson, its soldiers, and the Army were percieved in those dark and controversial days of the Vietnam War.  That officer was Lieutenant Colonel George Barante, a non regular Army officer with a keen eye for public impressions, and with a williness to do original things to influence public opinions. He was an original tough minded New Yorker who also understood media and the press.

Barante and I got along fine from the git go.

I liked General Rogers after my first meeting with him. He seemed to regard me as not only professional in my G-3 Duties, and one who, in Korea, had learned the hard lessons for Americans in combat,  but also as one who could and would think 'outside of the box' to address problems - just as he did.

Just about the time he arrived on Post, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Westmoreland, (who had taken Harvard business school courses about 'management')  decreed that on large Army Posts there should be just one integrated staff for both the Combat Units and the Post staff - i.e. the Deployable Military Unit, and the Permanent Post Staff.

So I suddently found myself, as the senior Lt Colonel in the G-3 section for the Mechanized Division with its mission to get ready for European wars,  but also making training plans for all the Non-Divisional Units who had different missions. A Lt Colonel just junior to me - Dutch Nelson - did much of that work. If the Division had to ship out for Europe, and I had to leave with it, Dutch would stay and run the 'Hotel' operations so to speak, of Fort Carson, for the remaining-behind units.

It was going to be hard work for me to be on top of both as well deal with the Regional Army elements who were starting to modify and try to expand Fort Carson's training areas to accomodate the novel Mechanized Division.

General Rogers continued to retain for a few months, the prior Chief of Staff of both the Division and Post who had served Gleszer - an older, but experienced, Airborne, full colonel, to whom all staff officers  reported.

But big changes were in the air, driven by General Rogers. In many ways the fact that the Commanding General of the Division - where the problems and serious war-missions were - and many of the social 'community' solutions were - controlled both, was fortunate. Unity of Command, a profoundly important Principle of War - in both combat and in large peacetime organizations. The place the Buck Stops at the top.

I found myself right in the middle of the changes implemented by Rogers, while the 'integrated' staff and command structure made it a little easier to deal - from the top - with the totality of the large 'community' that was Carson.

General Rogers, the singular Commander of all that went on at Fort Carson - from the long time Federal employment civilians who ran the post supply system to the military M113 mounted Mech Infantry Soldiers, started radically different small changes that then built up to unprecedented - in traditional Army practices - to a totally different philosophy of leadership for a peacetime, post Vietnam War, but still ready to fight the next war - Army.

His first command to all the subordinate commanders and all the Civilian heads of Post departments, was 'Take care of the Soldier" - not just 'Soldier, do your duty or else"

For a Division and Post where misbehaving, short timers in the Army, coming off an unpopular war where even the American public looked down on them, the soldiers were being blamed for everything, that was a refreshing change to require all leaders to FIRST take care of the welfare of the soldiers, AND then listen to them, seriously before demanding their performance. Good leaders in the Army had always 'taken care' of their soldiers first, but the  tensions and turbulance at the end of Vietnam where outgoing drafted soldiers didn't give a damn, even embittered the long time career NCOs and officers who tended to treated them with more hard discipline than understanding coming off a nastly, unpopular, war.  And they didn't listen to those of lesser rank. For the traditional view of the Army was that Americans, once drafted by law, were obliged to obey the orders of the Chain of Command, or face Courts Martial punishment, not complain except in a very formal procedures to the IGs - Inspector Generals. And 'suggestions for change' by soldiers were rarely listened to or acted upon. Because the other belief was that more senior, older, experienced and trained NCO's and offficers 'knew it all' and unsolicited advice was not welcome - from outside civilians, or 2 year draftees. It was still the old Brown Shoe Army. The Fort Carson Stockade was filling up.

But the word started spreading, that 'The Old Man' - the top local commander, a general - cares about us. Even the older civilian employees who did much of the in and out processing of soldiers, with the myriad details about uniforms, Army equipment they possessed, travel reimbursements - etc - and tended to treat the soldiers rudely when they had a 'don't care' attitude - were ordered to 'care for the soldier.' They, many of whom were having the same kind of attitude problems with their own teen age children, got the message and began to 'care' more, and tolerate the war returnee soldiers better. 

Rogers started to implement a whole series of radical things that utterly changed the morale of everyone at Fort Carson, became national news, and eventually influenced the entire Army to make the changes necessary to attract, and retain Volunteer, rather that Drafted, soldiers.

First he convened an 'Enlisted Men's Council, where-in every unit all  the soldiers below the rank of E-5 (Sergeant) were to ELECT a spokesman for the complaints from the lower rank soldiers of that unit. And HE would meet with that Council weekly, requiring the Post Staff heads to attend and listen while the Sp4 and Privates of the Division got their men's gripes - and suggestions - off their chests.

When they complained they could not drink beer in the barracks, he rescinded that order. When they complained the Enlisted Clubs on post were shut down too early, he changed the hours. When they complained of Army chow, and that they ate off post at places like McDonalds, he got a Burger King to set up ON post. But he also let them understand they could help improve soldier's lives at Fort Carson by making constructive suggestions, not just pass on complaints. He gave the radical 'Enlisted Men's Council' a stake in running Fort Carson. And he adopted up to 70% of their suggestions - which began to flow as they realized he was serious about making changes that would make their life and duties while at Fort Carson better.

The Ticking (in my head) Computer Bomb  

One revelation, at this improbable time in my maturing - but 'back of my head'  -education about the future of America  happened right about then - 1970, when General Rogers was attempting to do all he could to help thousands of soldiers who had their lives changed by the draft - spent a full year in a nasty, and seemingly hopeless war - and then faced only a few months left at Fort Carson before being dumped back out into American society at the end of their enlistment. What were they, individually,  going to do for a living after 2 disruptive years of their young lives? They wondered, and he, in an astonishing desire to 'take care of his soldiers' even to the point of helping them make the transition from the Army into civilian life, actually looked into what it would take - even if only by giving them advice as they went out the door.

Roger's - who from his broad understanding of America culture, and his willingness to think 'out of the box'  briefly addressed that issue by asking himself - and then the Fort Carson staff - whether he could 'match up' the individual skills the soldiers had aquired - by Army specific training during their two Army years - with possible civilian jobs or career fields they could pursue after their service. And he asked the Post's civilian Computer Data Base managers what it would take to feed in the individual soldier's 'MOS' (military occupational specialty) job, and correlate it with outside jobs and careers.

Given that at least 5,000 soldiers a month were leavng the service from Carson  (and about the same number were arriving from Vietnam with the very high 'turnover' rate Carson was experiencing ) that would have been an impossible task to do manually. But Rogers knew that Carson had main-frame computers tracking all the equipment and supplies it handled, and all the personnel - including MOS records, and post finances.

But the answer he got was that it would cost over a million dollars, years or more of 'computer programming' work, and a much expanded civilian staff. That answer caused Rogers to swiftly drop the idea. But when I heard the proposal and the answer, I was instantly angered by that bureacratic staff answer. I knew virtually nothing about computer costs, or programming lead times. But I knew that America's future was going to be greatly affected by progress in computers in government, business, science, defense, and finance. And I was already reading Toffler's landmark book 'Future Shock' that was making predictions of how computers were going be one of the forces that would accelerate changes in society.

I instantly exclaimed to myself 'BullsXXX'  That staff just doesn't WANT to take on such a task - or seriously measure it - even if they were given the resources. And they had no grasp of what an original idea Rogers was asking about - in his desire to help his soldiers as much as he could. I also dropped the matter too. I had much more pressing duties to attend to.

But I remember that moment - a kind of epiphany - even now as I write - over 40 years later - because the brief exchange set off a ticking idea bomb in the recesses of my brain  that would, within 5 years - and after I had retired from miltiary service - burst  my thinking 'out of the box' into my conviction that we were entering into an 'Information Age', in which computers would make things possible that had never been practical or economic before. This was 7 years before the world's first 'personal' computer - the Apple II - was unveiled and 8 before its Radio Shack competitor - showed up to change the world. And what I then invented from their potential.

At 42 that confirmed, - again - how, fueled by the genes in my ancestral Celtic imagination, I was able to vizualize unborn future possibilities that my practical side honed by my West Point Bachelor of Science education, and my 20 years experience using it was going to be able to bring into the real world.

I began to read, when I had the time from my grinding duties, a large number of books and papers that attempted to define the future in ways that were  not just linear extensions of the past. In retrospect, my FIELD MANUALS for how to make the Future Army - starting at Fort Carson - work were 'Future Shock,' Neither Marx nor Jesus. 'The Medium is the Message', and 'Megatrends.'

The Roger's Initiatives

The astonishing, in retrospect, number of changes - at least 57 - that Roger's had already changed in policies, regulations, practices that the Public Information Officer -  compiled to give to the Press, is shown here as a small original pdf file.

Volar Changes

As word got around about the litany of changes Rogers implemented, both the more traditional-minded "Old Army" officers and NCO's on Fort Carson, their spouses, the older and more conservative civilians - both employees who worked at Carson, and many in the surrounding Colorado Springs and El Paso County expressed great doubts that they would 'work.'

Only the younger soldiers and their wives and girlfriends, and some young 60's generation, usually well educated, commissioned officers applauded the changes. Many of those were disbelieving that General Rogers was serious about following through on many of them, or that his superiors would 'let him' do many of the things he announced or ordered done. But as in many positions of authority - one does not know the limits of that authority unless he exceeds it and is admonished by superiors. He was not curbed. Because his 'superiors' had no answers of their own for low morale, racial and drug problems, the lingering anti-war sentiments, short-timer attitudes - or the distaste Fort Carson soldiers had for just Army chow, WWII barracks living, shoddy entertainment facilities, poor treatment by civilians off post, and no place to gripe - except to each other.

Things were so bad few of the doubters had any better solutions, as crime, political dissent, violating  regulations and the break down of 'good order and discipline' with drugs everywhere affected life everywhere in El Paso County.

Change in Handling Racial Problems

Then Rogers  separately convened a 'Racial Harmony Council' after many of the issues which came up in the 'Enlisted Council' meetings were in fact race relations problems. Low ranking black, Hispanic, or other ethnic minority soldiers could also elect their spokesmen. General Rogers would meet them too, listening to their gripes about everything from Racial Discrimination to lack of black cosmetics for their wives in Carson's PX. That too began to change the racial attitudes toward race on the Post.

Roger's took complaints about Civilian agencies - Police, Highway Patrol, even the elections law. And had his counterpart officials, Provost Marshal, Legal officers, meet with off post agencies.

There was even a 'Junior Officers' council started.

A much overlooked factor was that many Drafted soldiers at low Army Rank had education and experience running civilian community centers, drug centers, even ecological programs - which they were willing to share with the Chain of Command to make Fort Carson's 'community' work better.

At one Enlisted Man's Council meeting, where drugs were the problem, I realized that the more senior Hospital military doctors and administrators didn't even know the difference between 'Mary Jane' and heroin, or how to treat them. Later I got behind a Drug Treatment 'Head Shop' and insured it was staffed by street-experienced low rank soldiers who had run such facilites. 

I immediately saw what brilliant and bold leadership was at work by Rogers - opening up his office to any complaint and act on it if it were justified - while still expecting the soldiers to do their duties - I caught the spirit of it within my own staff sections, military and civilian.

Meanwhile I had been doing a mamonth and original staff analysis of just what the 'Training demands' that higher (than even the Fort Carson Commander) headquarters required of all units that were so overwhelming they could not do them all. I came up with an ingenious way to put them in priority by time measurements. So I was wrestling with the combat training and readiness needs of the command. My primary responsibility.

Then I got a note from Gen Dewitt Smith, who had carefully listened to my comments and plans about training, and the adequacy of our training areas.

Sudden Promotion of My Status 

Dewitt suggested to General Rogers that he make ME, who was on the promotion list for Colonel, but months away from being promoted, THE Chief of Staff of BOTH the Division AND Post!

That would elevate me in position over 12 Full Colonels and many more Senior to me (date of rank) Lieutenant Colonels on Fort Carson! I was doubly stunned, first of all by the suggestion by Dewitt. And then I was astonished by the fact that General Rogers agreed. The previous older, much  longer in colonel's time in grade, incumbent was retiring that month. Rogers moved me out of the G-3 slot and put me in as THE Chief of Staff of both the Division and Post.

As the local and Denver Press reported it was very unusual for a Lieutenant Colonel to be made Chief of Staff of a large command - a full Colonel's position. 

That was an enormous vote of confidence, not only in my ability to handle the job, but in my creative ability to further General Rogers' vision of how to get everyone at Carson to help, rather than hinder, it in its missions.

I knew that the changes I was getting behind would be very controversial within the Army. And those at the Department of Army who judged my performance and fitness for advancement could well be prejudiced against such radical changes and that could affect my future. Very controversial officers are often not advanced, regardless of who sponsored them earlier - or what they had accomplished during their 'controversial' years. Billy Mitchell was an example.

I took a deep breath when I sat down at the Chief of Staff's desk, right outside General Roger's office door, realizing I had 25 Lieutenant Colonels and a number of full colonels now reporting directly to me, a $30 million post budget to manage,  multi-thousand civilian employees to oversee, a host of problems with housing, the hospital, the processing centers, the stockade, the commissary and post exchange, and with the District Attorney, the Police Department, the Highway Patrol, the Mayor and City Council to deal with. And yet an underlying  Mission to get the 5th, later 4th Mechanized Infantry Division ready for European contingencies and deployment, including combat.

But at the core, I knew that the rock-bottom mission of Fort Carson was still - to get, and mantain, Combat Readiness of a 16,000 soldier Division.

Training Land Issues

At the same time the Army itself was trying to expand Fort Carson on the land that the City Council promised would be 'easy' to buy without condemnation proceedings. So I was thrust also into appearing before County Commissioners on land issues. Where I ran into the reneging by Colorado Springs, and Pueblo Elected Officials of the 'promises they had made' to the Army for the expansion of Fort Carson - if the Army just promised to keep Carson open and filled with spending soldiers.

At one point in 1971 I appeared before the three El Paso County Commissioners, 2 Republicans and 1 Democrat, on whether or not 'Rancho Colorado' land - useless for anything, with no water, a strip that could be used as a live fire 'buffer' between the populated areas east of Interstate 25 - could be purchased by the Army without condemnation procedures. Because a fly-by-night developer suddenly decided he wanted to 'develop' that land, the two Republican Commissioners voted against the purchase. Only the Democratic Commissioner listened carefully to our - and my - military arguments and voted for the purchase. The vote of the other two were clearly 'knee jerk' conservatives siding with a businessman over the needs of the Army

The same problem emerged when the Pueblo County Commissioners balked at permitting the Army to purchase land south of the then-southern Fort Carson Boundary - which had been adequate space from 1942 to 1968 for the training needs of the 'boots on the ground' Infantry units, but were not at all big enough for the needs of the Mechanized units. And they even objected to the Army getting access to the Northern shore line of the brand new FEDERAL Pueblo Reservoir - so that the amphibious M113 tracks of the Mech Division could properly train for river crossings in Europe. Pueblo wanted that Reservoir as their private lake. As the envisioned a beautiful resort there.

They too reneged on their promise to the Army. So in the end only part of the needed expansion of the training ground was acquired. And a sorry marginal value subdivision called Pueblo West was created on the south of the Reservoir.

I have NEVER forgiven either Colorado Springs or Pueblo for their hypocritical efforts to get the Federal Government to pour millions into the retention and expansion of Fort Carson and the stationing of at least one 16,000 man Mechanized Infantry Division, there with with promises to help the Army acquire the needed training land and then turn around to object to the Army acquiring the land. Bluntly neither city deserves Fort Carson's largesse. And having trained a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, fought in two wars, and having been the G-3 of the Division before becoming Chief of Staff I knew, better than any one else - what was needed to get, and keep ready, the central combat division stationed at the Fort.  

And that hypocricy is what motivated me, after never having registered to vote with a party affiliation, registered as a Democrat when I retired two years later, and remained a Democrat into  20010.

My Scope

Under General Rogers I felt I could use my innate ability to find creative ways to do things and I could approve many things on my own and not have to ask him for permission for every small thing. One does not know when his authority is exceeded until he actually tries to do things and is curbed by his superiors. That was just as true for General Rogers and his superiors, as for myself. The line between an impractical dreamer and an applauded innovator, is pretty thin. And is often as much a function of how much implicit authority one's boss gives as in risk taking in an inherentily hirearchical system. I passed onto my subordinates the same liberal authority.

Fort Carson swiftly began to take on a permissive climate of 'change' that cascaded down the chain of command. Even the lowest rank soldiers began to take their own initiative to improve smal things about the Post and Army. That was one lasting legacy from General Rogers leadership style.      

I never doubted what our military missions were - it was simply that we were going about getting them done in new ways that were calculated to get our soldiers, officers, civilians under our control to help get things done, rather than be obstacles - in spite of national and societal problems.

I was never so 'open minded' to change that my brains fell out. For I have always tried to relate what I am doing, or supporting, back to first principles. I knew what the Army was for, and what place its soldiers had in American Society, and I knew that as the nation, and warfare, changed, so needed soldiers and the Army to change - while still being capable of carrying out the foreign policy objectives of the United States.  

Societal Communicationst.

A whole number of other innovations were implemented by Gen Rogers.  Thettthe

The essense of what we were striving to do became apparent.

A young lieutenant suggested that Fort Carson open a 'Coffee House' on post - to compete with the anti-military gatherings off post. It was. And General Rogers was the first post official to sit on the 'hot seat' where any soldier could come in at night and ask him about, or criticize anything about Carson or the Army while inside the Coffee House. While the soldier would still would be expected to be soldierly outside. The unprecedented on post 'Coffee House' got so popular that even some civilians snuck onto the post to attend it, rather than the ones downtown. It had more open and honest dialogue.

At one time a Soldier named Gaxiola told the General he was running a political prison - Fort Carson's Stockade. Rogers asked "Why don't you work with us to improve things rather than fight us?" Gaxiola said "What can I do. I am only a BAR man." Rogers answered "You can become a counselor in my stockade" Which he was duly appointed. It was later when the wisdom of that move paid off.

I recognized that the most fundamental innovation Roger's had made was to separate open and free DIALOG - including strong criticism -  between soldiers and the chain of command right up the Commanding General from expectations of obedient soldierly BEHAVIOR on post and when in ranks on duty.

One Radical move we made was to permit Black soldiers to put on Black Guerilla Theater on Post. And the General commanded all the battalion commanders to attend at least one show.

The rules there were simple. Soldiers could say anything they wanted as actors on the stage. But would be expected to salute - maintain military courtesy - when outside the Little Theater.

We were as concerned about 'educating' our key commanders about racial attitudes as expressed by soldiers - free to do so - as we were in how they dealt with such volitile matters.

I also realized that General Rogers and I knew - from our broad education - more about the value of Aristotle's views of the societal value of theatrical 'katharsis' than the black soldiers did. Critcism in a socially approved forum - theater - can be more effective in making profound points than street protests or law suits.

Even more socially extreme, a few younger activist Catholic Chaplains got together and put on the only legally approved - outside of New York - performances of 'Jesus Christ, Superstar' on our military post. Of course that musical tried to synthasize the '60's culture with traditional Christianity. The little old Post Theater became a place of reform.

About that time, I had begun, to read papers and acadmic books which dealt with the profound societel changes taking place in American society and their probable future course. It was another way we were beginning to understand the changing nature of American soldiers which we had to motivate and command in time of war.

It is not too much to say my Field Manuals for the future Army - running Fort Carson - were Future Shock, Neither Marx Nor Jesus, the Medium is the Message, the Greening of America, and Megatrends.

I later realized we, at Fort Carson, in the Army, were already way ahead of the civilian population of Colorado Springs in understanding changes that were taking place in soldiers.

I found such readings very useful after I retired, when began to act to change a whole depressed and blighted neighborhood of the City of Colorado Springs.

Of course the big question always asked by those not involved was "But will the hippie Volunteer Soldiers Fight"

I think their behavior in Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan since the 60's proves they have and will.

All these radical changes were taking place and affecting the attitudes, not only of the lowest rank soldiers on post, and the skeptical traditional NCOs and Officers  but also was leaking out across the city of Colorado Springs into the civilian community at large. But to that point - 1970 - it had been essentially a 'local' and inside-the-Army and Colorado Springs story.

That held until a New York Times reporter who was in Denver covering a financial story heard about radical changes taking place at Fort Carson. He contacted the post, and LTC George Barante the Public Information Officer responded to his call. In short order Barante filled him in on the radical changes taking place, providing him a copy of the fifty-seven changes already made. The reporter broke the story in a long piece about the 'New Army' starting up at Carson.

Every major newspaper in the country, and the news services picked up on the story.  Network television news organizations -  NBC, CBS, ABC - rushed to Fort Carson to tape visible evidence of the 'changes', interviewing soldiers, NCOs, officers and 'experts' about the Army. Foreign news sources - and their defense departments who had to deal with 60's revolution youth - picked up on it. Commentators - some of them long time 'military affairs' columnists  - rendered opinions about the 'new Army' before they had even a chance to visit the post.  Suddenly Fort Carson was big national news.

Since the controversies, protests, - over the Vietnam War - mixed in with changing Administrative policies and Congressional debates about the future military were already news, Fort Carson with real soldiers coming from and going to Vietnam with what many considered a 'radical' lifestyle while at the Fort became the focus of much sociological and military reporting. And endless jokes and cartoons about the 'hippies' in uniform.

 Public Incidents

Several noteworthy events happened as Fort Carson came into the Limelight.

Fort Carson staged the first Rock Concert ever at Fort Carson, and probably the first on any Army Post.

Then Jane Fonda, the controversial actress who opposed the war and had permitted herself to be photographed sitting in a North Korean Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery weapon seat while shot down American pilots were still Prisoners of War in Hanoi - an act that forever after earned her the scorn of all but a tiny minority of US Military personnel - came to Fort Carson. She was with a rag tag group of civilians from the area - some undoubtedly ex-soldiers.

Instead of stopping her at the gate - as other Posts would have done - she was graciously invited into General Rogers office to meet with him. She claimed his Stockade was a 'Political Prison'. He said he didn't think so. Would she like to visit it and talk to any prisoners? She never had been close to, much less inside, such a place before. But she said yes and visited the barbed wire Fort Carson Stockade - not yet a permanent-construction military jail. It was all wooden barracks and barbed wire.

She talked to any prisoner she wanted, and was not so sure they were just there for political reasons. (Most were for there for simple military crimes reasons.)

General Rogers also invited her to come back with her Anti-War group and he would give her the stage in the Main Post theater, let any soldiers who wanted to, hear her.

She came out to the barbed wire - other side of which was her scruffy friends and announced that "General Rogers was the nicest general she had ever met" 

She couldn't handle the openess and candor, and never came back again.

One of the other 'Open Dialogue' policies Gen Rogers implemented was to invite to Fort Carson, and give them the stage in the large Post Theater whomever more than a handful of enough soldiers wanted to hear - key national and controversial figures. Not only Labor movement leader 'Corky Gonzalas' and Ralph Nader, but also - from the right "William J Buckley" (for there were also soldiers with quite conservative political views on the post). And even local, new Colorado Springs Symphony Conductor Charles Ansbacher spoke on the stage to an appreciative enlisted audience. He was frankly stunned at the 'cultural' level that existed on post. Like others with no contact with the US Military since WWII, he only had a wooden view of soldiers of the US Army.

Racial Bloodbath Averted

Then a potentially major incident happened, the details of which were classified for several years. The local press never covered it. Its outcome proved that there had been real progress made in  'trust' of key members of the Fort Carson Chain of Command by black soldiers. 'Mediators' between militant blacks and whites some of which had run 'community' programs in volitile cities sprung up. One was white Specialist 5th Class Rosendahl, who had the ear of the General and even a small office with a telephone in the headquarters. In civilian life he had a degree in sociology. His job was circulate around the Post, to listen, talk to soldiers, report, and sometimes arbitrate racial  'attitudes.' 

He was so successful, with national publicity of his role, no less than John D  Rockefeller III visited Fort Carson in April of 1971 and ended up hiring Sp5 Rosendahl as he left the Army, to help him serve as a 'troubleshooter' in his youth-oriented Charities working out of Rockefeller Plaza in New York. For just as the Army was having difficulty dealing with - or even 'communicating' with 1960's youth, so was Rockefeller's Philanthropic organizations having trouble getting the 'trust' of troubled, and black youth. The Army was teaching civilian institutions how to handle them!  

This major racial incident started off post when there was an ugly incident when a white soldier moonlighting as a gas station attendant was confronted by a group of blacks who entered his station - he thought to rob him - so he pulled out a gun and shot one of them. Since the blacks had been working for the black Lieutenant Governor of Colorado and were driving a State Car, the news went national.

About a week later, I was asleep at about 2AM, when my bedside phone rang. It was a black 'brotherhood' soldier - Hilson Edwards - who had been attending the Racial Harmony Council meetings and was beginning to know he could 'talk' to senior white officers, including me.

He opened with - and I never forgot it - "We - have a problem."  

He went on that a carload of Black Panthers had snuck onto the post from the southern, less manned, entrance to Carson in a car which had loaded rifles in the trunk. They had pulled up at one end of a long slightly curved street called 'the banana' that went through the troop barracks area AND was next to the Enlisted Service Clubs - which were permitted to sell beer on post and stay open until 2AM. A large collection of black soldiers were milling around in the center of the street, blocking the little vehicle traffic at that time of night. The Military Police had been called and a section of them, armed with .45 caliber pistols under the command of an MP lieutenant was in a v formation at the other end, trying to clear the roadway of mostly black soldiers - many of who were intoxicated.     

Pvt Edwards said the 'brothers' wanted the MPs to fire the first shot and then they would pass out the rifles and turn it into a deadly  riot.

It was a set up.

I immediately called the Provost Marshal and ordered him to stop the MPs from trying to clear the road and hold fast. Only fire if they were assaulted.

Then I called white General Dewitt Smith the Assistant Division Commander, who quickly drove down to the Brigade Area, and with black soldier Hilson Edwards at his side walked slowly through the crowd, which gave way and slowly dispersed without incident. The Brigade Commander of the area was brand new and had hardly learned how we handle racial problems. He was not called until later.

Edwards went around to the rear of the crowd and saw the Panthers, their effort at inciting 'guerilla street action' frustrated (I knew by then most of the tactics of insurgents and by ordering the MPs to stop, their plans went awry) pack up and get back off post the way they came in.

No shots were fired. Even though the city newspaper criticized - from one MPs' complaint that they were not permitted to 'do their job.' Of course the MPs had no clue what the Black Panthers had planned.  We did not answer that complaint.

And the next day was payday. Drugs were coming into Colorado Springs. So Edwards with SP5 Rosendahl set up a kind of telephone command post in his office, close to my Chief of Staff's office, while a handful of black soldiers downtown listened to the rumors, and called Edwards from payphones, that the Panthers were in the downtown and were going to go into Fanny Mae Duncan's "Cotton Club" - where blacks hung out and try to start things that could end in violence.

At the critical moment I called the Chief of Police in Colorado Springs and said "The Black Panthers are coming in the back door of the Cotton Club. You better go in the front door."

The Chief, utterly unaware of what was going on (and had no black policemen on the force), did that, the Panthers backed out, left town, and never came back. Twice we defeated that violent group in their attempts to create a big incident.

One or two bloodbaths were averted - largely because of the trust that had been built up between key black soldiers and key officer in top of the white chain of command. The observant blacks - like Edwards - realized that the only people on Post who would be hurt, would be their fellow black soldiers. So in the end they trusted us more than the Black Panthers - to 'take care of the soldiers.'

This incident on post was classified for a time. But its reports got all the way to the Secretary of the Army, who, in a meeting with the Secretary of the Air Force was asked whether he could send some 'Fort Carson' officers to Travis Air Force Base in California, where the Air Force was having 'black political problems' in its jail. Irony. The Army helping out the Air Force over their racial problems.

When General Smith asked Hilson Edwards why he, the general, was not verbally or physically abused when he walked through that crowd of black soldiers, Edwards answered "You were with me."

Interestingly, these kinds of experiences, the high-level (for soldiers) dealing with senior white officers, and the various crises that were met with a degree of cooperation between blacks and whites, became memorable events in the lives of many of those soldiers.

One example was that Hilson Edwards, who had musical talent, after he left the Army and led a successful black band in New York, actually came back to visit Fort Carson with some black band members, asked to see me, and with tears in his eyes told them all the things good that happened at Fort Carson when he was there having me confirm it. And some members of the Enlisted Council learned how things work so well, that a number of them went back to small towns and ran for mayor, and councilmen. They became involved.

That did not mean everything went smoothly.

On one occasion, the big bull Provost Marshal Colonel of Fort Carson came into my office and pounded on the desk, that a 'Specialist Hare' had been stopping his Patrol Jeeps and upbraiding them for  their littering from the jeep. From the experience of the Council of which he was Chairman at one time, Hare had learned 'responsibility' and was taking it when he saw that other soldiers were not as self- disciplined as he had become. He was reinventing what NCO do in the Army. When soldier of junior officer 'suggestions' were made to the Chain of Command - right up to General Rogers - and they were acted upon, the next lesson was learned - with authority, comes 'responsibility'.When Junior rank enlisted men and junior officer's 'ideas' were implemented they began to act more responsibly themselves - helping the entire command improve. Self discipline and not just outward conformity.

Then there was an Hispanic officer who left the service, and went to work in one of the Post administrative offices as a civilian employee where my own brother in law, Ernie McCoy had worked for years. When the time came to promote one, McCoy was promoted on the merits by the Post Civilian work force top administrator and not the Hispanic man. He later ranted and raged that I had promoted the white relative, though I had nothing to do with it. And he tried to poison Hispanics in Colorado Springs against me after I retired. (I never let Ernie know that)

Popular Endorsement

One other noteworthy incident came when the great World War II cartoonist, Bill Mauldin came to Carson to see the changes. He too visited the Fort Carson Stockade. When he got to the soldier PFC Gaxiola whom General Rogers offered - in the Fort Carson Coffee House - to be a 'counsellor in his stockade' - Gaxiola told Mauldin that the big reason many soldiers were in the stockade is that they had no education. That what is needed by him to help educate them is an Encyclopaedia Britannica.

So Mauldin called his Publisher in Chicago and said "I want you to send an Encyclopaedia Brittanica to the Fort Carson Stockade. If you won't pay for it, I will."

It was delivered.

Then Mauldin drew a classic cartoon that made Life Magazine Cover, with his iconic, typical WWII grunt soldiers 'Willy and Joe" figures musing over the 'changes they saw. But also made a series of very laudatory remarks about the changes - saying we were 'bridging the generation gap, way ahead of the rest of the country.'

The Publicity for Fort Carson started shifting from outright skepticism by professionals, pundits, and other parts of the Army, through recognition Fort Carson was 'keeping up' with the times and youthful American culture, to rate praise, such as from Bill Mauldin.

While the Army at Fort Carson was solving the problems of dealing with disaffected hippie and racial minority soldiers - the get the Army working the way in needs to, we were pioneering ways that civilian society could learn from.

Colorado Springs PD started recuiting black police officers from some of the discharged black soldiers.

Another Change of Command

By late summer 1970 the Achievements by General Rogers at Fort Carson in turning around the morale of the troops, reductions in on and off post criminal and racial incidents, and some progress toward getting better soldiers to reenlist, got the attention of Congress as well as high civilian officials. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited and assured Rogers of $5 million to carry out more of his ideas. Several Congressmen visited Carson, as did President Nixon. (For Carson could be the proof an all-Volunteer Army could work and the Draft stopped) But if young American volunteered to serve - as much for its care and 'benefits' as anything - would they also be willing to fight in a war?  A big, yet unanswered - question.  

Changes would cost money and changes in some laws, so the Army needed a better Pentagon spokesman for those changes. They decided to reassign Major General Rogers to head up the office of Army Congressional Liason in Washington.

Before he left he asked whether I wanted to come with him - change my orders from being Chief of Staff to the Pentagon again.  Having had my family in a stable place for only two years, with young David already, as a Day Student (which we could afford) enrolled in excellent Fountain Valley Prep school heading for college instead of being a boarding student (which we could not afford), I had to think overnight about it.

I knew that Gen Rogers was headed for the Army top. And I knew he would insure that I was made at least a Brigadier General, without me however, ever having commanded a Brigade as a full colonel. Perhaps a Major General. I was right about his going to the top - he soon became Chief of Staff of the Army and even later the NATO Supreme Commander, with Four Stars. He would have taken me along as part of 'his team.'

But I also knew I would be too old to command a  Division in Europe by the time of the next war - 20 years as I calculated. I would then be over 62. I wanted to have a chance to command, at least a Mech Infantry Brigade of 3,000 under the 'New Army' policies and to see if I could get  'volunteers' ready (and willing) to fight. I had ideas of how to do that - as an extension of my better understanding of what could motivate this new generation, to become superior combat soldiers.  So I turned down that golden opportunity. Without regrets. He, and General Dewitt Smith, who also soon left to head up the Army's Public Information Staff, made it up to me some 30 years later, when I was nominated for a high West Point award.

So Rogers was replaced by ambitious Major General John C  Bennett as commander of Carson and its Division. Who, on the surface of his background - West Point Class of 1945, 82d Airborne, would be able to continue the soldier-centered efforts Rogers had started.

5th Mech to 4th Mech 

Just as General Bennett assumed command, the long expected change happened - the 5th Mech was deactivated, while the Colors of the 4th Infantry Division which had been returned from Vietnam as its last soldiers were sent back to the US, were handed to the Fort Carson the old 5th Mech-  became - for the first time - the 4th Infantry Mechnanized Division. Few men were moved.

We just took off our Red Diamond patches and put on the Ivy Leaf Patch. Only our unit history and highway signs would have to change.

Now Fort Carson became the home to a Combat Division whose proud heritage - as a straight Infantry  boots on the ground - Division going back to WWI and landing on Utah Beach at Normandy, was now a Mechanized Infantry Division in which every soldier rode to battle in small armored vehicles. Not tanks, not trucks.

I began to notice that Fort Carson had already started to become - which it never had been before - a 'desirable' assignment for up and coming mid grade - Lt Col to General - Army officers.  The mediocre  'Camp Carson' (for 30 years) had, as "Fort" Carson started to arrive as a 1st Rate Army base. Before the 1990s three more Army 'Chiefs of Staff' will have had passed through there as Mech battalion or brigade commaders. Even Colin Powell became an assistant Division Commander before going on to his fame as the most senior black officer in the Department of Defense as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    VOLAR Comes to Carson

The Nixon Administration, trying to deal with both the political fallout from the war, great national distaste for the draft - which made up the bulk of the 54,000 soldiers killed in Vietnam - wanted solutions to achieving a volunteer Army. So it created a formal program - VOLAR - Army lingo for Volunteer Army which would be the template for the entire Army. And spread to the other services.

That motivated the VOLAR Army Staff section in the Pentagon to contact me, as Chief of Staff at Carson where the innovations started, and wring out of me as many proven, and large, 'recommendations' to help attract and retain as many good soldiers as possible.

My own recommendations centered on two unfilled requirements. First, as even the Rifle Squad Infantry was getting higher tech and complicated, continuing Education beyond high-school or GED testing, expecially among NCOs, needed to be backed and seriously funded by Congress.

I had done my part when I learned that a community college had no permanent campus in El Paso County. So I backed the Army selling a slice of land near I-25 to the college where it was close to the catonement area and the Security-Widefield and Fountain towns where most NCO families lived. And it and was not suitable for training. It is now called Pikes Peak Community College and serves a large number of soldier, NCO, and officers as full college benefits began to be implemented Army wide.

Then also, observing how the newer generation was getting married younger and living with girls and marrying more - that the Army must 'support the family' - legal military Dependents - and not just the soldier - housing, child care, medical and all the 'family' needs even when the soldier was off to war. That too had to become part and parcel of the new Volunteer Army.

So much 'VOLAR' was spread across the Army, world wide - often resisted by commanders, even though it was a Policy - that it became a cliche'  Exactly how it was supposed to work was a puzzle to some.

So I was requested to fly to Germany, and at least 'educate' the leaders of  the III Corps, in how VOLAR  worked. The Army in Germany suffered from some of the same problems, including drugs, which US units did. So I did this 'education' of officers between the time I left the Chief of Staff's position, and took as Brigade Command.

The 3d Armored Division took to the VOLAR  recommendations like a duck to water - because their top commander could see its need, and value, better than most other generals there then. They honored me as seen below.

Civic Action

Now there were many opportunities for Fort Carson's soldiers and units to 'help out' in the civilian communities of Colorado. One of the Ethics of the new generation was to be helpful, to help solve societal problems.

Beyond perfectly acceptable 'invididual' volunteering, sometime we were approached by communities or organizations to bring real resources to needed tasks. So long as we cleared with any Unions who did similar work, and we could justify the expenditure of men and materials as actual 'training' we responded.

One developed into a formal program called MAST. Fort Carson had Helicopters - Hueys and Chinooks. Rescue of injured mountain climbers in the Colorado Rockies was a natural task - with superb training or pilots, crews, and medical personnel. MAST became popular and actually spawned, with all the Vietnam returning helicopter pilots the growth in Colorado of Hospital based private 'Flight-for-Life' technology.

Another one was from the fact that some units, such as the 52d Engineer Battalion is a constuction unit - and unless it just builds bridges and takes them down again, they cannot get good practical training. So the first 'Domestic Action' project was their building an overpass high over Pikes Peak Avenue at the Deaf and Blind School. It is still there.

And a big one that got a big story in the September 19th, 1971 Washington Post together with an extended interview of Secretary of the Army Froehlke was the 'Civic Actions' taken in dirt poor (Hispanic side), and just very low income (white side) of Center, eColorado, in the San Luis Valley of Colorado. An Hispanic Fort Carson Lieutenant Juan Gomez who not only grew up there, suffered much discrimination in that town, had some medical training and hated the Army, suggested that Fort Carson see whether it could justify completing a little Medical Clinic in town there, that would help his people as well as the rest of the townsfolk.

Before the 'Center Project' was done, not only did Fort Carson soldiers rebuild the old Jail, complete the Clinic, but also built rebuilt the sewer and water pipe system in the poorest, Hispanic, part of town. Carson provided tools and manpower, but no money for materials. The town had to provide that.

Two things were interesting about this project. First of all when the town was asked what it needed, only representatives from the white side of town - which include all the town officials, came to the first meeting. We said the WHOLE town must have a say. So Hispanics were invited and came too. In the end decisions represented the whole town.

Then 23 years later, in 1994 after I retired and was doing advanced technical pioneering wireless for the National Science Foundation - I had occassion to extend a wireless internet link from Alamosa to Center to permit the school to get Internet connectivity it did not have yet, nor could afford to extend 20 miles by wireline. A 'Juan Gomez' wanted to see me at the school. He was that same Lieutenant, now in business, and wanted to thank me profusely for not only what Fort Carson did then, but by my insisting that the Hispanics be also 'at the table' - that started a social revolution in and around Center. Hispanics got elected to the School Board, and the town began to integrate in ways it never had before. The evenhanded Army became the catalyst for social change in a racially divided town.

Congressional Hearing With a Sergeant

By late 1971 Congress got interested enough with the 'Fort Carson Changes,  that they started hearings. One of the first ones, before a Senate Subcommittee featured lowly Sgt David Gyongyos, who made both a prepared statement and answered all the questions put to him. He had been a Sp4 on General Rogers Enlisted Man's Council, and had been at Carson through the changes for 18 months. It stunned some people that such a low rank enlisted man from Fort Carson testified before Congress about Volar, and thei Senators listened.

Click here for Testimony (PDF file)

Testimonials like that gave the Congress the backbone to make the historic changes to the legal basis of the Army - the Draft.

The Enlisted Wives Council

Both as Chief of the large Fort Carson Staff - most of whose military members had wives - and later when I commanded a Brigade - I took a chapter from General Rogers creation of an Enlisted 'Man's' Council - and having heard the soldiers ask questions and make recommendations on behalf of their wives - I created a Staff wide 'Enlisted Wives Council'. I, my wife, the Command Sergeant Major and his wife' met several times with women 'elected' by their peers. And listened to their complaints and suggestions. And acted on many of their suggestions. That worked as well as its counterpart for men.  

I knew that good married soldiers and NCOs could be greatly influenced whether or not to join the Army, and then reenlist based on their own knowledge and experience of 'Army Life" 

Issues of the Hospital, Schools, Commissary, Post Exchange, Housing - were discussed and we were able to take action to improve their Army family life and even, when they were employed as Civilians in the Headquarters for a second family income, improve conditions in their office lives.

Taking a Brigade

Soon after my trip to Europe, I was given the command of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry "Chiefs" Division, Mechanized. And left the Headquarters of Fort Carson. The previous commander, Col M C Ross had just been promoted to Brigadier General, and had to move on to another assignment.

I had two Mech Infantry Battalion, two Armor (Tank) Battalions - 4,000 men.

I dove in.

I took command in November, 1971

From Staff Officer to Commander

My predessor, Col Ross had done a good job implementing General Roger's 'Volar' changes in the 4000 officer and man Brigade. And General Bennett seemed ready to continue them, Division and Post wide. I didn't feel like I had to contribute new innovations in the 'life of the soldier' side.

But for several reasons I was ready to really tackle the 'Mechanized Combat Training' side.

First of all, almost none of the soldiers, NCOs, or officers who had served during the Vietnam War and were assigned to Fort Carson later had ever been near M113 tracked vehicles - which was for Mech Infantry the same as Huey Helicopters were in Vietnam - the way to get small units to the immediate battlefield. Yet, with our Division Mission to get ready to fly to Germany and then fight a Mechanized war with Mech Infantry vehicles, my soldiers and leaders did not know enough about them or how best to fight from them.

Secondly my 'Infantry' officers had never gone through any specialized 'Mech Infantry' training. Mech Infantry did not have a 'Branch Home.' Artillery officers went through Fort Sill, Armor officers went through Fort Knox, Airborne officers went through Fort Bragg, and Infantry officers went through Fort Benning. And even the Air Mobile officers were going to find a home at Fort Hood. Mech Infantry was an Orphan.

It occurred to me the 'new' Fort Carson for a 'new' Volunteer Army could become the Home of the Mech Infantry.

Thirdly, I had observed that soldiers, some having built up savings in Vietnam, came to Carson, and then, off-post, bought motorcycles or jalopies, hopped them up on weekends to explore Colorado. But they hated to be marched to the Motor Pool to do vehicle maintenance by the numbers.

I had to make training 'interesting' for a risk taking, free wheeling, outdoor liking, generation. It was called, under VOLAR 'Adventure Training'

But I had to adapt it to Mechanized Infantry.

I pondered the question, what was the essential battlefield function of Mech Infantry? As a western American native, who grew up with horses, I realized there had been a precedent, as late as the Civil War. The Dragoons! Men who rode to battle on horses but fought on foot. Not Cavalry which had become Armor - tankers who fought FROM their tanks.  Not Infantry, but a hybrid - which Mech Infantry was.

And since we were at Fort (Colonel Kit) Carson - western frontiersman, were were horsemen of a type. We were IRON Horsemen. And thus I gave birth to - and General Bennet endorsed, the name of the 4th Mech as the "Iron Horse Division"  Which still exists.

And just in the early days when the horse mounted Cavalrymen trained before wars, they rode to the hounds, had riding competitions, and had their own form of "Adventure Training" through which hard battlefield skills were mastered.

Since the M113s were designed to cross country, climb slopes, even swim lakes and rivers - all while protecting the Infantrymen inside from small arms and shell fragments right up to the point they had to discharge the armed soldier squad which then assaulted on foot - supported sometime from the .50 caliber machine gun mounted on top the track.

Now at Carson at Turkey Creek Ranch we had a "Recondo" training area. Where some men were trained in lonely Reconnaisance missions as difficult and dangerous that 'Rangers' went through. Training with Pride of Individual accomplishment.

Combining Mech and derrying Do Recondo, out came the name of the Adventure Training program that would challenge all.   

The name, the program, the brand 'Mechando' was born.

Mechando Training would start at the individual soldier level. Aimed at mastery by every soldier and officer in handling that M113 tracked vehicle on the battlefield. Detroit had done a marvelous job producing such a machine that was easy to drive - it did not require specialized training as pilots do. It just had an accelerator pedal and two laterals. Pull on the right one, the track would turn to the right, on the left it would turn left, press on the gas pedal and it would lurch forward up to 40 miles per hour. Pull on both laterals to brake.

But how steep a hill could it climb? How wide a trench could it span? How good are the brakes - pulling back both laterals - going downhill? What water can it cross? Yeah, the driver and track commander could close their hatches and see through their thick gladd periscopes, but what was the armor protection good for?

You have to test it, and your, limits by trying it.

And the other key point was that unless the officer or NCO sitting in the commanders seat looking ahead, either with the hatch open or closed - through the glass periscope, and acting as the track commander - knows EXACTLY what that track is capable of, he is in no position to order, under stress of combat and terrain, the Driver what to do. In an aircraft the 'commander' is the pilot. But in a tracked vehicle, the man in the commanders seat is in charge - and the driver must go where the commander commands.

I did not want to have M113s of my Brigade coming up on the banks of the River Elbe in Germany against the Russian defenses on the other side, and the Driver balking at entering the water to cross because he is 'unsure' of the angle he can enter the water at, or is scared. That's what NCOs are for. And they must know all their 'tools' better than those lower in rank and with less experience.

The Mechando Gauntlet

So relying on NCO's who had served in Europe in Mechanized units to help, we designed a course - the Gaunlet - that every soldier must drive over, with the steepest slope the track could climb, and go downhill still under control, the widest ditch it could cross. And a small lake it could swim. But how steep a slope could it go into, or out of the water? We had to experiment - and I drove myself with an experienced M113 NCO in the commander's hatch, linked to me by the Intercom.

And because an M113 was armored, it could take fire - up to a point.  So one portion of the course was set up so the buttoned up track, the soldier-driver looking through the closed-hatch periscope would drive while live small arms fire was hitting the track from the front and side. I had them use frangible .30 caliber ammunition which could not penetrate but would strike and fragment noisely so the soldier would get the experience of being 'under fire' while driving across the battlefield. And knew that if he opened the hatch he might be a dead man.

There was great excitement in the Brigade when soldiers, NCO's, and officers on my staff knew that 'the old man' (me) was testing and designing that Gaunlet course myself. So much so when we got to firing at the track while it was going through, I had to invite about 8 of them - including the Brigade Chaplain who begged to go too - to get inside, button up, while I drove the course while it was being fired at. And to make it even more realistic, I had a firing team, fire a dummy warhead on a 3.5 inch rocket launcher right at my track from 100 yards dead ahead. For I wanted to know whether I could yank a lateral just as I saw that rocket backblast flash and cause it to miss or hit at an angle and not cleanly penetrate.

Needless to say, that was exiting for them. And as the story went through the ranks what we had just done, my point was made that I was serious about my soldiers training realistically and aggressively with their M113 APC's as a 'weapon.' For I had noted when I commanded the 5th Mech Battalion a year earlier, that many officers and NCOs handled their M113s 'gingerly' - as if they were a nice car - and not aggressively - as combat demands. And I knew that my reputation as a combat commander was going up, as they realized I would face the same fire they did when the time came.

General Bennett was game to require every 4th Mech Division soldier and officer to drive through the Mechando course. Below is a picture of him in the drivers hatch of an M113, ready to put on his helmet, lower his seat, close the hatch and drive over the Course, while an NCO acts as the track commander.

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The only ones who were pained by my charging around the Fort Carson Hills in an M113, were the maintanance crews who had to repair any damages. Expecially when we 'rolled' a few tracks when they tilted too far on side hills - misjudging their tipping point.

When the Testing and Trial Runs were done, we had the first part of the Gauntlet done. We christened it the "Fire Run"  

Two more to go.

Finally we laid out the Night Run. Units in the battlefield would often have to follow each other, single file at night, blacked out with only their blackout lights on, and seeing those of the track in front of them - through the dust it might raise.

We did that through woods, while experienced NCOs would drive the track in front at a very brisk speed through and around the trees, while the soldier being trained, followed.

The Reward

When the soldier, or NCO, or Officer being 'qualified' successfully finished the Gauntlet's Fire Run, Water Run, Night Run, I thought he needed some kind of visible award.

First he was pronounced a true MECHANEER  And was awarded a Mechaneers Certificate, signed by me.

And THEN, both to give him a visible emblem of his success, that was - like a Ranger Shoulder Tab, Pilot Wings, or Parachute Badge - he was given a real Gauntlet - the standard GI black glove, BUT with a flared (ala the Dragoons of the Civil War) cuff stitched on it, AND his First and Last name Stamped on that cuff by a steel die.

And of course the glove with cuff was a perfectly useful item to wear when around, driving, or working on his M113 Track.

And whenever Unit training of the Brigade involved working with the Tracks, men would wear their gloves.

But that was not the end of Mechneer Training. For at the Unit level, when sections, squads, platoons, Mech Infantry Companies moved with Tanks from my two Armor Battalions, and supporting Self Propelled Artillery Batteries they often had to go long distances over roads.

Officer and NCO leaders of such columns had to learn a lot of other characteristics of the M113 to be able to solve many practical problems. For instance I observed whenever a column of tracks were on the road, sometimes one would break down. But as often as not, if it were not possible to 'go around it' lieutentant would immediately call for a Tank Retriever! Which would take forever, from far back, to get there and move the dead heavy track.

But what was the dead weight of an M113? And could many men move it? So I got the men, starting on flat paved, surfaces, to see how many men it took to move it off the road. For the 'flotation' of tracked vehicles would permit that. We had, instead of 'Tug a War' for exercise 'Tug a Track' - so that lieutenant might first tell the 12 man squad in either his, or another track to 'push it off the road.'

And to teach forms of 'infiltration' to or through a spread out enemy I had a tank battalion spread widely as a typical 'screening force' down range at night, while individual M113s with their motors as LOW as they could go, 'sneak' through the lines.

In other words I got the Mech Infantry units of the Brigade to eat, drink, think, and play with those tracks. Adventure training - but right to the point of combat capabilites of the Brigade.

To underscore it, I personally drove the small M114 'scout' track home and parked it behind my quarters, then drove it to 'work' the next morning.  They got the point

Community Relations

With all that training, and on-post soldier activites with families and girl friends, we still have annual community obligations.

For example there is annually a big Rodeo in Colorado Springs. It is preceeded by a downtown Street Breakfast where cooks from Fort Carson do the cooking. We were tasked for some Brigade cooks.

Then there is a two to three day Range Ride by a group who invites key people in the city to ride with them. I was asked this year to host them riding around our large downrange training grounds. I also, of course, rode with them. Here is a picture of the feed we gave them at Turkey Creek ranch which is on the Post.

Quite apart from the public, popular press, and distant military commanders, the question was whether or not the Military Chain of Command from the troop level at Fort Carson, through its Commanding General, 5th Army Commander (Lt General Mock), Chief of Staff of the Army,  the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of Defense, and the President as Commander in Chief would endorse all the changes so swiftly made.

Retired General Bruce Clarke, with 40 years service, who had commanded 7th Army in Germany with all it tank and tracked forces arrayed against the Soviet threat and was sent by General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff to judge Carson's changes, heartily endorsed them, right down to permitting Company Commanders to train individual soldier skills in the Division.

Two final visitors to Fort Carson seemed to so endorse both the VOLAR - Volunteer Army pointed, and the form of Adventure Training I had implemented with Mechando - directly addressing the combat unit skills of those volunteers.

The first was the Secretary of the Army, James Froehlke who, on September 15th, 1972 visited and as quoted "minced no words as a news conference the day before when he strongly supported the use of civilian KPs, the Unit of Choice program, and the Army's goal of an all Volunteer force by July 1973."

Secretary of the Army, viewing Mechando. My at far right

The Unit of Choice Program was aimed at American Communities where a number of young men could volunteer for the Army but ALSO elect to all serve together in the same Army unit. We had launched that program when I was involved in going to Rheinlander, Wisconsin, where recruting efforts were made to get as many volunteers as possible and let them go to serve in a unit at Fort Carson after they went through normal Basic Training. It worked, and 70 soldiers signed up, called themselves the 'Hodag Platoon' after a mythical logger of the Wisconsin Woods.

And he drove an M113 of my 3d Brigade, strongly endorsing such training.

The second visitor gave me great Joy. For I would show him a new thing or two about tracked vehicles in war. He was Brigadier George Patton Jr - son of the great WWII Armor leader, George Patton. Jr was high up in the Army's Trainng and Operations staff in the Pentagon.

What was great fun, was that I got him into the open hatch with me on an M113 as a sergeant drove the track out to the Gauntlet training area. Behind us was another M113 full of Colorado Springs Press people wanting to interview the son of the famed commander.

Now there was a radio connection between the two tracks, so the Press could as him questions over the radio as we travelled out there, and he could answer. But there was also an Intercom between the driver and me in the open hatch. So whatever was said on it was only heard by the driver.

We drove up to and approached a VERY steep hill, and stopped. I - a straight leg INFANTRY - not Armored Corps as Patton was - Officer - took the driver's seat, and Patton and I put on our earphones.

He was bemused that me, an Infantryman was going to drive that track up that STEEP hill (which a 60 ton tank could not have traversed as well as that Mech Infantry M113)

And while he was smiling back at the Press and chatting with them over the radio, he was hollaring at me over the intercom, with words "Hughes, if you roll this track I'll break every bone in your body" (he was recovering from a broken ankle). I drove on.

He was SCARED!

So we eventually came down again and the 'demontration' of the now-famed Gauntlet was over.

Here is a picture of me driving the M113, Patton and some of the Press in the Hatch as we drove back to Carson

So I had the delight as a Infantryman, scaring the pants off the great George Pattom Jr in a tracked vehicle!

He pronounced the Gauntlet as 'good training.' I gave him a pair of Mechaneer Gauntlets. He got the point.

The Iron Horse 100

Now that training for all the soldiers was proceeding apace, it was time to be sure the Commanders could effectively command a Mech Battalion or larger. There was an M577 Command Post vehicle - modified on the chassis of an M113 - with a high armored box on top within which a Commander or Staff head could operate with multiple radios, map displays, two or three other assistants, keep up with the M113 with their 12 man squads and command the unit from the 'Command Post vehicle

Below - me and my HQ Crew before the Iron Horse 100 before a M577

'Commanding' or operating as a Principal Staff officer - S-3 (operations) S-2 (intelligence), S-1 (personnel), S-4 (supply), and even S-5 (civil affairs) with their assistants, data, and with communications to all the units and the commanders, while on the move would take skill. So we created the Iron Horse 100 - a competition between a battalion or brigade commander and his 4 staff heads, each with their own M577s travelling 100 miles day and night over a prescribed route through check points while undertaking a series of requirements -from handling - coding and decoding classifed messages (including the location of the next check point, communicating and receiving orders, navigating through unfamiliar terrain including roadless portions, and not running out of gas and oil, or  breaking down.  And against time. Fastest time wins.  

I started the first one, competing against my own staff heads, one of whom, the S-3 was an armor branch officer who knew tanks and always was kidding about we 'infantrymen' trying to master armored track vehicles. A seperate team from any of us had to design the details of the test so none of us had prior knowledge of what we would have to do or where to go.  And if their track broke down they had to finish all 16 stations anyway, even by jeep or truck.

It took almost 24 hours to complete, starting with a Le Mans - run from the briefing tent to the tracks - to start. And there was intentional not enough gas to get through, so they had to rendevous with a POL tanket r enroute.

It was fun - and difficult - two had to finish in wheeled vehicles.  The armor officer came in 2d to me - who won the contest. It ended right at Fort Carson's hesadquarters where General Bennet greeted the winner - me. So I guess I was a master Mechaneer.

Thus by the time I left the Brigade, Fort Carson had proven to the Army, bottom to top, that it could not only attract Volunteers, and that over 50% of them would reenlist, while making their lives tolerable, even interesting, but also become trained for modern combat- and I judged - would be willing - and able - to fight.

As the rest of the Volunteer Army has proven out the last 38 years ever since the draft ceased in 1973

General Bennett decided to make a big change.

One of his close West Point friends was Alexandar Haig - who was President Nixon's Chief of Staff. In a series of phone calls between Bennett and Haig, it was clear Nixon was 'in trouble.' Bennett thought he could help, to leave Carson and work in the White House. He left Carson so quickly, just promoted Brigadier Vince Gannon became 'intereim' commander of Fort Carson and the 4th Division.

As I heard the story Bennett became a custodian of the infamous Nixon Tapes. All that unravelled soon, Nixon resigned, the White House staff was dispersed, and the last thing Bennett did was retire to Alaska, where he had served before.  He loved that state. He died there from an airplane accident.

The Army scrambled to find a new commander for Fort Carson, and it - I think hastily - appointed new Major General Hamlet, who had been an excellent repeat commander of aviation units in Vietnam. He was a black OCS graduate who learned how to fly. He knew nothing about the Mechanized Army and he was no man to continue the development of Carson or the Division as pioneers in the Volunteer Army. He did not last and was never promoted above Major General. He ended his carreer in the Inspector Generals Office at the Department of the Army.  

Frustrated I decided it was time for me to get out. I had been at Carson 4+ years, had had four different Commanding Generals, through times of great turbulance.

I could have then, after having commanded a Brigade for a year having gotton to know the 'new' generation of soldiers and young officers - and having studied while at Carson leading predictions of the future of this country, I saw other goals I might pursue as a civilian. And those predictions - which in many ways became my 'Field Manuals' for running an Army base in the early 70s were Toffler's "Future Shock", "Neither Marx Nor Jesus", the "Medium is the Message" and Tofflers "Megatrends." Interpretations of change - and we were going through great changes.

When I was offered an opportunity to go back to the Pentagon, I said to the general running the Personnel Office, who knew my record

'Washington had become a great soggy log, floating down the Potomac with a million ants on it, all thinking they are steering that. Been there, done that. Change in this country starts at the bottom, the grass roots and main street America, not at the top. No, I am going to retire before I need to after my 27 years service - including West Point - service for which Congress refuses to credit against retirement, find a neighborhood in my nearby hoo me town of Colorado Springs - and if I can make it work during these times of great change economically, politically, culturally and technologically, it might become a model for many communities."

I changed command of the 3d Brigade to the officer who had followed me there. And General Hamlet awarded me my second Legion of Merit at the ceremony.

My Last Tribute by Soldiers

Soldier-editors of the Fort Carson 'Mountaineer' newspaper wrote this summary of my role at Fort Carson the day of the Change of Command ceremony

Click here to read the PDF file

I was flown to Washington for several weeks in Lt Gen F orsythe's office - who was made a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army working on the Volunteer Army. I was asked  to deliver what I had learned pioneering the Volunteer Army at Carson.

Then I returned to be retired by the Army on the 31st of January, 1973.

To continue with my Military Years click…NEXT, Medals and Citations (1)